

# **UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (USTRANSCOM)**

**SOURCE SELECTION DOCUMENTATION  
HTC711-10-C-S002**

**AIR TERMINAL & GROUND HANDLING SERVICES  
AL MUBARAK AIR BASE KUWAIT**

## **SOURCE SELECTION AUTHORITY DETERMINATION OF CAV INTERNATIONAL PAST PERFORMANCE RATING**

As the Source Selection Authority (SSA) for this acquisition, I have reviewed the Initial Rating Team Worksheet. After my initial review, I have some concern with the Source Selection Evaluation Team's (SSET) confidence assessment rating of High Confidence for CAV International. Therefore, I have conducted an independent review and analysis of CAV's past performance record. Upon conclusion of my review, my confidence assessment differs from that of the SSET.

In determining a confidence assessment rating, the SSET looked at six records of past performance for CAV. Five of these were considered Somewhat Relevant and one was considered Highly Relevant. The effort considered Highly Relevant is the work they are currently performing at Al Mubarak Air Base as the incumbent contractor. The team's assessment states that "as this effort was deemed most relevant to the required effort, it was given greater consideration in determining an overall confidence rating." As a great deal of the team's decision to rate CAV as High Confidence is based on their performance as the incumbent, that is the main focus of my review and is also where my assessment differs.

Although there were no major mishaps or negative performance trends under CAV's five somewhat relevant contracts, CDRs were issued under some of them. For HTC711-07-C-0007, CAV received CDRs for weapons accountability, baggage security, and failure to follow the Foreign Clearance Guide. CAV took appropriate corrective action to prevent reoccurrence. For HTC711-08-C-0004, CAV received a CDR for not properly coordinating an explosive movement. They took appropriate corrective action, retrained personnel, and created a guide. This prevented additional occurrences. Under FA4428-05-C0006, CAV received CDRs for improper inspection of hazardous material. Their corrective actions prevented additional occurrences. These CDRs, however, share a common safety-related thread.

Under their highly relevant contract, the record shows that CAV has been performing essentially the same services as required under this solicitation as the incumbent contractor in Kuwait since 1 Oct 06. The record also shows CAV has been positively recognized for various performance initiatives during the period of this contract. The concern I have is with CAV's record of safety issues since the start of this contract. There were some minor safety issues that resulted in comments in their monthly evaluations. However, I will address the more significant safety concerns.

For the base year of performance CAV received four Contract Discrepancy Reports (CDRs). One of these CDRs addressed five safety mishaps. In an effort to improve safety, CAV appointed safety representatives and stressed safety to their workforce.

During the first option year, sixteen CDRs were issued. Three of these were for safety accidents/incidents and the failure to report them in a timely manner. Additionally, a letter of concern was issued regarding the numerous vehicle incidents during the period 1 Oct 07 through

17 Mar 08. There were 36 mishaps reported, three of which caused major damage to government-furnished equipment and cargo. One of these incidents caused over \$250,000 worth of damage to two mine resistant ambush protected vehicles. CAV responded to the letter with a top down review of their policies, procedures, and training programs. Also during this period, there was an incident that caused serious injury to a loadmaster during vehicle loading operations. By CAV's own admission, this was caused by operator error on the part of the CAV employee who was driving the vehicle.

During the second option year, CAV received seven CDRs. Two of these were for safety related issues for which CAV implemented procedures to prevent occurrence. Additionally, during this period, there was an incident that resulted in the death of a United Airlines representative. Witness statements indicate that, in part, this incident resulted from actions of the CAV employee who was operating the baggage conveyor. The CAV employee lowered the safety rails on the conveyor as he turned to instruct Army personnel who were helping with the baggage detail at the same time the United Airlines representative started to exit the baggage compartment of the aircraft. This inattention resulted in the United representative falling to the ground.

During the third option year, a C-17 aircraft was damaged during loading operations. There were two CAV drivers involved; one driving the truck and the other driving the trailer. CAV also provided load team members who watched for proper clearance. Air Force loadmasters were also involved in the upload. According to witness statements, load team members signaled the driver to stop; however, it is unclear if the signal to stop was given too late or if the driver failed to stop when the signal was given. This resulted in the ramp toes striking the wingbox and, when the vehicle was repositioned, tearing a piece of insulation from the wingbox. CAV has implemented new loading procedures for these vehicles.


For each of the major incidents mentioned above, the SSET concluded they did not reflect a lack of quality control, safety, or knowledge of procedures on the part of CAV, and did not detract from CAV's overall past performance. I do not agree with this assessment, because the incidents do reflect safety-related errors, misjudgments, or inattention on the part of CAV employees sufficient to affect the company's overall past performance confidence rating.

Even though CAV has not completely eliminated safety mishaps, I do believe CAV takes the responsibility of safety seriously and consistently looks at their operation to make improvements and to determine appropriate measures to prevent additional safety incidents. CAV's monthly performance evaluation ratings and annual Contractor Performance Assessment ratings are in the Satisfactory to Very Good range, confirming their ability to perform future requirements.

However, although I do have confidence in CAV's ability to successfully perform the required effort, my level of confidence differs from that of the team based on the above safety issues. Unlike the SSET, I believe these issues cannot be completely discounted. Although CAV was not determined completely accountable for each of the major safety incidents in the current contract, they did have some level of responsibility for each of them. Additionally, and importantly, they have responsibility for overall safety on the airfield.

In conclusion, I believe that each of the safety mishaps was attributable to some degree to the negligence or inattention on the part of CAV or a CAV employee. This is sufficient to support a determination of a Significant Confidence past performance rating, vice High Confidence.

Based on the above, as the SSA, I have determined CAV's past performance rating is Significant Confidence.



JOYCE M. PAVLAK  
Source Selection Authority

17 May 2010

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION—SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AIR TERMINAL AND GROUND HANDLING SERVICES (ATGHS)  
AT  
KUWAIT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT/ABDULLAH AL MUBARAK AIR BASE, KUWAIT  
REQUEST FOR PRPOSAL (RFP) HTC711-09-R-0041

PROPOSAL ANALYSIS REPORT

**1. INTRODUCTION.**

**1.1. Discussion of Requirement**

This requirement is to provide ATGHS at Kuwait International Airport (KWI)/Abdullah Al Mubarak Air Base, Kuwait. ATGHS contracts provide services on behalf of the Air Mobility Command (AMC) in support of the Department of Defense (DOD) Airlift System to include, but not limited to, all US Government owned or operated aircraft, US sponsored foreign Government aircraft, Coalition Forces aircraft, commercial contract airlift, and tendered aircraft. The Contractor acts as an AMC liaison providing services and equipment.

**1.2. Source Selection Procedures**

The Source Selection Evaluation Team (SSET) conducted this source selection in accordance with (IAW) Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 12, the Source Selection Plan (SSP) dated 19 Oct 09, and the Request for Proposal (RFP). RFP HTC711-09-R-0041 was issued on 19 Oct 09. Eight amendments were issued. The solicitation closed and offers were received on 4 Jan 10. Eight offers were received.

**1.3. Evaluation Criteria**

The Source Selection Authority (SSA) approved the basis for contract award, evaluation factors, and scope of evaluation by approving the SSP. We provided the same basis for contract award, evaluation factors, and scope of evaluation to offerors in the RFP. The factors used to perform the evaluation were:

- Factor 1: Past performance
- Factor 2: Staffing plan
- Factor 3: Implementation plan
- Factor 4: Price

Past performance, staffing plan, and implementation plan were of equal importance and, when combined, were significantly more important than price considerations.

A past performance confidence assessment was assigned by the SSET for each offeror as a measure of the Government's confidence in the offeror's ability to successfully perform the requirements of the solicitation based on the offeror's demonstrated present and past performance. Each past performance effort was evaluated on the basis of recency (within the last 5 years) and relevancy. The SSET considered the past performance information submitted by each offeror, as well as any additional past performance information obtained by the Government. In the event adverse data was reflected in a survey, the Contracting Officer provided the contractor an opportunity to respond if the contractor had not previously been offered the

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION — SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

opportunity and this information was provided to the SSET. The SSET was not given any information that was not recent. After the SSET determined the relevancy of each effort being evaluated and the offeror's performance thereto, one overall confidence assessment was assigned for each offeror.

The SSET evaluated each offeror's technical proposal against the technical evaluation factor's Measure of Merit. Each offer's strengths, weaknesses, deficiencies, color code rating and proposal risk assessment for each technical factor were documented on a Rating Team Worksheet. The technical factors and their Measure of Merit are:

Staffing Plan. The government will evaluate the offeror's proposed workforce and organization plan to ensure the offeror is capable of meeting the minimum contract requirements.

Measure of Merit: The Measure of Merit is the government's minimum requirement for the stated factor. The offeror submits a plan that demonstrates the offeror will, throughout the term of the contract, employ personnel qualified to manage, supervise, and operate an air terminal and ground handling effort.

Implementation Plan. The government will evaluate the offeror's timeline and plan for contract implementation.

Measure of Merit: The Measure of Merit is the government's minimum requirement for the stated factor. The offeror submits an implementation plan that ensures a fully operational organization is established by the performance start date.

#### **1.4. Cost/Price**

Each offeror's proposed price was evaluated for completeness and reasonableness. In determining completeness, each price proposal was evaluated to ensure all required pricing was included in Section B. In determining reasonableness, the Government conducted a comparison of all offerors proposed prices, along with a comparison to the Independent Government Cost Estimate (IGCE). A review of prices for all offerors indicates there is adequate competition. This is a firm fixed-price contract. Offerors were required to submit a price for basic monthly service and a price for towing service to/from Kuwait International Airport Engine Run-up parking spot/lease of space at the Engine Test Run location. All other Contract Line Item Numbers (CLINs) are reimbursable with a Not to Exceed price set by the Government.

#### **1.5. Offerors**

Eight offerors submitted proposals in response to the RFP. They are:

CAV International

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION - SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

## 2. INITIAL EVALUATION RESULTS

Initially each offeror's proposal was reviewed to ensure compliance with all minimum mandatory requirements of the RFP such as: all amendments acknowledged, all representations and certifications complete, all prices completed, validated CCR registration, and all other proposal submission requirements identified in the RFP. Electronic mail notices were sent for all non-compliance issues. All incorrect/missing information was corrected and/or provided.

### 2.1. CAV International

#### 2.1.1. Staffing Plan (~~Outstanding~~/Low Risk)

CAV submitted a staffing/organizational plan and proposed a workforce which demonstrates they will, throughout the term of the contract, employ personnel qualified to manage, supervise, and operate this air terminal and ground handling effort.

Strengths:

- In addition to the AMC Station Manager and Alternate Station Manager and (b)(3) (AMCC - PWS paragraphs 1.1. through 1.1.8.15.3., Aircraft Services - PWS paragraphs 1.2 through 1.2.10., Passenger Services - PWS paragraphs 1.3. through 1.3.9.3., and Aircraft Ground Services - PWS paragraphs 1.7. through 1.8.7.). While the PWS requires the offeror to provide services in these key performance areas, (b)(3) r (b)(3) . This benefits the government by p (b)(3) (b)(3) , reducing the risk of degradation of services and reduced oversight on the part of the government. (b)(3)
- (b)(3) This eliminates the government's need to expend hundreds of man-hours (b)(3) a (b)(3) . This results in significant monetary direct and indirect cost savings (b)(3) (b)(3)
- In addition to meeting safety requirements outlined in PWS paragraph 4.5., (b)(3) (b)(3) . This benefits the government by (b)(3) (b)(3)

No weaknesses were identified in CAV's proposal and their approach has little potential to cause disruption of schedule or degradation of performance.

#### 2.1.2. Implementation Plan (~~Acceptable~~/Low Risk)

CAV submitted an implementation plan that ensures a fully operational organization is established by the performance start date. No strengths or weaknesses were identified. Their approach has little potential to cause disruption of schedule or degradation of performance.

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION — SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

**2.1.3. Past Performance (High Confidence)**

CAV International was assigned a performance confidence assessment of High Confidence. CAV submitted and the SSET evaluated past performance on six contracts. Five were determined to be Somewhat Relevant and one was determined to be Highly Relevant. Each contract is discussed below:

HTC711-07-C-0007 - The team determined the Baltimore Commercial Gateway contract to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract, CAV provides commercial passenger and baggage services, ensuring maximum aircraft utilization, and facilitates on-time aircraft departures. CAV staffs passenger processing operations at least six hours prior to scheduled aircraft departure for international flights, and at least four hours prior to scheduled aircraft departure for domestic flights, and must remain open to meet aircraft delay processes. They average 70 to 100 flights per month and 111,160 passengers annually, which is significantly less than the required effort. This is dissimilar to the 24/7/365 ATGHS requirement at Kuwait. The gateway services are provided at a U.S. International Airport rather than the austere environment of Kuwait. They do not provide the complete range of ATGHS required under this solicitation, which includes command and control, load planning, aircraft services, aircraft ground services, material handling equipment and aerospace ground equipment maintenance and repair performance requirements. Their overall performance has consistently been rated very good. They exceeded performance requirements on numerous occasions. They established a hands-on, first rate quality program, were lauded for their professionalism and outstanding customer service, and recognized for continually providing efficient and timely service as well as their attention to detail. Although Contract Discrepancies Reports (CDRs) were issued for weapons accountability, baggage security, and failure to properly follow the Foreign Clearance Guide, appropriate corrective actions were taken to prevent reoccurrence.

HTC711-08-C-0004 – The team determined the Eielson ATGHS contract to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract, CAV accomplishes many of the key areas of performance required under this solicitation; however, at a significantly reduced level. CAV staffs the ATOC function 24-hours a day, 7-days a week. All other functions are staffed and services provided 0730-1630 local time Monday through Friday and outside of these established operating hours to meet specific mission requirements. Although these operational hours are dynamic, they are not as demanding as the 24/7/365 ATGHS requirement at Kuwait. Consideration was given to the similarity of their performance; however, CAV handled an annual average of 1,671 aircraft compared to 11,616 aircraft at Kuwait. These services are provided at a U.S. Air Force Base with climatic challenges, which can be equitably compared to the austere environment of Kuwait. They do not provide command and control, aircraft ground services, or material handling equipment/aerospace ground equipment maintenance and repair. Their overall performance has been rated satisfactory to very good. They exceeded performance requirements on numerous occasions. CAV provided passengers ground transportation to billeting, the Base Exchange, and on-base eating establishments, as no base shuttle service exists. They conducted numerous community Space Available travel briefings and generally enhanced AMC's image. A CDR was issued for not properly coordinating explosives movement. CAV took appropriate corrective actions,

(b)(3)

HTC711-08-C-0002 – The team determined the Bogota ATGHS contract to be Somewhat Relevant. Their overall performance has been rated satisfactory. CAV provides services when aircraft are scheduled, not 24/7/365 as required under the solicitation. While services are performed on a foreign commercial international airport, it does not present the challenges of providing services supporting the war on terrorism in Kuwait. Under this contract, CAV accomplishes many of the key areas of performance required under



SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION — SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104  
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

this solicitation. Consideration was given to the similarity of their performance; however, the workload at Bogota is less than one percent of that at Kuwait.

FA4428-05-C0006 – The team determined the ATGHS contract for five locations in Central and South America (Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay) to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract, CAV accomplishes many of the key areas of performance required under this solicitation. CAV provides services when aircraft are scheduled, not 24/7/365 as required under the solicitation. While services are performed at foreign commercial international airports, they do not present the challenges of providing services in Kuwait. Consideration was given to the similarity of their performance; however, all five locations combined handled an average of 110 aircraft annually compared to an average of 968 aircraft per month at Kuwait. Their overall performance has been rated satisfactory to very good. CAV was lauded for their support of critical communications during a visit by the U.S. President to Uruguay. CDRs were issued for improper inspection of hazardous materials. Appropriate corrective actions were taken to prevent reoccurrence.

FA4428-05-C-0009 – The team determined the ATGHS contract for two locations in Japan (Misawa AB and Fukuoka IAP) to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract, CAV accomplishes many of the key areas of performance under this solicitation; however, at a significantly reduced level. They do not provide command and control, aircraft ground services, or material handling equipment/aerospace ground equipment maintenance and repair. CAV provided services at Misawa AB from 0600-1900 local time, Monday through Sunday; and at Fukuoka IAP from 0730-1630 local time, Monday through Friday. This is dissimilar to the 24/7/365 ATGHS requirement at Kuwait. These services were provided at a U.S. Air Base and an international airport rather than the challenging environment of Kuwait. Their overall performance was rated very good. CAV streamlined aircraft engine shipment processing procedures. They were lauded by the Inspector General on their ability to integrate operations with the Wing during an operational readiness inspection. CAV provided assistance and after hour services for stranded pilots and maintenance crews working to recover a damaged F-16 aircraft.

FA4428-06-C-0005 – The team determined the Kuwait ATGHS contract to be Highly Relevant. Under this contract, CAV provides essentially the same services required by this solicitation. They currently maintain the capability to simultaneously provide ATGHS for a working MOG of six wide-body aircraft or equivalent thereof, which exceeds the requirements of this solicitation by two wide-body aircraft. They provide ATGHS 24/7/365, which is the same as the hours of operation in this solicitation. Their overall performance has been rated satisfactory to very good. They exceeded performance requirements on numerous occasions. They act quickly to resolve issues and support government objectives. CAV has supported the repatriation of over 494 fallen warriors by providing washed 463L pallets and new cargo straps, as well as coordinating the dignified transfer ceremony. CAV provided support for a U.S. Presidential visit by facilitating force protection measures on the commercial side of Kuwait International Airport. Throughout the year, CAV received numerous laudatory comments from CENTCOM, DLA, TCSP, and DDKS along with several squadron and group commanders.

For the base period 1 Oct 06 through 30 Sep 07, their quality of service was rated very good. They received four CDRs for this period: 1 for failing to properly inspect hazardous materials shipments, 1 for safety related incidents (C130 towing, aircraft loading-snapped skid place strap, 60K Loader damage, backing a passenger van into a pole, and 60K Loader hitting a parked 60K Loader), 1 for failing to keep the passenger gate holding area sterile, and 1 for failure to identify hazardous material on a general cargo pallet.

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION - SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

For Option Year 1, 1 Oct 07 through 30 Sep 08, their quality of service was rated satisfactory. They received sixteen CDRs for this period: 1 for allowing a non-US citizen airline representative to sign for Signature Service Cargo, 1 for delaying four aircraft between 20 and 85 minutes, 3 for processing hazardous materials with documentation errors, 3 for contractor personnel not reporting incidents within required timeframes, 1 for loading cargo on the wrong aircraft, 2 for losing three land mobile radios, 1 for delaying four aircraft between 14 and 45 minutes, 1 for failing to properly inspect MHE, operate and repair AGE, input data into OLVIMS, and maintain MHE bench stock, 1 for improperly placarding two hazardous material pallets which also lacked appropriate documentation, 1 for failing to identify hazardous material on a pallet, and 1 for failing to properly operate, maintain, and repair MHE and AGE. A Letter of Concern was issued in May 08 regarding the number of vehicle incidents during the period 1 Oct 07 through 17 Mar 08. During this period there was one incident which caused over \$250,000 in damages to two MRAPs. There were other vehicle incidents which mainly involved damage to K-loaders (i.e. catwalks, windows, and rails). CAV responded to this letter with a top down review of their policies, procedures, and training programs.

For Option Year 2, 1 Oct 08 through 30 Sep 09, their quality of service improved and was rated very good. They received seven CDRs for this period: 1 for improperly loading cargo causing damage to the aircraft, 1 for aircraft ground services taxiing aircraft's wing over parked vehicle, 1 for failure to report incidents within the required timeframe, 3 for failure to operate, maintain, and repair MHE and AGE, and 1 for failure to manage information and terminal resources.

CDRs were issued in several of the same areas over the term of this contract. CAV reviewed these CDRs to determine appropriate procedures were in place to mitigate reoccurrence. The team did identify a pattern which indicated CAV experienced an increase in safety related incidents beginning Jun 07 up to Mar 08 when a Letter of Concern was issued. At this point, CAV management instituted procedures and established policies which resulted in significant improvements. Their remedies for failing to follow proper procedures included (b)(3) The team determined CAV appropriately addressed performance issues. CAV has not been issued a CDR related to safety incidents in the past 16 months. Furthermore CAV has not been issued any CDRs in the past six months.

The SSET has personal knowledge of three incidents which occurred during the performance of this contract that were not mentioned in the past performance information reviewed. In accordance with the RFP, CAV was given an opportunity to respond to this adverse past performance via Evaluation Notice 011. Each incident is detailed below based on eye witness statements (reported on AMC IMT 441, Mishap Report of Injury/Illness and Treatment) and mishap reports:

a. The first incident occurred on 8 May 09 and resulted in the serious injury of a loadmaster during commercial aircraft (Russian IL-76) vehicle loading operations. CAV was loading M1078 trucks (seven ton armored vehicle) onto the aircraft. One truck had been successfully loaded and the loadmaster gave the signal to begin loading the second truck. As the loadmaster walked backwards he was positioned on the aircraft center line between the parked truck and the truck he was spotting onto the aircraft. He signaled the CAV driver to continue forward. When the second truck was within three feet of the first truck, the engine revved causing it to speed forward without warning pinning the loadmaster between the two trucks. CAV's witness statements indicate operator error on the part of the driver of the M1078. The space inside the M1078 is limited, with the gas and brake pedals extremely close to each other. When the driver went to press the brake pedal, he had difficulty applying the brakes and hit the brake and gas pedals at the same time causing the vehicle to jump forward.

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION—SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

The Government Safety Investigation identified three primary factors for the accident: 1) the accidental application of the accelerator; 2) the position of the loadmaster; and 3) the excessive loading speed of the vehicle. They found no evidence of brake failure or mechanical problems with the vehicle. The report made no suggestions or recommendations for changing procedures or enhancing training. After the incident, CAV immediately conducted a personnel safety stand down, provided remedial training, and held an operational risk management meeting with all personnel involved to identify what happened, how it could have been prevented, and how to prevent recurrence. CAV has extensive experience with successfully loading M1078s, with the exception of this incident. Based on witness statements and mishap reports, this incident was the result of the driver applying the brake and gas pedals simultaneously. The incident does not reflect a lack of quality control, safety, or knowledge of proper aircraft loading procedures on the part of CAV.

b. The second incident occurred on 9 Oct 09 and involved the death of a United Airlines representative during aircraft baggage downloading operations. A United Airlines maintenance representative entered the baggage compartment to remove baggage restraints in preparation for download. As is authorized under DOD 4500.9R, Part III and is standard procedure in Kuwait, approximately 30 Army passengers on the aircraft were selected to provide assistance with baggage download. Based on the CAV baggage conveyor operator's statement, he turned to instruct two Army personnel to enter the baggage truck while simultaneously lowering the safety railing on the conveyor. He was not notified by the United Airlines representative that he intended to exit the aircraft so he could relock the safety rail into position and stop the moving conveyor belt. When he turned, he noticed the United representative falling to the ground. Other witness statements portray a similar sequence of events with some variations (e.g. the representative reached for the rail and it wasn't there, he reached for the rail and it collapsed, he reached for the rail and the CAV employee lowered it at the same time).

Assigned Air Expeditionary Group safety personnel did not conduct an investigation nor did security personnel take any statements based on the fact the incident involved contractor (CAV and United Airlines) personnel. The 521 AMOW Commander determined "there was DOD interest in this incident due to the high volume of untrained DOD personnel exposed to falling hazards on a daily basis during baggage upload and download operations". The Commander directed the 723 Air Mobility Squadron Safety Office to conduct an investigation as it pertains to DOD personnel supporting baggage handling operations. The investigation concluded with the following recommendations to the 521 AMOW Commander: a complete Job Safety Analysis be conducted on baggage upload and download operations which identifies all hazards, create a briefing checklist based on the job safety analysis to standardize baggage upload and download operations, provide safety briefings to government personnel in one of the buses, and contract ground crew support should consist of a minimum of three personnel. None of these recommendations resulted in the government directing a change to baggage upload/download operations via contract modification. CAV successfully handles hundreds of passenger missions per month uploading and downloading baggage without incident. The incident does not reflect a lack of knowledge of proper baggage downloading procedures on the part of CAV.

c. The third incident occurred on 8 Feb 10. A C-17 aircraft was damaged during the loading of a M1070P Truck and M1000 trailer (similar to a commercial semi tractor-lowboy trailer with armor). Based on CAV operator statements, there were two operators, one driving the truck and the other driving the trailer, who both had loaded several of these vehicles previously. CAV provided load team members to watch for proper clearance between the vehicle and aircraft while two AF loadmasters conducted spotting operations. One loadmaster was positioned at the rear of the vehicle as it entered the aircraft using hand signals to relay on-load directions to the other loadmaster positioned in front of the vehicle directing the

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION - SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

operators during loading operations. During upload operations, the vehicle became misaligned and loading operations were stopped. The two loadmasters switched positions and uploading operations resumed. When the trailer ramp toes where within six to eight inches of the wing box, the loadmasters and load team members signaled "STOP". Subsequent events are unclear based on witness statements (e.g. AF loadmasters claim operators did not stop immediately when signaled to do so, operators indicated they did attempt to stop immediately upon being signaled to do so but six to eight inches is too little space to stop). The ramp toes did strike the wing box and when the vehicle was repositioned it tore a piece of insulation from the wing box. CAV has successfully loaded a large variety of outsized and unique war-fighting vehicles under an Internal Air Transport Certification. Based on witness statements, it is unclear if CAV operator actions can be attributed to causing the damage to the aircraft. CAV now briefs all C-17 loadmasters to stop the vehicle as soon as the first two axles clear the ramp crest to permit proper trailer adjustments with ample clearance.

The team reviewed documentation concerning these incidents which resulted in a fatality, serious personnel injury, and damage to an aircraft. They gave careful consideration to the gravity of each incident, day-to-day processes involved with loading hundreds of cargo and passenger aircraft, hi-operations tempo involved in supporting the war-fighter, and the potential for mitigating operational risk. Overall the team determined everyone involved (government, other contractor, and CAV personnel) in these incidents could have taken actions to reduce operational risk. The team noted CAV capitalized on the lessons learned from each incident and implemented revised vehicle loading processes, conducted remedial training, and initiated safety down-time reviews. The team considered the impact of these incidents on CAV's overall past performance when assigning their confidence assessment rating.

CAV possesses a broad range of experience in ATGHS. CAV was consistently recognized for favorable customer relations, skilled and enthusiastic managers and staff, and a willingness to provide support above and beyond contract requirements. Five of the six contracts reviewed were determined to involve some of the magnitude and complexities when compared to this solicitation. Their performance ranged from satisfactory to very good. The sixth contract reviewed involved essentially the same magnitude of effort and complexities as this solicitation requires. The high ops tempo of approximately 1000 aircraft arrivals/departures per month, most which arrive and depart between 1800 and 0400 local, congested ramp conditions with poor lighting and airfield markings, six nose-to-tail wide body aircraft parking spots with limited access to active taxiways, as well as multiple agencies conducting operations simultaneously are unique to this contract. Performance on this effort was rated satisfactory to very good. This contract was rated highly relevant. As this effort was deemed most relevant to the required effort, it was given greater consideration in determining an overall confidence rating. While CAV has had to address some performance issues over the life of this contract, they have consistently and successfully performed the required service. Therefore, the team is confident they can continue to consistently and successfully perform these services. Based on the offeror's performance record, the SSET has essentially no doubt CAV can successfully perform the required effort.

**NOTE:** The Source Selection Authority had some concerns with the SSET's confidence assessment rating of High Confidence for CAV International. The SSA conducted an independent review and analysis of CAV's past performance record and concluded that CAV's past performance rating should be Significant Confidence (See SSA Determination filed with CAV's Initial Rating Team Worksheet). Because of this, all letters provided to and discussions held with CAV indicate a Significant Confidence assessment rating. However, because this PAR documents the SSET's findings, CAV's confidence rating continues to be shown as High Confidence.

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION - SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

**2.1.4. Price - \$59,891,808.00**

CAV's price was evaluated against the criteria of completeness and reasonableness. The price is considered fair and reasonable based on comparison with the other proposals, the Independent Government Cost Estimate, and adequate price competition.

**2.2. (b)(3)**

**2.2.1. Staffing Plan (~~Acceptable~~/High Risk)**

(b)(3) submitted a staffing/organizational plan and proposed a workforce which demonstrates they should, throughout the term of the contract, employ personnel qualified to manage, supervise, and operate this air terminal and ground handling effort. No strengths were identified.

- Weakness: (b)(3) staffing plan includes a significant amount of personnel cross-utilization with individuals being assigned a primary function as well as first, second, third, and fourth collateral duties.

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3) First-line supervisors will be unable to focus on PWS performance and supervisory requirements, increasing the risk of degradation of services. EN 008 was developed.

(b)(3) proposed staffing plan is likely to cause significant disruption or degradation of performance.

**2.2.2. Implementation Plan (~~Acceptable~~/Low)**

(b)(3) has submitted an implementation plan that ensures a fully operational organization is established by the performance start date. No strengths or weaknesses were identified. (b)(3) approach has little potential to cause disruption of schedule or degradation of performance.

**2.2.3. Past Performance (Little Confidence)**

(b)(3) was assigned a performance confidence assessment of Little Confidence. (b)(3) submitted and the SSET evaluated past performance on four contracts. The Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS) was checked for additional contracts; however, no relevant contracts were found. Three of the contracts reviewed were determined to be Somewhat Relevant and one was determined to be Not Relevant. Each contract is discussed below:

FA4890-07-C-0016: The team determined this contract for Operations, Maintenance, and Support for the U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command Primary Training Ranges to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract, (b)(3) deals mainly with the operations, maintenance, and support of bombing and gunnery ranges. Most of the key ATGHS performance areas are not performed under this contract. Information control, management information systems, and data records/report services are provided and are comparable

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION — SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

to this solicitation. Their overall performance was rated very good. They were recognized for their ability to retain a qualified workforce at ten U.S. locations.

M67854-07-C-8017: The team determined this contract for Operation and Maintenance Services at 29 Palms Marine Base CA, satellite operations in Bridgeport CA, and care of equipment in Yuma AZ to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract, (b)(3) operates and maintains training ranges, is involved in construction of new targets and buildings, and takes care of equipment. Most of the key ATGHS performance areas are not performed under this contract. Information control, management information systems, and data records/report services are provided and are comparable to this solicitation. Their overall performance was rated excellent.

SP0600-09-C-5904: The team determined this contract for Operation, Maintenance, Security, and Safety of government aviation and ground fuel facilities at ten Army installations in South Korea to be Not Relevant. Under this contract, (b)(3) is responsible for receipt, storage, transfer, issue, quality control, and accounting services for bulk and retail jet, diesel, retail gasoline, and automotive unleaded fuels. None of the key ATGHS performance areas are performed under this contract. Overall performance was rated very good.

F41689-02-D-0044: The team determined this contract for Operations and Maintenance of Air Combat Training Systems at five U.S. locations to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract, (b)(3) is responsible for operations, maintenance, and mission support performance of Air Combat Training Systems. Most of the key ATGHS performance areas are not performed under this contract. Information control, management information systems, and data records/report services are provided and are comparable to this solicitation. Their overall performance was rated exceptional. They were recognized for their professional and dedicated workforce. (b)(3) was recognized by the Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) team chief for their excellent support of the 355<sup>th</sup> Wing during their Phase II ORI.

(b)(3) has experience with providing operations and maintenance of primary training ranges and training systems as well as fuel distribution facilities. Their overall past performance was rated very good to exceptional. Three of the four contracts reviewed were deemed somewhat relevant as they do involve some of the ATGHS performance areas required under this solicitation; however, many key areas are not covered. These efforts are all performed in the United States rather than in the challenging environment of Kuwait. Their performance on one contract was deemed not relevant as it related to fuel storage and distribution and was not comparable to this effort. Based on the offeror's performance record, the SSET has substantial doubt (b)(3) can successfully perform the required effort.

#### **2.2.4. Price - \$58,710,627.96**

(b)(3) price was evaluated against the criteria of completeness and reasonableness. The price is considered fair and reasonable based on comparison with the other proposals, the Independent Government Cost Estimate, and adequate price competition.

#### **2.3. (b)(3)**

##### **2.3.1. Staffing Plan (~~Unacceptable~~/Unacceptable Risk)**



SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION — SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104  
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(b)(3) staffing plan fails to meet the government's minimum requirements indicating they will not be able to successfully perform the requirements of this solicitation. Their proposed workforce and organizational plan does not include all air terminal and ground handling service functions. Specifically, they failed to identify staffing for the key areas of Air Mobility Control Center, Passenger Services, Data Records and Reports, and Aircraft Ground Services. They did not provide a plan which demonstrates an ability to operate an ATGHS 24/7, 365 days/year with a sustained capability to work a wide-body MOG of four aircraft. EN 002 was developed.

(b)(3) proposed staffing plan is very likely to cause unmitigated disruption of schedule and severely degraded performance.

### 2.3.2. Implementation Plan (~~Acceptable~~/High Risk)

(b)(3) proposed implementation plan includes a timeline which indicates an intention to be fully operational by the performance start date. No strengths were identified.

- Weakness: Their plan poses increased risk as they intend to mobilize their entire workforce into Kuwait on the 15<sup>th</sup> of September 2010, completing personnel orientation, country residency, base access, and other associated transition requirements in a two-week period. Additionally, they plan to simultaneously receipt and inspect all contractor-furnished equipment to be delivered on 15 Sept 10. Their implementation plan compresses these activities into the last two weeks prior to performance start and gives the government cause for concern. Their implementation plan does not depict how they could compress all these activities into two weeks. In our experience these activities take well over two weeks to accomplish. EN (003) was developed.

This timeline is likely to cause a significant disruption of schedule and degradation of service.

### 2.3.3. Past Performance (Satisfactory Confidence)

(b)(3) was assigned a performance confidence assessment of Satisfactory Confidence.

(b)(3) submitted and the SSET evaluated past performance on three contracts. PPIRS was checked for additional past performance information but none was found. All three were determined to be Somewhat Relevant. Each contract is discussed below:

Ground Handling (\$2.5M) - The team determined this Ground Handling Services effort at seven U.S. locations to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract, (b)(3) provides aircraft ground handling and cargo services at U.S. airports rather than the austere environment of Kuwait. They do not provide passenger and baggage services. Their overall performance was rated very good to exceptional. (b)(3) was recognized for maintaining discipline in processes and procedures, being able to adjust to a fluid operation schedule, and understanding the need for safe on-time performance.

Ground Handling (\$3.8M) - The team determined this Ground Handling Services effort at three U.S. locations to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract, (b)(3) provides ramp services at U.S. International Airports rather than the challenging environment of Kuwait. They do not process passengers, provide command and control, handle or process hazardous shipments, maintain customer-furnished equipment, work with secure data or create manifests, or accomplish data records and reports. Their overall performance was rated satisfactory. (b)(3) was recognized for responding quickly to customer concerns.

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION - SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Ground Handling (\$25.5M) - The team determined this Ground Handling Services effort at ten sites in support of the U.S. Postal Service to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract, (b)(3) primarily supports U.S. Postal air and ground networks handling Express, Priority, and First Class mail within the United States, not the demanding environment of Kuwait. They do not process passengers and baggage or provide aircraft transient service. They provide facilities, scanning, container preparation, record keeping, and electronic data interchange services. Their overall performance was rated satisfactory to very good.

(b)(3) was recognized for strict adherence to contract terms, willingness to go above and beyond contract requirements, focus on safety and work relationships, and maintaining open lines of communication.

(b)(3) possesses experience in providing a range of related ATGHS with the exception of command and control or passenger services. Their overall past performance was rated satisfactory to exceptional. All of the contracts reviewed were deemed somewhat relevant as they involve only some of the magnitude and complexities of this solicitation. Their performance, under all three contracts combined, contains many of the key ATGHS performance areas and demonstrates proven management and technical capabilities. Based on the offeror's past performance record, the SSET has some doubt (b)(3) can successfully perform the required effort.

**2.3.4. Price - \$56,395,428.00**

(b)(3) price was evaluated against the criteria of completeness and reasonableness. The price is considered fair and reasonable based on comparison with the other proposals, the Independent Government Cost Estimate and adequate price competition.

**2.4. (b)(3)**

**2.4.1. Staffing Plan (Acceptable/Low Risk)**

(b)(3) submitted a staffing/organizational plan and proposed a workforce which demonstrates they will, throughout the term of the contract, employ personnel qualified to manage, supervise, and operate this air terminal and ground handling effort. No strengths were identified.

- Weakness: (b)(3) staffing/organizational plan did not identify staffing to perform Funds Handling or Communications Management and Information Systems services. EN 004 was developed.

(b)(3) approach has little potential to cause disruption of schedule or degradation of performance.

**2.4.2. Implementation Plan (Acceptable/Moderate Risk)**

(b)(3) submitted an implementation plan that ensures a fully operational organization is established by the performance start date. No strengths were identified.

**Weaknesses:**

- (b)(3)'s implementation plan does not allot time to accomplish government provided familiarization training or any other required training. T (b)(3)



~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION — SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

c (b)(3) . The team has some doubt they have allotted appropriate time to take advantage of government familiarization training (1 Jul 10 – 30 Sep 10) or accomplish other required training. The offeror may not have allotted sufficient time to accomplish individual employee training requirements based on their intent to complete the hiring process on 15 Sep 10.

t (b)(3)  
(b)(3) However, their CFE table does not include any follow-me vehicles or a sufficient number of aircraft stairs.

EN 005 was developed.

(b)(3) approach can potentially cause disruption of schedule or degradation of performance.

#### 2.4.3. Past Performance (Neutral/Unknown Confidence)

(b)(3) was assigned a performance confidence assessment of Neutral/Unknown Confidence. This proposal is a Teaming Arrangement consisting of (b)(3) and (b)(3) In accordance with their proposal, (b)(3) will be the command center in the United States responsible for Human Resource duties. (b)(3) will be responsible for all field work in Kuwait and manage the contract. Past performance for each company was reviewed with a focus on their roles and responsibilities under the proposal as specified above. (b)(3) submitted and the SSET evaluated past performance on two contracts – one for (b)(3) and one for (b)(3) PPIRS was checked for additional contracts but none were found. Both contracts were determined to be Not Relevant. Each contract is discussed below:

W9124J-09-P-0005 - The team determined (b)(3) purchase order for Ten Pounds Block Ice and Twenty Pounds Crushed Ice for Ft. Sam Houston TX to be Not Relevant. Under this purchase order, they filled orders and delivered ice to required locations. Their performance efforts did not involve any of the magnitude of effort and complexities of this solicitation.

W911S8-09-P-0242 - The team determined the (b)(3) 40-foot Storage Container purchase order to be Not Relevant. Under this purchase order, they delivered four 40-foot containers to Ft. Lewis WA. Their performance efforts did not involve any of the magnitude of effort and complexities of this solicitation.

(b)(3) does not possess any experience in providing Air Terminal and Ground Handling Services. On the survey submitted, their overall past performance was rated exceptional for non-relevant services. Past performance for (b)(3) was also determined to be Not Relevant. On the survey submitted for (b)(3), their overall past performance was rated exceptional for non-relevant services. While the proposal states that the owner, (b)(3), has extensive knowledge of ATGHS he has not been responsible for the overall manning and management of any ATGHS operation. The proposal also states that (b)(3)'s employees have extensive knowledge of ATGHS; however, (b)(3) as the prime contractor, will have overall responsibility for all performance areas throughout the term of the contract regardless of any changes in personnel at (b)(3) that may occur after award. In accordance with the RFP, offerors with no relevant past or present performance history shall receive the rating Neutral/Unknown Confidence.

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION - SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

**2.4.4. Price - \$56,712,000.00**

(b)(3) price was evaluated against the criteria of completeness and reasonableness. The overall price is considered fair and reasonable based on comparison with the other proposals, the Independent Government Cost Estimate, and adequate price competition. However, the government does have concerns with the price of CLINs 1003, 2003, 3003, 4003 (towing service to/from Kuwait International Airport/Abdullah Al Mubarak Airbase Aircraft Engine Run-up parking spots and lease of space at the Engine Test Run location). This price seems high based on the Government's knowledge of this requirement. EN 006 was developed.

**2.5. (b)(3)**

**2.5.1. Staffing Plan (Excellent/Low Risk)**

(b)(3) submitted a staffing/organizational plan and proposed a workforce which demonstrates they will, throughout the term of the contract, employ personnel qualified to manage, supervise, and operate this air terminal and ground handling effort.

- Strengths: In addition to meeting safety requirements outlined in PWS paragraph 4.5., (b)(3)  
(b)(3) . This benefits the government by (b)(3)  
(b)(3)

No weaknesses were identified. (b)(3) approach has little potential to cause disruption of schedule or degradation of performance.

**2.5.2. Implementation Plan (Acceptable/Low Risk)**

(b)(3) submitted an implementation plan that ensures a fully operational organization is established by the performance start date. No strengths were identified.

- Weakness: Their plan identifies required Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE); however, it does not indicate they will have required aircraft stairs on site by the performance start date. (b)(3) approach has little potential to cause disruption of schedule or degradation of performance.

**2.5.3. Past Performance (Little Confidence)**

(b)(3) was assigned a performance confidence assessment of Little Confidence. (b)(3) submitted four contracts for consideration. The government pulled three additional contracts from PPIRS for a total of seven for the SSET to evaluate. One was rated Relevant, five were rated Somewhat Relevant, and one was rated Not Relevant. Each contract is discussed below:

FA4428-04-C-0002: The team determined the Kuwait ATGHS contract to be Relevant. The team only reviewed one year of past performance, 1 Oct 04 through 30 Sep 05, for this contract due to the RFP requirement that requires past performance information be recent (e.g. the contract shall have been performed during the past five years from the date of issuance of this solicitation). Under this contract, (b)(3) provided the same services required by this solicitation; however, they were only required to maintain a capability to simultaneously provide ATGHS for a working MOG of two wide-body aircraft or

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION - SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

equivalent thereof which is 50% less than the current requirement. For this one-year period, (b)(3) processed approximately 300,000 passengers and 39,000 tons of cargo versus the current average of 556,565 passengers and 104,336 tons of cargo. They provided ATGHS 24/7/365, which is the same as the hours of operation in this solicitation. Their quality of service was rated marginal. Thirty-nine CDRs were issued in the areas of safety, command and control, cargo preparation/processing, maintenance of government furnished equipment. An additional sixty-one deficiencies were noted for the year. (b)(3) corrective actions failed to prevent reoccurrence. The government was forced to implement a parallel cargo accounting system and report movement ready cargo on-hand daily to 618<sup>th</sup> TACC and AFCENT AMD to ensure airlift was planned. (b)(3) did receive positive customer feedback for passenger services from external customers.

F11626-03-C-0004: The team determined the ATGHS contract for two locations in Japan (Misawa AB and Fukuoka IAP) to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract, (b)(3) accomplished many of the key areas of performance under this solicitation; however, at a significantly reduced level. They did not provide command and control, aircraft ground services, or material handling equipment/aerospace ground equipment maintenance and repair. (b)(3) provided services at Misawa AB Monday through Sunday during daytime installation operating hours; and at Fukuoka IAP from 0730-1630 local time, Monday through Friday. This is dissimilar to the 24/7/365 ATGHS requirement at Kuwait. These services were provided at a U.S. Air Base and an international airport rather than the challenging environment of Kuwait. Their overall performance was rated very good. (b)(3) streamlined aircraft engine shipment processing procedures. They were lauded by the 35<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing for their weapons safety program. They developed superb working relationships and were customer oriented. Significant discrepancies were identified in the areas of passenger terminal security, hazardous materials acceptance, and cargo processing. (b)(3) took appropriate actions to prevent reoccurrence.

HTC711-09-C-0003: The team determined the ATGHS contract for two locations in Japan (Misawa AB and Fukuoka IAP) to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract, (b)(3) accomplishes many of the key areas of performance under this solicitation; however, at a significantly reduced level. They do not provide command and control, aircraft ground services, or material handling equipment/aerospace ground equipment maintenance and repair. (b)(3) provides services at Misawa AB staffing ATOC 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and all other functions from 0730-1800 local time, Monday through Friday and outside of these established operating hours to meet specific mission requirements. At Fukuoka IAP, they provide services 0900-1300 local time, Monday through Friday and when aircraft are scheduled. This is dissimilar to the 24/7/365 ATGHS requirement at Kuwait. These services were provided at a U.S. Air Base and an international airport rather than the challenging environment of Kuwait. Consideration was given to the similarity of their performance; however, at both locations combined they handled only 82 aircraft monthly compared to an average of 968 aircraft per month at Kuwait. Their overall performance was rated satisfactory to very good over a six month period. (b)(3) placed advertisements on the Armed Forces Network announcing the return of the Patriot Express mission with services to Yokota, Japan and Seattle, Washington. They also disseminated Space Available passenger travel information enhancing AMC's image.

HTC711-08-C-0001: The team determined the ATGHS contract for nine locations in Central and South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela) to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract, (b)(3) accomplishes many of the key areas of performance required under this solicitation. (b)(3) provides services when aircraft are scheduled, not 24/7/365 as required under the solicitation. While services are performed at foreign commercial international airports,

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION — SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

they do not present the challenges of providing services in Kuwait. Consideration was given to the similarity of their performance; however, all nine locations combined handled an average of 136 aircraft annually compared to an average of 968 aircraft per month at Kuwait. Their overall performance has been rated satisfactory. (b)(3) was recognized for providing a highly proficient, resourceful, and knowledgeable workforce. They facilitated 100% on-time aircraft departures. All of the aircrew surveys received indicated they were provided satisfactory services.

FA4428-06-C-0004: The team determined the ATGHS contract for two locations in Korea (Gunsan AB and Gimhae ROKAF) to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract, (b)(3) accomplished many of the key areas of performance under this solicitation; however, at a significantly reduced level. They did not provide command and control, aircraft ground services, or material handling equipment/aerospace ground equipment maintenance and repair. (b)(3) provides services at Gunsan AB from 0800-1700 local time, Monday through Friday, and outside of these established operating hours to meet specific mission requirements. At Gimhae ROKAF, they provide services 0730-1630 local time, Monday through Friday, and when aircraft are scheduled. This is dissimilar to the 24/7/365 ATGHS requirement at Kuwait. These services were provided at a U.S. Air Base and a Korean Air Base rather than the challenging environment of a Kuwaiti Air Base. Consideration was given to the similarity of their performance; however, at both locations combined they handled only 355 aircraft annually compared to an average of 968 aircraft per month at Kuwait. Their overall performance was rated satisfactory to very good. (b)(3) streamlined aircraft engine shipment processing procedures. (b)(3) provided a snack bar for customers at Gimhae as there are no American eateries on or near the base. They received laudatory comments from the Gunsan Wing XP for their exercise support and participation during the Peninsula Combat Employment Readiness Exercise. They displayed flexibility, sound judgment, and pride in accomplishing mission requirements. Three CDRs were issued for safety related incidents. (b)(3) took appropriate actions to prevent reoccurrence. A letter of concern was issued regarding the failure to have a certified Hazardous Material Inspector on-site at Gimhae.

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

FA4428-05-C-0007: The team determined the Central and South America ATGHS (Belize and Brazil) contract to be Somewhat Relevant. (b)(3) provides services when aircraft are scheduled, not 24/7/365 as required under the solicitation. While services are performed at foreign commercial international airports they do not present the challenges of providing services supporting the war on terrorism in Kuwait. Under this contract, (b)(3) accomplishes many of the key areas of performance required under this solicitation. Consideration was given to the similarity of their performance; however, at both locations combined they only handled 36 aircraft annually compared to an average of 968 aircraft per month at Kuwait. Their overall performance has been rated satisfactory to very good. They supported the annual Tradewinds exercise which increased Belize's workload by 200% and received a letter from the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil lauding the efforts of the Station Manager and his assistance during a U.S. Presidential visit.

SP0600-08-C-5840: The team determined the Non-Systems Fuels contract to be Not Relevant. Their overall performance was rated very good. (b)(3) operated and maintained Air Force owned fuel facilities at seven locations in the United States. Their performance efforts did not involve any of the magnitude of effort and complexities of this solicitation.

(b)(3) possesses a broad range of experience in ATGHS. One contract reviewed was determined Not Relevant. Five of the contracts reviewed were determined to be somewhat relevant as they involved some of the magnitude and complexities when compared to this solicitation. Their performance ranged from

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION - SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

satisfactory to very good. The Kuwait ATGHS contract was rated relevant as it involved the same services of this solicitation but at a reduced magnitude of effort and complexity. Their performance on this effort was rated marginal. As this effort was deemed most relevant to the required effort, it was given greater consideration in determining an overall confidence rating. Based on the offeror's performance record of this effort (marginal) and also considering the satisfactory to very good ratings received on the four somewhat relevant contracts, the SSET has substantial doubt (b)(3) can successfully perform the required effort.

**2.5.4. Price - \$61,706,856.00**

(b)(3) price was evaluated against the criteria of completeness and reasonableness. The overall price is considered fair and reasonable based on comparison with the other proposals, the Independent Government Cost Estimate and adequate price competition. However, the government does have concerns with the price of CLINs 1003, 2003, 3003, 4003 (towing service to/from Kuwait International Airport/Abdullah Al Mubarak Airbase Aircraft Engine Run-up parking spots and lease of space at the Engine Test Run location). This price seems high based on the Government's knowledge of this requirement. EN 009 was developed.

**2.6. (b)(3)**

**2.6.1. Staffing Plan (Acceptable/High Risk)**

(b)(3) submitted a staffing/organizational plan and proposed a workforce which demonstrates they should, throughout the term of the contract, employ personnel qualified to manage, supervise, and operate this air terminal and ground handling effort.

**Strength:**

- In addition to the AMC Station Manager and Alternate Station Manager, (b)(3)  
(b)(3) (ATOC - PWS paragraphs 1.1. through 1.1.8.15.3., Ramp  
Operations - PWS paragraphs 1.2.1., 1.3.1., 1.3.8.2. through 1.3.8.2.2., and 1.8.7., Cargo Operations -  
PWS paragraphs 1.1.9. through 1.1.9.2. and 1.2.2. through 1.2.5.). While the PWS requires the offeror  
to provide services in these key performance areas, (b)(3)  
(b)(3) This benefits the government by (b)(3)  
(b)(3)

**Weakness:**

- The government has concerns with (b)(3) proposed manpower for the "ramp handlers" function, which includes all flight-line activities (ATOC ramp controller requirements, passenger and cargo activities, cargo processing, cargo truck escorting, aircraft ground services, and baggage handling). Although the overall number of personnel proposed appears minimally sufficient, the government has concerns that the proposed manpower for the ramp handler function does not provide (b)(3) the ability to provide sustained ATGHS for a wide body MOG of four aircraft or equivalent thereof.

(b)(3) approach is likely to cause significant disruption of schedule or degradation of performance.

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION — SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

### 2.6.2. Implementation Plan (~~Acceptable~~/Low Risk)

(b)(3) submitted an implementation plan that ensures a fully operational organization is established by the performance start date. No strengths or weaknesses were identified. (b)(3) approach has little potential to cause disruption of schedule or degradation of performance.

### 2.6.3. Past Performance (Little Confidence)

(b)(3) was assigned a performance confidence assessment of Little Confidence. This proposal submitted by (b)(3) identifies (b)(3) as a consultant/subcontractor responsible for portions of the implementation plan (e.g. recruitment, training, and general preparation for the execution phase of this contract). (b)(3) will be responsible for all other performance areas. Past performance for each company was reviewed with a focus on their roles and responsibilities under the proposal as specified above. (b)(3) submitted and the SSET evaluated past performance for five contracts – four for (b)(3) and one for (b)(3). PPIRS was checked for additional past performance information on (b)(3) but none was found. Two efforts submitted for (b)(3) were rated Somewhat Relevant and two were rated Not Relevant. The effort submitted for (b)(3) was rated Not Relevant. Each contract is discussed below:

ADF/SA GH 001 - The team determined the Aerial Port Activity for Australian Air Defense Forces at Al Minahd, UAE to be Somewhat Relevant. (b)(3) provides wide-body and other cargo aircraft services when aircraft are scheduled, not 24/7/365 as required under the solicitation. Their overall performance has been rated very good to exceptional. Services are performed in the Middle East at a UAE Air Base with challenges similar to providing services supporting the war on terrorism in Kuwait. Under this contract, (b)(3) accomplishes many of the key areas of performance required under this solicitation. They do not provide Aircraft Ground Services. Consideration was given to the similarity of their performance; however, based on annual contract costs of \$410K compared to the Independent Government Cost Estimate of \$16M, the workload does not equate to the magnitude of effort required at Kuwait.

USTC Tender Afghanistan - The team determined (b)(3) cargo handling services to be Somewhat Relevant. (b)(3) only provides limited cargo download/upload for tender airlift missions when aircraft are scheduled, not 24/7/365 as required under the solicitation. Their overall performance was rated very good. Services are performed at FOB Sharana, Afghanistan in a demanding environment much like Kuwait. Consideration was given to the similarity of their performance; however, their services are limited to downloading and uploading cargo on aircraft using a 10K forklift which does not compare to the ATGHS requirements under this solicitation in magnitude or complexity.

USTC Tender Balad Iraq – The team determined this is an airlift services effort which did not involve any ATGHS and is Not Relevant. Their overall performance was rated exceptional with positive comments concerning adherence to all written directives, instructions, and contract requirements. Services are performed at Balad Iraq in an environment much like Kuwait. Although (b)(3) airlifts cargo in a timely manner, they do not provide any cargo, passenger, or aircraft ground handling services. This effort does not compare to the ATGHS requirements under this solicitation.

USTC Tender Tikrit Iraq - The team determined this is an airlift services effort which did not involve any ATGHS and is Not Relevant. Their overall performance was rated very good. Services are performed at Tikrit Iraq in an environment much like Kuwait. (b)(3) airlifts cargo, but they do not provide any cargo, passenger, or



~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION - SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

aircraft ground handling services. This effort does not compare to the ATGHS requirements under this solicitation.

FA5587-09-P-0045 ( (b)(3) ) – The team determined this Night Monitor contract did not involve any ATGHS and is Not Relevant. Their overall performance was rated exceptional. Services are performed in RAF Lakenheath United Kingdom in an environment completely dissimilar to that of Kuwait. This effort does not compare to the ATGHS requirements under this solicitation.

(b)(3) possesses limited experience in providing cargo handling services. Their overall past performance for somewhat relevant and not relevant contracts was very good to exceptional. The somewhat relevant contracts involved only cargo handling requirements and none of the magnitude and complexities when compared to this solicitation. Their past performance indicates cargo handling capabilities which are narrowly focused services when compared to the broad range of services of this solicitation. Based on the offeror's performance record, the SSET has substantial doubt (b)(3) can successfully perform the required effort.

#### **2.6.4. Price - \$66,080,016.96**

(b)(3) price was evaluated against the criteria of completeness and reasonableness. The price is considered fair and reasonable based on comparison with the other proposals, the Independent Government Cost Estimate, and adequate price competition.

#### **2.7. (b)(3)**

##### **2.7.1. Staffing Plan (~~Acceptable~~/Low Risk)**

(b)(3) submitted a staffing/organizational plan and proposed a workforce which demonstrates they will, throughout the term of the contract, employ personnel qualified to manage, supervise, and operate this air terminal and ground handling effort. No strengths or weaknesses were identified. (b)(3) approach has little potential to cause disruption of schedule or degradation of performance.

##### **2.7.2. Implementation Plan (~~Acceptable~~/Low Risk)**

(b)(3) s submitted an implementation plan that ensures a fully operational organization is established by the performance start date. No strengths or weaknesses were identified. (b)(3) approach has little potential to cause disruption of schedule or degradation of performance.

##### **2.7.3. Past Performance (Satisfactory Confidence)**

(b)(3) was assigned a performance confidence assessment of Satisfactory Confidence. (b)(3) submitted and the SSET evaluated a total of six contracts. All of the contracts were rated Somewhat Relevant. Each contract is discussed below:

ATD Nellis 08-SC002: The team determined this Backshop Maintenance for Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) effort to be Somewhat Relevant. As a subcontractor under this contract, (b)(3) picks up, delivers, inspects, services, repairs, and performs approved modification on over 1,050 pieces of AGE. They provide these services at Nellis AFB NV rather than the challenging environment of Kuwait. They do not provide command and control center services, process cargo or upload/download aircraft, process passengers, handle or

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION— SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

process hazardous shipments, work with secure data or create manifests, or accomplish data records and reports. Their overall performance was rated exceptional. (b)(3) was recognized for being very responsive to the needs of their customers.

F33601-03-C-0004: The team determined this contract for Small Air Terminal Operations at Wright Patterson AFB OH to be Somewhat Relevant. As a subcontractor under this contract, (b)(3) accomplishes many of the key areas of performance required under this solicitation. They do not provide command and control or aircraft ground services. (b)(3) provides services when aircraft are scheduled, not 24/7/365 as required under the solicitation. Services are performed at a U.S. Air Force Base and they do not present the challenges of providing services in Kuwait. Consideration was given to the similarity of their performance; however, (b)(3) handled an annual average of 2,907 aircraft compared to 11,616 aircraft at Kuwait. Their overall performance has been rated exceptional. (b)(3) was recognized for establishing excellent lines of communication and providing proactive management.

W912PE-09-C07055: The team determined this contract for Transient Alert Services at Stuttgart Army Airfield Germany to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract, (b)(3) has provided transient alert management and control, VIP services, upload/download of cargo, vehicle equipment escort, and emergency aircraft services since Sep 09. Services are performed at an Army Airfield with an operational environment which does not compare to Kuwait. Their overall performance was rated satisfactory. They were recognized for their focus on customer requirements, which is only comparable to the Aircraft Ground Services portion of this requirement.

FA5587-06-C-0002: The team determined this contract for Transient Aircraft Services at RAF Mildenhall and RAF Lakenheath UK to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract, (b)(3) s performs transient aircraft management, emergency, special event/exercise, and DV aircraft services. However, these services are only comparable to the Aircraft Ground Services portion of this requirement. Their overall performance was rated exceptional. They were recognized for their very good ability to retain key personnel and a qualified workforce, as well as proactive customer services and operational support. (b)(3) was recognized by the Wing Commander for outstanding professionalism and expertise during the 75<sup>th</sup> Anniversary two day air display. (b)(3) was also recognized for their ability to maintain a 98.7% quality control performance rating which exceeds the command and contract standard of 95% as stated in the Service Delivery Summary of the Performance Work Statement.

FA4452-08-C-0003: The team determined this contract for Aerial Delivery Flight Services at four U.S. Air Force Bases (Charleston, Pope, McChord, and Dyess) to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract (b)(3) rigs aerial delivery platforms (ADP), inspects and packs parachutes, loads and unloads aircraft (Dyess AFB only), and recovers ADPs from the drop zone. However, these services are only minimally comparable to aircraft services and data records/reports portions of this requirement. Two letters of concern were issued for performance being late and for (b)(3) being unavailable to provide required services. (b)(3) took action to prevent reoccurrence. Some services were provided above and beyond contract requirements, for example at Pope AFB they assisted in base preparations for Hurricane Hannah which allowed the 2<sup>nd</sup> Airlift Squadron to continue airdrop training prior to aircraft evacuation; at Dyess AFB they supported three times the normal airdrop operation; and, at McChord AFB they supported AMC Rodeo 2009. Services were provided at an overall satisfactory level.

FA4428-05-C-0010: The team determined the Eielson ATGHS contract to be Somewhat Relevant. Under this contract, (b)(3) accomplished many of the key areas of performance required under this solicitation; however, at a significantly reduced level. (b)(3) staffed all functions and performed the services required



~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION - SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

under this contract 0730-1630 local time, Monday through Friday; and staffed functions outside of these established operating hours, as required, to meet performance requirements 24 hours a day. Although these operational hours are dynamic, they are not as demanding as the 24/7/365 ATGHS requirement at Kuwait. Consideration was given to the similarity of their performance; however, (b)(3) s handled an annual average of 596 aircraft compared to 11,616 aircraft at Kuwait. These services are provided at a U.S. Air Force Base with climatic challenges, which can be equitably compared to the austere environment of Kuwait. They do not provide command and control, aircraft ground services, or material handling equipment/aerospace ground equipment maintenance and repair. Their overall performance was rated satisfactory to very good. They exceeded performance requirements on numerous occasions. (b)(3) conducted Space Available travel briefings for Ft. Wainwright retiree's open house, contacted space available passengers at billeting to inform them of flight departure changes ensuring they made their flight, and provided passengers ground transportation to billeting as no base shuttle service exists. They were lauded by the Red Flag Logistics Officer for providing assistance during redeployment operations. CDRs were issued for security of classified materials, accidents involving materials handling equipment, and aircraft loading operations. They provided remedies in a timely manner. After discussions between the Contracting Officer and (b)(3) ' management, the government agreed not to exercise the option beyond FY07. (b)(3)

(b)(3)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3) has experience with providing aircraft transient alert services, small air terminal operations (many of the key ATGHS performance requirements at a significantly reduced level), equipment maintenance, and aerial delivery services. Their performance under all six contracts together contained most of the key ATGHS performance areas. Their overall past performance was rated satisfactory to exceptional. All of the contracts reviewed were deemed somewhat relevant as they involve some of the magnitude and complexities of this solicitation. Based on the offeror's past performance record, the SSET has some doubt (b)(3) s can successfully perform the required effort.

#### **2.7.4. Price - \$59,020,320.00**

(b)(3) price was evaluated against the criteria of completeness and reasonableness. The price is considered fair and reasonable based on comparison with the other proposals, the Independent Government Cost Estimate and adequate price competition.

#### **2.8. (b)(3)**

(b)(3) proposal was not evaluated. During the initial proposal compliance review, a check of CCR identified this firm as a foreign owned company. The solicitation requires the successful offeror to have a facility clearance which may only be obtained by U.S. firms. (b)(3) was contacted to determine how they intended to meet this requirement. A review of their response indicated that they do not meet this minimum requirement. They were notified that their proposal was not eligible for award and would not be further evaluated as they were not in compliance with the requirements of the solicitation at the time of original submission.

**SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION – SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104  
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**Initial Evaluation Results Matrix**

	Staffing Plan	Implementation Plan	Past Performance	Price	Price Ranking
(b)(3) (b)(3)	<del>Unacceptable</del> Unacceptable Risk	Acceptable High Risk	Satisfactory Confidence	56,395,428.00	1
(b)(3) (b)(3)	Acceptable Low Risk	Acceptable Moderate Risk	Neutral/Unknown Confidence	56,712,000.00	2
(b)(3)	Acceptable High Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Little Confidence	58,710,627.96	3
(b)(3)	Acceptable Low Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Satisfactory Confidence	59,020,320.00	4
<b>CAV International</b>	Outstanding Low Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	High Confidence	59,891,808.00	5
(b)(3)	Excellent Low Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Little Confidence	61,706,856.00	6
(b)(3) (b)(3)	Acceptable High Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Little Confidence	66,080,016.96	7
(b)(3)	Not Evaluated	Not Evaluated	Not Evaluated	Not Evaluated	

**2.9. Summary.** As a result of the initial evaluation of all offers received in response to the solicitation, the Contracting Officer has determined discussions will be needed to maximize the Government's ability to obtain best value.

**3. Initial Discussions.** The competitive range was not reduced for purposes of efficiency and discussions were held with all offerors. Each offeror was formally notified of the initial evaluation results of their respective proposals. The ENs documented by the SSET during initial evaluation were released to all offerors beginning the discussions process. Oral discussions were held on 28 Apr 10 with (b)(3) and 29 Apr 10 with all remaining offerors to address any questions they had in regards to their initial evaluation results or the ENs (Ref: Record of Discussions, dated 28 Apr 10 for (b)(3) and individual Record of Discussions, dated 29 Apr 10 for all other offerors. Records of Discussion are filed with each individual proposal). The Offeror's responses to the ENs and proposal revisions were received on 3 May 10 and evaluated by the SSET. The SSET documented whether or not the offeror's responses to the ENs resolved the clarifications and/or deficiencies cited. The SSET also evaluated the proposal revisions against the evaluation criteria and documented any changes to the strengths, weaknesses, color codes, proposal risk assessment, past performance confidence assessment, and evaluated price from the original proposal as shown on the Interim Evaluation Results Matrix. A summary of the discussions held with each offeror is shown below by evaluation factor.

**3.1. Evaluation Factor 1, Staffing Plan, Summary**

**3.1.1. CAV International.** CAV was issued one EN for this factor. EN 001 requested clarification on how CAV intended to allow flexibility to continue to meet all PWS performance requirements when personnel are absent for vacation or other personal time off. (b)(3)

(b)(3) The team determined that CAV provided sufficient information for a better.

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION — SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

understanding of how their staffing plan includes coverage during vacation and time off. CAV's staffing plan rating remained unchanged at Outstanding/Low risk.

**3.1.2.** (b)(3) was issued one EN for this factor. (b)(3) staffing plan includes a significant amount of personnel cross-utilization with individuals being assigned a primary function as well as first, second, third, and fourth collateral duties. (b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3) (b)(3) EN008 requested clarification on how (b)(3) plans to mitigate the risk associated with this method of staffing. (b)(3) response indicates they (b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3) (b)(3) plan for staffing the Station Manager/Alternate Station Manager positions

(b)(3)

(b)(3) The team determined this is still a high risk method of managing day-to-day operations. Subsequent EN 013 was issued.

**3.1.3.** (b)(3) was issued one EN for this factor. (b)(3) did not provide a plan which demonstrates an ability to operate an ATGHS 24/7, 365 days/year with a sustained capability to work a wide-body MOG of four aircraft. EN 002 requested (b)(3) identify staffing for the key areas of Air Mobility Control Center, Passenger Services, Data Records and Reports, and Aircraft Ground Services.

(b)(3) response identified how they plan to staff these four functions however, as outlined, their staffing plan provides insufficient personnel to accomplish contract performance requirements associated under each of these functional areas. The team determined this plan is still unacceptable with unacceptable risk. Subsequent EN 015 was issued.

**3.1.4.** (b)(3) was issued one EN for this factor. (b)(3) staffing/organization plan did not identify staffing to perform Funds Handling or Communications Management and Information Systems services. EN 004 requested (b)(3) clarify how these functions would be covered. (b)(3)

(b)(3) The team determined the risk for this plan has increased from low to high. Subsequent EN 017 was issued.

**3.1.5.** (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor. However, in response to discussions (b)(3) notified the government that (b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3) As this was essentially a new approach, the government had insufficient information to evaluate their staffing plan. EN 018 was issued requesting (b)(3) provide a revised staffing plan which clearly identifies (b)(3) (b)(3). Their rating for this factor was changed to "unknown".

**3.1.6.** (b)(3) was issued two ENs for this factor. EN 007 requested clarification on how (b)(3) intends on allowing flexibility to continue to meet all PWS requirements when personnel are absent for vacation or other time off. This team determined that (b)(3) provided sufficient information for a better understanding of how their staffing plan includes coverage during vacation and time off. EN 010 requested clarification on how the proposed manpower for the ramp handler function will provide (b)(3) the ability to provide sustained ATGHS for a wide body MOG of four aircraft or equivalent thereof. (b)(3) responded that

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION — SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

they intend

(b)(3) s. The team determined this approach is acceptable but will require close monitoring. (b)(3) previously noted strength of (b)(3) no longer exist in their proposal. (b)(3) s staffing plan rating changed from Acceptable/High risk to Acceptable/Moderate risk. Subsequent EN014 was issued.

3.1.7. (b)(3) was not issued any ENs for this factor. Discussions were held to review their overall ratings and answer any questions. (b)(3) had no questions. Their ratings remain unchanged at Acceptable/Low risk.

### 3.2 . Evaluation Factor 2, Implementation Plan, Summary

3.2.1. **CAV International.** CAV was not issued an EN for this factor; however, they submitted revisions to their implementation plan in an effort to improve their rating. The SSET reviewed the proposal revisions but determined that CAV's rating remained unchanged at Acceptable/Low Risk.

3.2.2. (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor. Their rating remains unchanged at Acceptable/Low Risk.

3.2.3. (b)(3) (b)(3) was issued one EN for this factor. (b)(3) proposed implementation plan includes a timeline which indicates an intention to be fully operational by the performance start date. However, the SSET feel it poses increased risk because it states they intend to mobilize their entire workforce into Kuwait on the 15<sup>th</sup> of Sep 10, completing personnel orientation, country residency, base access, and other associated transition requirements in a two week period. EN 003 requested clarification on how they plan to accomplish all of these activities in a two week period. (b)(3) response provided information which shows they intend to have equipment on-site and fully operational, all employees hired, trained, and on-site by 15 Sep 10. They've set aside the two weeks prior to contract start for local acclimation, orientation, specific position briefs, and run-through of individual tasks. The team determined that (b)(3) has mitigated the risk for this factor and has changed the rating from high risk to low risk.

3.2.4. (b)(3) was issued two ENs for this factor. (b)(3) implementation plan includes a timeline which indicates an intention to be fully operational by the performance start date; however, it includes two weaknesses. First, it does not allot time to accomplish government provided familiarization training or any other required training; and second it does not include any follow-me vehicles or a sufficient number of aircraft stairs. EN 005 requested clarification on how (b)(3) intends to accomplish training by the performance start date. (b)(3) s response provided a revision which r (b)(3) This team determined this provides sufficient time to accomplish individual employee training requirements. EN 012 requested clarification on their plan to have follow-me vehicles and sufficient aircraft stairs on site on the performance start date. Their response reflected (b)(3) The team determined their revision clarifies their intent to have sufficient vehicles on-site by the performance start date. The rating for this factor is changed from Acceptable/moderate risk to Acceptable/low risk.

3.2.5. (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor. During discussions (b)(3) was notified of the weakness in their implementation plan (e.g. it identifies required Contractor Furnished Equipment; however, it does not indicate they will have required aircraft stairs on site by the

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION - SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

performance start date). (b)(3) responded that (b)(3) Also, in response to discussions, (b)(3) notified the government that (b)(3) As this was essentially a new approach, the government had insufficient information to evaluate their implementation plan. EN 018 was issued requesting (b)(3) provide a revised implementation plan (b)(3) Their rating for this factor was changed to "unknown".

3.2.6. (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor. Their rating remains unchanged at Acceptable/Low Risk.

3.2.7. (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor. Discussions were held to review their overall ratings and answer any questions. (b)(3) had no questions. Their rating remains unchanged at Acceptable/Low Risk.

### 3.3. Evaluation Factor 3, Past Performance, Summary

3.3.1. CAV International. CAV was issued one clarification EN for this factor prior to discussions. The SSET had knowledge of three accidents that occurred under Contract FA4428-06-C-0005, ATGHS Kuwait, that were not documented in the past performance information received/reviewed. EN 011 was issued to provide CAV an opportunity to respond to this adverse past performance. CAV provided sufficient information for the SSET to determine their confidence assessment rating. During discussions CAV questioned the Significant Confidence rating and asked what doubt did the government have that CAV could successfully perform the contract. CAV was reminded that the solicitation allows the government to give greater consideration to those efforts deemed most relevant to the efforts in the RFP. In this case, it is the performance for the current contract in Kuwait. The safety incidents identified in the EN were too close to be ignored and resulted in the Significant confidence rating.

3.3.2. (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor. During discussions (b)(3) questioned their confidence assessment rating stating they have recent/relevant experience in ATOC, AMCC and passenger service. The government explained that three of the contracts reviewed were determined to be somewhat relevant because (b)(3) only performed some of the services required by this effort. One contract submitted was determined to be not relevant. In response to discussions, (b)(3) did not provide any additional past performance information. The SSET confidence assessment remains unchanged at Little Confidence.

3.3.3. (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor. The SSET confidence assessment remains unchanged at Satisfactory Confidence.

3.3.4. (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor. The SSET confidence assessment remains unchanged at Neutral/Unknown Confidence.

3.3.5. (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor; however, during discussions they requested an opportunity to provide additional information to address their past performance rating of Little Confidence. In their response (b)(3) notified the government that (b)(3) stating they have taken this measure in order to allay any continuing concerns regarding performance risks and to overcome the "Little Confidence" rating. Past performance information on (b)(3) was also provided. As this was

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION — SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

essentially a new approach, the government had insufficient information to evaluate their past performance. EN 018 was issued requesting (b)(3) provide a revised staffing and implementation plan which (b)(3) This information is required to determine an overall past performance confidence assessment rating based on the functions each party will perform. Their rating for this factor was changed to "unknown".

**3.3.6.** (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor. During discussions (b)(3) asked if their confidence rating was a result of negative past performance or was it a relevancy issue. The government explained it was a relevancy issue. The contracts submitted for review were mainly cargo processing (uploading/downloading). Of the five contracts submitted two were determined to be somewhat relevant and three were not relevant. In response to discussions, (b)(3) did not provide any additional past performance information. The SSET confidence assessment remains unchanged at Little Confidence.

**3.3.7.** (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor. Discussions were held to review their overall ratings and answer any questions. (b)(3) had no questions. The SSET confidence assessment remains unchanged at Satisfactory Confidence.

### **3.4 . Price**

**3.4.1. CAV International.** CAV was not issued an EN for price but was notified that their overall price was among the highest priced offers received. CAV submitted a revised pricing schedule which reduced their overall price by \$1,423,644 to \$58,468,164.

**3.4.2.** (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor. Their price remained unchanged at \$58,710,627.96.

**3.4.3.** (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor. Their price remained unchanged at \$56,395,428.00.

**3.4.4.** (b)(3) was issued one EN for price. EN 006 requested clarification of the price for CLINs 1003, 2003, 3003, and 4003, Towing, as it seemed high based on the Government's knowledge and analysis of this requirement. (b)(3) provided revised pricing for these CLINs and reduced their overall price by \$666,000 to \$56,046,000. Subsequent EN 016 was issued because in addition to reducing the towing CLINs, (b)(3) also reduced the price of CLINs 0001, 1002, 2002, 3002, and 4002. These are government priced reimbursable CLINs which cannot be changed by the offeror.

**3.4.5.** (b)(3) was issued one EN for Price. EN 009 requested clarification of the price for CLINs 1003, 2003, 3003, and 4003, Towing, as it seemed high based on the Government's knowledge and analysis of this requirement. (b)(3) was also notified that their proposal was one of the highest priced offers received. (b)(3) provided revised pricing for CLINs 1003, 2003, 3003, and 4003 which reduced their overall price by \$2,578,800 to \$59,128,056.

**3.4.6.** (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor; however, they were notified that their overall price was the highest priced offer received. Their price remained unchanged at \$66,080,016.96.

**3.4.7.** (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor. Their price remained unchanged at \$59,020,320.

SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION—SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104  
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**Interim Evaluation Results Matrix**

	Staffing Plan	Implementation Plan	Past Performance	Price	Price Ranking
(b)(3)	Acceptable High Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Neutral/Unknown Confidence	56,046,000.00	1
(b)(3)	Unacceptable Unacceptable Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Satisfactory Confidence	56,395,428.00	2
CAV International	Outstanding Low Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	High Confidence	58,468,164.00	3
(b)(3)	Acceptable High Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Little Confidence	58,710,627.96	4
(b)(3)	Acceptable Low Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Satisfactory Confidence	59,020,320.00	5
(b)(3)	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	59,128,056.00	6
(b)(3)	Acceptable Moderate Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Little Confidence	66,080,016.96	7

**4. Final Discussions.** Each offeror was formally notified of their interim evaluation results upon conclusion of the initial round of discussions and review of all proposal revisions. Subsequent ENs documented by the SSET were released to offerors on 6 May 10. Oral discussions were held on 7 May 10 (Ref: Record of Discussions, dated 7 May 10. Records of Discussion are filed with each individual proposal). The Offeror's responses to the subsequent ENs and proposal revisions were received on 13 May 10 and evaluated by the SSET. The SSET documented whether or not the offeror's responses to the ENs resolved the clarifications and/or deficiencies cited. The SSET also evaluated the proposal-revisions against the evaluation criteria and documented any changes to the strengths, weaknesses, color codes, proposal risk assessment, past performance confidence assessment, and evaluated price as shown on the Final Evaluation Results Matrix. A summary of the discussions held with each offeror is shown below by evaluation factor.

**4.1. Evaluation Factor 1, Staffing Plan, Summary**

**4.1.1. CAV International.** All issues with CAV were resolved after the first round of discussions. Rating remains unchanged at Outstanding/low risk.

**4.1.2.** (b)(3) was issued a subsequent EN (013) for this factor. (b)(3) proposal revisions submitted in response to the first round of discussions clarified their plan t (b)(3)

(b)(3)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(3) This plan does not show they will have a Station Manager or Alternate Station Manager on site during all hours of operation with full authority to act for the contractor on all contract matters relating to the daily operation of this contract. This plan indicates (b)(3) (b)(3) which potentially leads to delays in crucial management decisions because there is no manager on site with authority to act for the contractor. (b)(3) revised their staffing plan (b)(3)



~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION — SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b)(3) with full authority to act for the contractor. The SSET determined this approach reduces the risk from high to low.

**4.1.3.** (b)(3) was issued a subsequent EN (015) for this factor. (b)(3) proposal revisions submitted in response to the first round of discussions identified a plan to staff the key areas missing in their original proposal. However, they intend to staff these areas utilizing personnel identified in the original proposed total workforce of seventy-five personnel. The government feels (b)(3) will not be able to successfully perform the required contract based on insufficient personnel. In response to EN 015, (b)(3) provided a revised staffing plan/organization chart which includes increased staffing for ramp services bringing the total proposed workforce to 142. The SSET determined this plan is acceptable with low risk.

**4.1.4.** (b)(3) s was issued a subsequent EN (017) for this factor. (b)(3) proposal revisions submitted in response to the first round of discussions indicated they did not have a clear understanding of the Funds Handling or Communications Management and Information System services. In response to EN 017 and discussions, (b)(3) provided sufficient information indicating their understanding of these functions and identified staffing for these functions. The SSET determined this reduces the risk from high to low.

**4.1.5.** (b)(3) was issued one EN for this factor. EN 018 was issued requesting provide a revised staffing plan which (b)(3). In response, (b)(3) submitted their original staffing plan, which the SSET had initially rated as Excellent/low risk, but which now (b)(3). The SSET determined the plan clearly i (b)(3) and retained the initial rating of Excellent/low risk.

**4.1.6.** (b)(3) was issued a subsequent EN for this factor. EN 014 was issued to inform (b)(3) of two things noted by the government as a result of their response to EN 010. First, the SSET determined (b)(3). Second, (b)(3) overall number of proposed personnel appears minimally sufficient and the government has concerns that the proposed manpower for the ramp handler function potentially does not provide (b)(3) the ability to provide sustained ATGHS for a wide body MOG of four aircraft or equivalent thereof. In their response to the EN, (b)(3). (b)(3). Based on this, the SSET determined the plan is still acceptable with moderate risk.

**4.1.7.** (b)(3) There were no issues with (b)(3) staffing plan. A second round of discussions was not required. Their ratings remain unchanged at Acceptable/Low risk.

## **4.2. Evaluation Factor 2, Implementation Plan, Summary**

**4.2.1. CAV International.** CAV was not issued an EN for this factor; however, they submitted revisions to their implementation plan in an effort to improve their rating. The SSET reviewed the proposal revisions but determined that CAV's rating remained unchanged at Acceptable/Low Risk.

**4.2.2.** (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor during this round of discussions. Their rating remains unchanged at Acceptable/Low Risk.



~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION — SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

4.2.3. (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor during this round of discussions. Their rating remains unchanged at Acceptable/Low risk.

4.2.4. (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor during this round of discussions. Their rating remains unchanged at Acceptable/Low risk.

4.2.5. (b)(3) was issued one EN for this factor. EN 018 was issued requesting (b)(3) provide a revised Implementation plan which clearly (b)(3). In response, (b)(3) submitted their original implementation plan, which the SSET had initially rated as Acceptable/low risk, but which now (b)(3). During discussions, the government readdressed the weakness in the implementation plan stating that the government understood that (b)(3) has the equipment staged at the airport. The concern was that (b)(3) had an insufficient number of staircase trucks. In their response, (b)(3) provided a revised plan that (b)(3). This response eliminates the weakness from the plan. The SSET determined the revised plan clearly (b)(3) y and retained the initial rating of Acceptable/low risk.

4.2.6. (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor during this round of discussions. Their rating remains unchanged at Acceptable/Low Risk.

4.2.7. (b)(3) There were no issues with (b)(3) ' implementation plan. A second round of discussions was not required. Their rating remains unchanged at Acceptable/Low Risk.

#### **4.3. Evaluation Factor 3, Past Performance, Summary**

4.3.1. **CAV International.** All past performance questions were resolved during the first round of discussions. The SSET confidence assessment remains unchanged at High Confidence.

4.3.2. (b)(3) All past performance questions were resolved during the first round of discussions. The SSET confidence assessment remains unchanged at Little Confidence.

4.3.3. (b)(3) There were no past performance questions after the first round of discussions. The SSET confidence assessment remains unchanged at Satisfactory Confidence.

4.3.4. (b)(3) There were no past performance questions after the first round of discussions. The SSET confidence assessment remains unchanged at Neutral/Unknown Confidence.

4.3.5. (b)(3) provided past performance information on two contracts for (b)(3). Completed past performance surveys were also received on these two efforts. Additional information was requested (via teleconference and email) to further clarify (b)(3). Past performance for each company was reviewed with a focus on their roles and responsibilities under the proposal. Based on the information provided, the SSET's overall confidence assessment for this proposal changed from Little Confidence to Satisfactory Confidence.

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION - SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

**4.3.6.** (b)(3) There were no past performance questions after the first round of discussions. The SSET confidence assessment remains unchanged at Little Confidence.

**4.3.7.** (b)(3) There were no issues with (b)(3) confidence assessment rating. A second round of discussions was not required. The SSET confidence assessment remains unchanged at Satisfactory Confidence.

**4.4. Price**

**4.4.1. CAV International.** All issues with CAV were resolved after the first round of discussions. Their price remains unchanged at \$58,468,164.

**4.4.2.** (b)(3) submitted a revised pricing schedule increasing their overall price by \$649,535.40 to \$59,360,163.36.

**4.4.3.** (b)(3) submitted a revised pricing schedule increasing their overall price by \$13,790,736 to \$70,186,164.

**4.4.4.** (b)(3) Subsequent EN 016 was issued because in addition to reducing the towing CLINs, (b)(3) also reduced the price of CLINs 0001, 1002, 2002, 3002, and 4002. These are government priced reimbursable CLINs which cannot be changed by the offeror. (b)(3) submitted revised pricing that returned these CLINs to the government priced amounts which increased their overall price by \$58,986 to \$56,104,986.

**4.4.5.** (b)(3) was not issued a subsequent EN for price although EN 018 requested a revised pricing schedule, if applicable, (b)(3) did not submit a revised pricing schedule. Their price remains unchanged at \$59,128,056.

**4.4.6.** (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor during this round of discussions. Their price remained unchanged at \$66,080,016.96.

**4.4.7.** (b)(3) was not issued an EN for this factor. Their price remained unchanged at \$59,020,320.

SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION — SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104  
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**Evaluation Matrix after discussions (prior to FPRs)**

	Staffing Plan	Implementation Plan	Past Performance	Price	Price Ranking
(b)(3) (b)(3)	Acceptable Low Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Neutral/Unknown Confidence	56,104,986.00	1
<b>CAV International</b>	Outstanding Low Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	High Confidence	58,468,164.00	2
(b)(3)	Acceptable Low Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Satisfactory Confidence	59,020,320.00	3
(b)(3)	Excellent Low Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Satisfactory Confidence	59,128,056.00	4
(b)(3)	Acceptable Low Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Little Confidence	59,360,163.36	5
(b)(3)	Acceptable Moderate Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Little Confidence	66,080,016.96	6
(b)(3)	Acceptable Low Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Satisfactory Confidence	70,186,164.00	7

**5. Evaluation of Final Proposal Revisions.** The Contracting Officer's request for Clearance to request Final Proposal Revisions (FPRs) was approved on 16 Jun 10. The Contracting Officer issued the FPR request to all offerors on 21 Jun 10. Final proposal revisions were received on 23 Jun 10 and evaluated by the SSET. The results of final evaluations are summarized below.

**5.1. Evaluation Factor 1, Staffing Plan, Summary**

**5.1.1. CAV International.** No changes were made to CAV's Staffing Plan; consequently, the assigned color code ratings and risk assessment remain unchanged.

**5.1.2.** (b)(3) . No changes were made to (b)(3) Staffing Plan; consequently, the assigned color code ratings and risk assessment remain unchanged.

**5.1.3.** (b)(3) No changes were made to (b)(3) Staffing Plan; consequently, the assigned color code ratings and risk assessment remain unchanged.

**5.1.4.** (b)(3) No changes were made to (b)(3) Staffing Plan; consequently, the assigned color code ratings and risk assessment remain unchanged.

**5.1.5.** (b)(3) No changes were made to (b)(3) Staffing Plan; consequently, the assigned color code ratings and risk assessment remain unchanged.

**5.1.6.** (b)(3) No changes were made to (b)(3) Staffing Plan; consequently, the assigned color code ratings and risk assessment remain unchanged.

**5.1.7.** (b)(3) No changes were made to (b)(3) Staffing Plan; consequently, the assigned color code ratings and risk assessment remain unchanged.

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION - SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

## **5.2 Evaluation Factor 2, Implementation Plan**

**5.2.1. CAV International.** No changes were made to CAV's Implementation Plan; consequently, the assigned color code ratings and risk assessment remain unchanged.

**5.2.2.** (b)(3) No changes were made to (b)(3) Implementation Plan; consequently, the assigned color code ratings and risk assessment remain unchanged.

**5.2.3.** (b)(3) No changes were made to (b)(3) Implementation Plan; consequently, the assigned color code ratings and risk assessment remain unchanged.

**5.2.4.** (b)(3) . No changes were made to (b)(3) Implementation Plan; consequently, the assigned color code ratings and risk assessment remain unchanged.

**5.2.5.** (b)(3) No changes were made to (b)(3) Implementation Plan; consequently, the assigned color code ratings and risk assessment remain unchanged.

**5.2.6.** (b)(3) . No changes were made to (b)(3) s Implementation Plan; consequently, the assigned color code ratings and risk assessment remain unchanged.

**5.2.7.** (b)(3) . No changes were made to (b)(3) Implementation Plan; consequently, the assigned color code ratings and risk assessment remain unchanged.

## **5.3 Past Performance.**

**5.3.1. CAV International.** Past performance confidence assessment remained High after FPRs.

**5.3.2.** (b)(3) Past performance confidence assessment remained Little after FPRs.

**5.3.3.** (b)(3) Past performance confidence assessment remained Satisfactory after FPRs.

**5.3.4.** (b)(3) . Past performance confidence assessment remained Neutral/Unknown after FPRs.

**5.3.5.** (b)(3) Past performance confidence assessment remained Satisfactory after FPRs.

**5.3.6.** (b)(3) Past performance confidence assessment remained Little after FPRs.

**5.3.7.** (b)(3) . Past performance confidence assessment remained Satisfactory after FPRs.

## **5.4. Price**

**5.4.1. CAV International.** CAV's price remained unchanged at \$58,468,164.00. The SSET considers the price fair and reasonable based on comparison with the other proposals, the Independent Government Cost Estimate and adequate price competition.

**SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION – SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104  
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**5.4.2.** (b)(3) price remained unchanged at \$59,360,163.36. The SSET considers the price fair and reasonable based on comparison with the other proposals, the Independent Government Cost Estimate and adequate price competition.

**5.4.3.** (b)(3) price remained unchanged at \$70,186,164.00. The SSET considers the price fair and reasonable based on comparison with the other proposals, the Independent Government Cost Estimate and adequate price competition.

**5.4.4.** (b)(3) price remained unchanged at \$56,104,986.00. The SSET considers the price fair and reasonable based on comparison with the other proposals, the Independent Government Cost Estimate and adequate price competition.

**5.4.5.** (b)(3) FPR reflected a \$1,352,352.00 price reduction from \$59,128,056.00 to \$57,775,704.00. The SSET considers the price fair and reasonable based on comparison with the other proposals, the Independent Government Cost Estimate and adequate price competition.

**5.4.6.** (b)(3) price remained unchanged at \$66,080,016.96. The SSET considers the price fair and reasonable based on comparison with the other proposals, the Independent Government Cost Estimate and adequate price competition.

**5.4.7.** (b)(3) price remained unchanged at \$59,020,320.00. The SSET considers the price fair and reasonable based on comparison with the other proposals, the Independent Government Cost Estimate and adequate price competition.

**Evaluation Matrix after FPRs**

	Staffing Plan	Implementation Plan	Past Performance	Price	Price Ranking
(b)(3) (b)(3)	Acceptable Low Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Neutral/Unknown Confidence	56,104,986.00	1
(b)(3)	Excellent Low Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Satisfactory Confidence	57,775,704.00	2
<b>CAV International</b>	Outstanding Low Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	High Confidence	58,468,164.00	3
(b)(3)	Acceptable Low Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Satisfactory Confidence	59,020,320.00	4
(b)(3)	Acceptable Low Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Little Confidence	59,360,163.36	5
(b)(3)	Acceptable Moderate Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Little Confidence	66,080,016.96	6
(b)(3)	Acceptable Low Risk	Acceptable Low Risk	Satisfactory Confidence	70,186,164.00	7

**6. Integrated Assessment.** The RFP stated the basis of award as follows: Award will be made to the offeror who is deemed responsible in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulations, whose proposal conforms to the solicitation requirements, and is judged, based on the evaluation factors to represent the best value to the Government. The Government seeks to award to the offeror who gives USTRANSCOM the greatest

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION - SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

confidence that it will best meet or exceed their requirements affordably. This may result in an award to a higher rated, higher priced offeror, where the decision is consistent with the evaluation factors and the Source Selection Authority reasonably determines that the overall business approach and/or superior past performance of the high priced offeror outweighs the cost difference. Following is an integrated assessment of the three highest rated/lowest priced offers:

The remaining offers ( (b)(3) (b)(3) and (b)(3) ) all have acceptable staffing/implementation plans with either Little or Satisfactory Confidence assessments ratings however all of their prices are higher than (b)(3) , and CAV's prices and will not be considered in the integrated assessment.

CAV's Staffing Plan is rated OUTSTANDING with low risk. (b)(3) plan is rated EXCELLENT with low risk. (b)(3) plan is rated ACCEPTABLE with low risk. The SSET found CAV's plan to be the best overall as CAV was the only offeror to receive an Outstanding rating. CAV's plan to employ (b)(3)

a (b)(3) reducing the risk of degradation of services and reduced oversight on the part of the government. CAV's plan also includes (b)(3)

(b)(3) . And finally, CAV's stipulation that they will (b)(3)

(b)(3) This will result in significant direct and indirect cost savings of government provided resources and training personnel.

All three offerors' Implementation Plans are rated acceptable with low risk. CAV has a solid plan that includes an in-place trained and qualified workforce which (b)(3)

CAV received the highest confidence assessment rating of all the offerors. CAV's performance confidence assessment is rated High while (b)(3) is rated Satisfactory and (b)(3) is rated Neutral/Unknown confidence. CAV is an experienced AMC air terminal and ground handling services provider with a proven past performance record that involves the same services included in this effort.

The challenges of providing AMC Air Terminal and Ground Handling Services at Abdullah Al Mubarak Air Base (AAMAB) are unique and complex. AAMAB Kuwait is a critical airlift hub supporting war-fighters in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The successful contractor is responsible for coordinating airlift mission requirements and providing required support services between the Continental United States through AAMAB and on to the theater distribution hubs supporting the war-fighters. Day to day operations are conducted within the very confined spaces of AAMAB with many unique challenges, e.g. six linear wide-body aircraft parking spots requiring constant aircraft towing and repositioning, extensive night time operations with minimal lighting and numerous outside agencies transiting the parking apron, as well as an austere environment including extreme heat conditions and sand storms. U.S. labor is limited locally, which makes it difficult to hire, transport, and maintain a qualified workforce.

The solicitation clearly stated that past performance, staffing plan, and implementation plan were of equal importance and, when combined, were significantly more important than price considerations. CAV's proven past performance and record of experience with essentially the same complexity, scope, and performance requirements mitigates any potential for mission failure and any concerns with a potential lack or

~~SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION - SEE FAR 2.101 AND 3.104~~  
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

gap in services which would require Military Augmentation - which is currently stressed due to support for the wartime Air Expeditionary Force taskings in Afghanistan.


CAV's price is \$2,363,178 higher than (b)(3), \$692,460 higher than (b)(3) but lower than the government cost estimate. (b)(3)

(b)(3) While not the lowest price, the benefits to the government are worth the additional cost.

#### 7. Best Value Award Recommendation.


The SSET determined CAV's proposal to be the best under non-price factors (High Confidence in past performance, Outstanding/low risk in staffing, and Acceptable/low risk in implementation). CAV's staffing plan includes significant strengths with tangible benefits to the government. Their implementation plan is solid and their past performance indicates a proven track record. As stated in the solicitation, the Government seeks to award to the offeror who gives USTRANSCOM the greatest confidence that it will best meet or exceed their requirements affordably. This may result in an award to a higher rated, higher priced offeror, where the decision is consistent with the evaluation factors and the Source Selection Authority reasonably determines that the overall business approach and/or superior past performance of the high priced offeror outweighs the price difference. CAV's higher price is worth the extra confidence the Government will have with a contractor who has an exceptional past performance record and proven ability to perform this requirement. The trade off of higher price for less risk represents the best value to the government. In conclusion, in considering all evaluation factors and their relative order of importance, as well as total evaluated cost, the SSET recommends award be made to CAV International.

Prepared by:

 4.25.2010  
Mr. Jerry Carnako (Date)

#### 8. Approval

As noted on Page 8 of this PAR, as the SSA, I determined CAV's past performance rating is Significant Confidence not High Confidence as assessed by the SSET. Even with this change, CAV still received the highest confidence rating of all offerors. I concur with the SSET's recommendation. It is my decision that CAV International is the best value offeror and will receive the contract award.

  
JOYCE PAVLAK

Source Selection Authority

Date: 29 Jan 10