Commemorating 30th anniversary of Operation Desert Storm

SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, Ill. –January marks the 30th anniversary of the end of Operation Desert Shield and the launching of Operation Desert Storm to liberate Kuwait. Then as now, the ability of the United States to rapidly deploy and sustain combat forces ensured the viability of U.S. regional military strategy.

During the Cold War, the United States had assured its allies that it would massively reinforce its forward-based forces in Europe and Asia in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union. Mobility was also critical to a new strategy of deterring Soviet aggression in Southwest Asia after the United States lost Iran as an ally and the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan in 1979. The U.S. Department of Defense invested in pre-positioned equipment and fast sealift ships for U.S.-based forces earmarked to intervene if necessary in the Persian Gulf region. The President established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in 1980 and then created a new combatant command, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in 1983 to plan for a contingency in the region. The United States also established U.S. Transportation Command in 1987 to provide global air, land, and sea transportation to meet national security tasks during wartime.

After the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, USCENTCOM began to consider Iraq as a more likely potential threat. At times both the United States and the Soviet Union provided security assistance to Iraq during its war with Iran that started in 1980. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein maintained a large, well-equipped army after the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988. On Aug. 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia. The United States condemned the invasion and, with the consent of Saudi Arabia, announced on Aug. 7 the deployment of forces to the region in Operation Desert Shield.

USTRANSCOM managed the deployment through its service components in two phases. The initial forces deterred further Iraqi aggression. In November additional forces provided the combat capability necessary to defeat Iraqi forces in Kuwait if Saddam Hussein failed to comply with United Nations resolutions.

Strategic mobility was critical to success. Although airlift moved over 500,000 passengers and a greater percentage of cargo than in previous conflicts, sealift delivered more than 95 percent of the tonnage required.

Prepositioned vessels, U.S. Navy’s Fast Sealift Ships, and ships activated from the U.S.-government controlled Ready Reserve Fleet managed by the Maritime Administration moved about 40 percent of the dry cargo and began arriving in theater within a week. Military Sealift Command made extensive use of chartered commercial ships to move the balance of dry cargo as well as petroleum products, using existing worldwide intermodal systems and commercial carriers willing to haul U.S. military cargo.

By the end of the buildup, the United States had employed almost all ships in the world capable of moving heavy equipment. The cargo delivered was greater than the amount moved across the English Channel to support the 1944 D-Day landings and subsequent campaign in Northwest Europe during a comparable seven-month period. Moreover, regional allies provided coalition forces access to airfields and high-capacity ports, and Persian Gulf allies provided refined petroleum products, which reduced the demand on sealift.

Finally, the movement was not contested. Iraq’s decision not to cross the border into Saudi Arabia in August gave the U.S.-led coalition time to build up a credible deterrent and then an offensive force. Fortunately, sea ports of debarkation and ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf did not face the kinds of attacks that had occurred during the Iran-Iraq War.

The U.S.-led coalition launched combat operations on Jan. 17, 1991, in Operation Desert Storm. Air forces struck strategic targets in Iraq and then shifted to another center of gravity, Iraqi forces in Kuwait. After gaining air supremacy, the coalition began a massive intra-theater shift of ground forces, supplies, and equipment to allow a flanking attack against the numerically superior Iraqi forces. The ground war began on Feb. 24, when U.S. and coalition forces crossed into Kuwait and southern Iraq. Over the next 100 hours, Iraqi forces were vanquished and Kuwait liberated. The redeployment began the following month, but a military operation to deny airspace to Saddam’s military forces began the following year and continued until 2003.

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm led to an investment in strategic mobility to underpin U.S. military strategy after the Cold War. The Department of Defense invested in Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off Ships and acquired the C-17 Globemaster to be able to deploy a smaller force based mostly in the United States. In 1992 USTRANSCOM gained additional responsibility to provide land, sea, and air transportation in times of peace as well as war. These events are worth remembering not only to mark the heroism of the assault forces on Jan. 17, 1991, and the massive effort to deploy and sustain them. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm also serve as a reminder of the importance of investment in strategic mobility and readiness at a time of shifting national and military strategy.