




# **United States Transportation Command's 20th Anniversary**



## **“Reflecting on the Origins and Evolution of the**



## **United States Transportation Command”**

### **A Panel Discussion**



**4 October 2007**

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## **“Reflecting on the Origins and Evolution of the United States Transportation Command” A Panel Discussion**

**4 October 2007**



**Edited by:**

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and  
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Scott Air Force Base, Illinois  
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## *Preface*

On 1 October 1987, William H. Taft IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Navy Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presided over the official activation of United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. On 4 October 2007, USTRANSCOM celebrated the twentieth anniversary of that seminal occasion with a day-long series of events. The command invited every former commander, deputy commander, chief of staff, director, and plank owner for whom an address could be found to join in the festivities. The day began with briefings to retired four- and three-star general and flag officers and ended with a formal banquet that included alumni, local dignitaries, component command commanders, current USTRANSCOM staff members, and spouses. Other events included dedication of the command's newest conference room in honor of Army Lieutenant General Edward Honor, Retired, who was a founding father and guiding hand to the command; and a ceremony in the main aircraft hangar, which featured a speech by Air Force General Duane H. Cassidy, Retired, USTRANSCOM's first commander, and the filling and sealing of a time capsule with items pertaining to the command's second decade.

For many who attended the anniversary commemoration, the highlight of the day was the history panel discussion, "Reflecting on the Origins and Evolution of the United States Transportation Command." As a relatively young organization, USTRANSCOM is fortunate to still be able to see and hear in person from senior leaders who were instrumental in launching and establishing the command. The hour-long discussion in a packed auditorium, characterized by both the wit and wisdom of the panelists, connected the command's past to the present and future. Along the way, new information came to light regarding some of the politics and maneuvering surrounding the command's creation.

In an effort to reach an audience beyond the standing room only crowd that was privileged to hear the panel discussion live, the USTRANSCOM Research Center is pleased to publish this annotated and illustrated transcript. Besides adding relevant explanatory footnotes and photographs, we have appended a number of documents relevant to the panel's topic. The result, we hope, is a reference work that will be of value not only to the USTRANSCOM staff and command alumni, but to the joint community at large.

The images on the back cover are of the USTRANSCOM badges from 1987 and 2007. The first fifty members of the command, the plank owners, received a USTRANSCOM badge with their corresponding number on the back. The badge depicted here belongs to Dr. James K. Matthews, the first historian for the command and plank owner number 10.

I would like to thank the panelists--General Cassidy; Lieutenant General Honor; Navy Vice Admiral Albert J. Herberger, Retired; and Army Lieutenant General Kenneth R. Wykle, Retired--for sharing their memories and insights on the occasion of USTRANSCOM's twentieth birthday. I am also indebted to Margaret J. Nigra, staff historian, who transcribed the recording of the proceedings, edited the manuscript, researched footnotes, checked facts, created and arranged the front and back matter, designed the cover, and prepared the final copy for publication. While gratefully acknowledging her invaluable and indispensable contributions, I retain sole responsibility for any errors or shortcomings.

JAY H. SMITH, Ph.D.  
Director, Research Center  
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**Dr. Jay H. Smith** is Director, Research Center and Command Historian, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). He assumed his position in 2003 following the retirement of USTRANSCOM's first historian and plank owner, Dr. James K. Matthews. Before coming to USTRANSCOM, Dr. Smith served more than 20 years as a historian for the Air Force at every level from wing to major command, holding ten positions with eight organizations at six bases in the continental United States, Korea, Hawaii, and Germany. He was the

last historian of Military Airlift Command and the first historian of Air Mobility Command and co-authored General Hansford T. Johnson's oral history with Dr. Matthews. Since coming to USTRANSCOM, Dr. Smith has published oral histories of Lieutenant General Gary H. Hughey, Lieutenant General Edward Honor, General John W. Handy, Lieutenant General Robert T. Dail, and Major General Carlos D. "Butch" Pair. Dr. Smith is also author and general editor of the manuscript *Force Behind the Force: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Iraqi Freedom*, which is to be published by the Office of the Director of Joint History in 2008.

## *Introduction*

Dr. Smith: Good morning, General Schwartz,<sup>1</sup> former [US]TRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command] commanders,<sup>2</sup> plank owners,<sup>3</sup> other distinguished TRANSCOM alumni, and current TRANSCOM staff. Welcome to today's 20th Anniversary History Panel reflecting on the origins and evolution of the United States Transportation Command. My name is Jay Smith. I'm the Command Historian at TRANSCOM and moderator for this morning's discussion.

It's been said that "the challenge of history is to recover the past and introduce it to the present."<sup>4</sup> Today, we're pleased to have with us four senior leaders who can help us do just that for TRANSCOM. In the interest of time, and because the panel members are well known to most of you, I will dispense with lengthy introductions. You will find brief biographies focused on their contributions to TRANSCOM in your programs. From your right to left, our panelists are Lieutenant General Edward Honor, United States Army, Retired; General Duane [H.] Cassidy, United States Air Force, Retired; Vice Admiral Albert [J.] Herberger, United States Navy, Retired; and Lieutenant General Kenneth [R.] Wykle, United States Army, Retired. So let's begin.

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<sup>1</sup> General Norton A. Schwartz, Commander, USTRANSCOM, September 2005 to the present.

<sup>2</sup> Former commanders in the audience included Air Force Generals Hansford T. "H. T." Johnson (September 1989 to August 1992) and Charles T. "Tony" Robertson, Jr. (August 1998 to November 2001).

<sup>3</sup> A plank owner is a member of the first crew to serve on a newly-commissioned ship; from the French tradition that such a crew member becomes part owner of the ship. The first fifty personnel assigned to USTRANSCOM were designated as plank owners. See Appendix 15 for the list of USTRANSCOM plank owners.

<sup>4</sup> David Thelen, Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Indiana University.



**Lieutenant General Edward Honor, US Army (Retired),** is a career Army transporter who represented the Army on the general officer steering committee in 1986 that developed the concept for a unified transportation command. General Honor was a fervent supporter of a strong unified transportation command with a full-time commander and responsibilities for managing the Defense Transportation System in both peace and war. This vision was not immediately fulfilled when United States Transportation Command was activated in 1987. Largely a wartime

command, USTRANSCOM had few peacetime responsibilities other than deliberate planning and exercises. Moreover, the Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command, was dual-hatted as the Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM. Eventually, however, General Honor's dream became reality. Following Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Secretary of Defense Richard B. "Dick" Cheney issued a 14 February 1992 memo giving USTRANSCOM operational control of the transportation component commands in peace and war and making it the single manager for defense transportation. And, on 7 September 2005, the dual-hat command arrangement ended when General Norton A. Schwartz became the first full-time Commander, USTRANSCOM. General Honor remained closely involved with USTRANSCOM as Commanding General of Military Traffic Management Command from 1986 to 1987; Director for Logistics, the Joint Staff from 1987 to 1989; and President, National Defense Transportation Association from 1989 to 2002.

## ***Army Lieutenant General Edward Honor***

Dr. Smith: Following the recommendation from his Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management,<sup>5</sup> on 18 April 1987 President Ronald Reagan directed the Secretary of Defense, Casper [W.] Weinberger [Secretary of Defense, January 1981 to November 1987], to establish a unified transportation command.<sup>6</sup> Anticipating this directive, General Alfred [G.] Hansen, Director for Logistics, the Joint Staff [June 1985 to July 1987], had already asked Admiral William J. Crowe, [Jr.] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [October 1985 to September 1989], to put him in charge of the planning effort for the new command.<sup>7</sup> General Honor, you were a member of the General/Flag Officer Steering Group chaired by General Hansen that developed the concept and implementation plan for the new unified transportation command.<sup>8</sup> Would you please describe for us how that process worked?

LTG Honor: With great difficulty. [Laughter] Our going-in position was that everybody non-concurred. [Laughter] But Al Hansen was

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<sup>5</sup> On 15 July 1985, President Reagan established by executive order the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. It was commonly referred to as the Packard Commission after its chairman, David Packard, co-founder of Hewlett-Packard and Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1971. According to the executive order, "The primary objective of the Commission shall be to study defense management policies and procedures, including the budget process, the procurement system, legislative oversight, and the organizational and operational arrangements, both formal and informal, among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Command system, the Military Departments, and the Congress." See Appendix 2.

<sup>6</sup> See Appendix 9.

<sup>7</sup> See Dr. James K. Matthews, *General Alfred G. Hansen, USAF (Retired): Establishment of the United States Transportation Command*, Scott Air Force Base, IL: United States Transportation Command, March 1999.

<sup>8</sup> General Hansen established a two-tiered task force to study the creation of a unified transportation command: a working group composed of colonels and Navy captains from the Joint Staff, Service headquarters, Military Airlift Command, Military Traffic Management Command, Military Sealift Command, and the Joint Deployment Agency to analyze reorganization options and recommend solutions; and a general officer steering group consisting of flag officers, general officers, and equivalent ranking civilians from the aforementioned organizations to monitor the progress of the working group and provide guidance.



General Alfred G. Hansen

certainly the person to chair that group. He was objective and seemed to be oblivious to the non-concurrences. There were 29 of us, about 17 colonels and lieutenant colonels and 12 general officers and SESs [Senior Executive Service civilians].<sup>9</sup> Al had to continually remind us that the objective was to fill the pond and not drain the pond. [Laughter] The steering group met from April through August [1986] almost continuously. Some days we achieved a bit; some days we walked out with no achievements.

In my capacity as the Army representative, I had obtained the backing of the Chief of Staff [of the Army, General John A. Wickham, Jr., June 1983 to June 1987] and the Secretary [of the Army, John O. Marsh, Jr., July 1981 to August 1989] prior to going on the steering group. Plus, I had worked with several of the Army leaders at that time who had deployed forces and were quite

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<sup>9</sup> Senior Executive Service civilians serve in key positions just below the top Presidential appointees. They hold general/flag officer equivalent ranks.

familiar with many of the difficulties that were encountered. So my task was not very hard to get them to concur with the formation of a UTC [unified transportation command].

As we went into the process, the Navy felt, as they do today I understand after having heard the briefing this morning, that belonging to a UTC would detract from their [Military Sealift Command (MSC)]<sup>10</sup> ability to perform their Navy mission. And I think they've picked up more Navy missions since they've been in the UTC, if I'm correct. Duane [Cassidy] can tell more about the Air Force, but as an Army guy, I suspect that no four-star wanted to preside over the loss of a specified command.<sup>11</sup> I guess they had a gathering of the "stars" out here at Scott [Air Force Base (AFB), Illinois] to determine how the Air Force would approach this thing. The Air Force non-concurred for a good while. Then they got religion, [Laughter] and they came on board with us.

Most people on that steering group really felt that the world would not be the same if there was a TRANSCOM. We in the Army, as a Service that needs to get to the fight, really didn't see any down sides. We felt that the unified transportation command would provide a policy and strategic headquarters that would do several things. It would provide a single face for DOD [Department of Defense] transportation; it would provide one-stop shopping for customers, we hoped; provide strategic agility; and provide one

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<sup>10</sup> Military Sealift Command is the Department of Defense's single manager for sealift and the Navy component of USTRANSCOM.

<sup>11</sup> A specified command has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is normally composed of forces from a single Military Department. Before the establishment of USTRANSCOM, Military Airlift Command (MAC) was a specified command and the DOD single manager for airlift. It became the Air Force component of USTRANSCOM. On 1 June 1992, the Air Force inactivated MAC and replaced it with the Air Mobility Command.



President Ronald Reagan and Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.

face to the transportation industry. The industry knows how to divide and conquer. I love them, worked with them for 13 years at NDTA [National Defense Transportation Association<sup>12</sup>] and for years before that as a transportation officer, but they do know how to divide and conquer. We felt that one face to the industry could mitigate that effect. And we felt that a unified transportation command could standardize the rules of engagement for deploying forces. But we really looked at this outfit as a policy and a strategic planning organization; i.e., looking out above, working with DOT [Department of Transportation], working with Congress, because many times in the federal government outside of DOD no one looks at whether or not capacities are in the inventory in the private sector that can support the Department of Defense. It's something that we have to be parochial about and look at at all times. In essence, we saw the UTC commander being the CEO [chief executive officer] with three COOs [chief

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<sup>12</sup> The National Defense Transportation Association is a non-profit, non-political, educational association committed to fostering partnerships between government, military and industry, and maintaining a strong and efficient global transportation, travel and distribution system in support of national security. General Honor served as the president from 1989 to 2002.



operating officers]--MTMC [Military Traffic Management Command],<sup>13</sup> MAC [Military Airlift Command], and the Military Sealift Command. We had some civilian opposition in the Army, but you have to realize that at that time MTMC was the single manager for land transportation and reported to the Secretary of the Army. The Secretary of the Army himself had no difficulty with the UTC, but some of his assistants, who really did the day-to-day work with MTMC, did.<sup>14</sup>

After working on the steering group as Director of Transportation for the Army, I was then moved to the Military Traffic



General Duane H. Cassidy and Lieutenant General Edward Honor

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<sup>13</sup> Military Traffic Management Command was an Army major command and the DOD single manager for ground transportation. It became the Army component of USTRANSCOM. The Army redesignated it the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command on 1 January 2004.

<sup>14</sup> Eric A. Orsini, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Logistics, 1975 to 2004, had reservations about the new unified transportation command. He did not want MTMC to lose its executive agency charter as the DOD single manager for land transportation. See Dr. Jay H. Smith, *Lieutenant General Edward Honor, USA, Establishment and Evolution of the United States Transportation Command: An Oral History*, Scott AFB, IL: United States Transportation Command, August 2006.



Management Command as the commander.<sup>15</sup> I was there four days and it was time to go to the Tank<sup>16</sup> for the decision on the UTC. En route to the Tank, General Wickham told me, “Charlie Gabriel [Air Force General Charles A., Chief of Staff of the Air Force, July 1982 to June 1986] and I talked last night, and we’ve changed signals a little bit. I agreed that TRANSCOM could go to Scott Air Force Base instead of the place that you’d recommended to me [MacDill AFB, Florida]. Do you think that you could work with TRANSCOM at Scott Air Force Base?” Well, what am I to tell my chief? We’re three minutes away from the Tank. [Laughter] So I said, “Yes sir, I can work with them at Scott or anyplace. Location doesn’t matter as long as we get the command formed.”



General John A. Wickham, Jr.  
Army Chief of Staff

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<sup>15</sup> General Honor was Director, Transportation, Energy and Troop Support, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army, from July 1984 to October 1986; and served as Commanding General, Military Traffic Management Command, from October 1986 to June 1987.

<sup>16</sup> The Tank is the informal name for the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room in the Pentagon, which is also known as the Gold Room. The Tank is used for meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, chaired by the Chairman or Vice Chairman; the Operations Deputies of the Services, chaired by the Director, Joint Staff; or the Deputy Operations Deputies, chaired by the Vice Director, Joint Staff, to address issues requiring approval of all the Services.

After I spent my nine months at MTMC, I was moved to the Joint Staff as the J4 [Director for Logistics, the Joint Staff (JS-J4), June 1987 to August 1989]. Admiral Crowe, who was just a wonderful guy to work for, called me and Tom Kelly [Army Lieutenant General Thomas W., Director for Operations, the Joint Staff (JS-J3), March 1988 to March 1991], the J3, in, and he said, “I want TRANSCOM to work, so you two guys keep the antibodies off of them.” [Laughter] In Washington, that meant don’t let people nitpick ‘em.



Lieutenant General Honor and the audience before the start of the program.

After my tour on the Joint Staff as the J4, a vacancy came open at NDTA, and I was offered the job there. By then I had 35 years of service. I continued to work with TRANSCOM, so I was able to observe the command up close and personal for about fifteen years. The committee structure that we had at NDTA supported USTRANSCOM and its mission. I can recall as Duane was trying

to put the Global Transportation Network [GTN]<sup>17</sup> together, and they were trying to figure out what it was, we assembled a number of industry people--UPS [United Parcel Service], FedEx [Federal Express], and others--to describe their systems. We had a technology working group to assist them. So the relationship was close, not only with the UTC, but with the Air Force, because of NDTA's relationship with MAC, formerly MATS [Military Air Transport Service].<sup>18</sup> Look at some of the old journals [*Defense Transportation Journal*, an NDTA publication]. Guys like Dutch Huyser<sup>19</sup> were all members of the Association, and we had worked together. We were not afraid of joint duty, afraid of a different uniform, of commanding an organization. That effort continued. And since Duane and I had worked on the "kitchen cabinet"<sup>20</sup> for the new chairman of NDTA,<sup>21</sup> with Duane coming as the first commander of USTRANSCOM, our relationship continued. It was a rather smooth working relationship, and that has continued to this day.

Dr. Smith: Thank you, General Honor.

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<sup>17</sup> GTN is an automated command and control and in-transit visibility information system that collects and integrates data from selected transportation information systems to create an integrated system of information for use by DOD and commercial transportation partners.

<sup>18</sup> Military Air Transport Service was renamed Military Airlift Command on 1 January 1966.

<sup>19</sup> Air Force General Robert E. Huyser's last assignment was as Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command, from 1979 to 1981. He retired in July 1981 and died in September 1997.

<sup>20</sup> The term was first used in 1831 when President Andrew Jackson stopped holding official cabinet meetings and relied on a group of intimate, unofficial advisors to form policy decisions. The phrase now applies to any informal group of advisors.

<sup>21</sup> Ronald W. Drucker, Chairman, NDTA, 1987 to 1993.



Panel members

From left to right: Lieutenant General Kenneth R. Wykle, Vice Admiral Albert J. Herberger, Dr. Jay H. Smith, General Duane H. Cassidy, and Lieutenant General Edward Honor



Members of the audience

From right to left: Vice Admiral Ann E. Rondeau, Deputy Commander, USTRANSCOM; General H. T. Johnson, Retired, former Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM and AMC; General Norton A. Schwartz, Commander, USTRANSCOM; and General Charles T. "Tony" Robertson, Jr., Retired, former Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, and Commander, AMC



**General Duane H. Cassidy**, US Air Force (Retired), was Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command (MAC) when he was also appointed the first Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) on 1 July 1987. He faced the challenge of creating a combatant command from scratch. USTRANSCOM had been located at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, primarily to take advantage of MAC's expertise in command and control, and in the beginning much of the staff was dual-hatted with the MAC

staff. USTRANSCOM became operational in four phases from April 1987 to October 1990. Under General Cassidy's leadership, the command drafted a National Sealift Policy that President George H. W. Bush signed in 1989. In addition, the command made major contributions to containerization policy, helped formulate transportation policy statements for the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation, and successfully fielded a Global Transportation Network prototype. By the end of General Cassidy's tour as USCINCTRANS in September 1989, the command had grown from 98 military and civilian employees to 360. It was becoming a force in shaping airlift and sealift policy. Due to General Cassidy's leadership and experience, the young command gained confidence and respect in the defense community.

## *Air Force General Duane H. Cassidy*

Dr. Smith: General Cassidy, you were Commander in Chief of Military Airlift Command when you were tapped to be dual-hatted as the Commander in Chief of TRANSCOM.<sup>22</sup> Prior to TRANSCOM's inception, I understand you were skeptical about proposals to create a unified transportation command. Why was that, and what changed your mind?

Gen Cassidy: I think our original position was rather arrogant and protective of MAC. I didn't want to go down in history as the guy who screwed up MAC. [Laughter] I'd been in MAC all my life, and I thought bringing on the Army and the Navy and their systems and their way of life would screw up MAC. I didn't want that to happen. So, as I say, it was an arrogant and protective position, but it had a lot more depth to it than that. Our position was, if we wanted to protect our huge investment--the Air Force's investment--in MAC, and what we thought was a superb job done every day, obviously, we thought we had to be in some control of how all this happened.

If you'll back up with me for a second to the Packard Commission, I, as a specified commander, had testified to the Packard Commission on several occasions. The Packard Commission convinced me that this was going to happen whether we liked it or not, that there was going to be a unified transportation command. Therefore, the problem became--not the problem, but our view of it--how do we construct this so it will work? How do we construct it so we can work together? What's the best way to do it, because we knew there was a lot of opposition. There was going to be

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<sup>22</sup> From the command's activation in 1987, the USTRANSCOM commander also commanded the air component command. When General Schwartz succeeded Air Force General John W. Handy on 7 September 2005, he became the first full-time USTRANSCOM commander, ending the dual-hat arrangement. Air Force General Duncan J. McNabb replaced General Handy as the first full-time commander of Air Mobility Command.





Members of the Packard Commission.

From left to right: David Packard, Frank C. Carlucci III, and James Woolsey

more opposition when we put it into the staff's hands, and we knew the opposition would grow as it went on. But we also knew from the get-go that it was going to happen. So if you have that in your head, that tends to make you feel differently about whether or not you should do it, because you're going to do it anyhow.

When you look at the people on the Packard Commission, there were some real heavyweights of our time, some real statesmen, on that commission.<sup>23</sup> For instance, General Barrow [Marine Corps General Robert H., Retired, Commandant, Marine Corps, July 1979 to June 1983], former Commandant of the Marine Corps, was on it; General Paul Gorman [Army General Paul F., Retired, Vice President, Burdeshaw Associates Limited] from the Army was on

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<sup>23</sup> In addition to the chairman, David Packard, the commissioners included Ernest C. Arbuckle; General Robert H. Barrow, USMC (Ret); Nicholas F. Brady; Louis W. Cabot; Frank C. Carlucci; William P. Clark; Barber B. Conable, Jr.; General Paul F. Gorman, USA (Ret); Carla A. Hills; Admiral James L. Holloway, USN (Ret); Dr. William J. Perry; Charles J. Pilliod, Jr.; Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret); Dr. Herbert Stein; and R. James Woolsey.

it, a real academic, professorial four-star general from the Army, a great guy; Admiral Jim Holloway [Navy Admiral James L., III, Retired, Chief of Naval Operations, June 1974 to July 1978 and President of the Council of American-Flag Ship Operators, 1978 to 1988], was on the commission, and Admiral Holloway was one who knew all the Services well. Then there were a couple of other names like Carlucci [Frank C., III, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Sears World Trade, Inc., 1983 to 1986; Secretary of Defense, November 1987 to January 1989] and Perry [Dr. William J., Chairman, Technology Strategies and Alliances, 1985 to 1993, Secretary of Defense, February 1994 to January 1997]--they became secretaries of defense. So this was not a commission of lightweights, or a commission that was put together just on the whim of the Congress or something. This was a commission that really had some heavyweights on it. As I sat and talked to them, I knew it [a unified transportation command] was going to happen. I could understand why they thought it was going to happen, and I knew once we put this together, they would still have some oversight on it. They had the President on their side, so we really had better do this correctly.

We, the Air Force, took a position that if we tried to get out in front of the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Chairman, if we tried to get out in front of them, they were going to look at us as power grabbers, the guys who wanted to take this over and take it to Scott Air Force Base, and we'd get more resistance than we'd ever want or ever would have had any other way. So Larry Welch, who was the vice chief, and later became the chief as this process went on [Air Force General Larry D., Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, July 1984 to August 1985, and Chief of Staff of the Air Force, July 1986 to June 1990], said, "Why don't we back into





General Duane H. Cassidy

this? Why don't you object a little bit to it, and it'll look good to everybody. [Laughter] It will seem to be your normal method of operation; [Laughter] and it will also coincide with a lot of the staff, because all the staff will non-concur going in," which is what Ed told you that they all did. So our position, although it had some substance, was quite frankly a maneuver on our part to say, "Hey, we're going to do this, and we're probably going to do it at Scott Air Force Base, because it's the best place to do it. It's out of Washington. There's already a staff set up. We've got a command and control system already there. And if nothing else, it's a good waypoint, a good place to get it started." So that's the position we went in with.



Colonel David S. Hinton

Then the two chiefs, the Army and the Air Force chiefs, talked to each other. General John Wickham, who was the Army Chief [of Staff] at the time, felt very strongly about a unified transportation command, certainly more so than Larry Welch did at that time. The idea was “Let’s let him [Wickham], let the Army, take the lead. We’ll agree with the Army, and then we’ll see if we can roll the Navy and the Marine Corps.” We were able to do that because Admiral Crowe was one of the supporters of the legislation. And that’s the way it came down.<sup>24</sup>

Dr. Smith: How do you go about creating a combatant command from scratch?

Gen Cassidy: The first thing you do is get a tenacious colonel who knows how to sweep floors, fly airplanes, and do everything else, and his name is Dave Hinton [Air Force Colonel David S., Chief of Staff, USTRANSCOM, February 1987 to August 1989]. We brought

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<sup>24</sup> On 1 December 1986, Admiral Crowe recommended, over the non-concurrences of the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps, that the Secretary of Defense establish a unified transportation command. William H. Taft, IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense, approved the recommendation on 31 December 1986, and President Ronald Reagan directed establishment of a unified transportation command on 18 April 1987. See Appendices 6, 7, and 9.



Major General John E. Griffith

him in from Europe and said, “Dave, we’d like you to start this command up. We’ll be back in a couple of weeks.” [Laughter] That’s maybe a little overstated, but it’s not too far off. Dave was our point man, and he had a guy by the name of Roy Baker [Air Force Colonel Roy T., Acting Director, Plans and Resources Directorate, USTRANSCOM, 1987], who would take orders from Dave. That’s why Dave hired him. [Laughter] Then I set about to try to pick the rest of the staff. That was easy, with one exception. It was certainly easy for the Air Force. We had Jack Griffith [Air Force Major General John E., Director, Operations and Logistics, USTRANSCOM, September 1987 to May 1990], who was a sitting two-star at the time. Jack had the credibility of knowing everything and everybody in Air Force transportation and logistics. I knew that if we could get Jack to take the job, he would bring with him his own personal credibility and a whole raft of young staff officers who would like to join him. So my first job was to get a hold of Jack and ask him, ask him politely. [Laughter]

Jack's sitting here, I'm looking at him. You'll have to ask him later, I guess, but I'm not so sure at this time in his career that Jack wanted to take something on like that, because none of us knew where this thing was going, other than the fact that we were going to do it.



Major General John R. Piatak

The second thing I did was call General Wickham and say, "I need your best Army two-star Transportation Corps guy for this job. You know he's going to have to be good." And General Wickham said to me, "Well, I don't have the very best two-star in the world, but I've got a one-star who's wonderful. If you get him promoted to two stars, you can have him." That was Jack Piatak [Army Major General John R., Director, Plans and Resources, USTRANSCOM, October 1987 to September 1989], whom most of you Army Transportation Corps guys know. He got promoted to two stars fairly shortly after we got him.

The important part of this whole process of selecting the senior people was that when the Goldwater-Nichols bill<sup>25</sup> was passed, it gave the combatant commanders, the CINCs [commanders in chief]<sup>26</sup> at the time, the ability to pick and choose the people they got. Heretofore, the Services had issued them whomever they wanted, and the combatant commander had to live with that, whoever that was. The next problem was finding a Navy guy. I don't mean to say it was a problem, but it was a problem. [Laughter] The next issue was finding the right admiral. The CNO [Chief of Naval Operations]<sup>27</sup> said, "Well, here, just take this guy." He gave it about two point three seconds worth of thought. I said, "No. I can't live with that." The CNO looked at me like "You have no right to say that," but he realized I did. We went through two iterations of admirals, and finally a guy I had never met, his name came up, and he had credentials that were almost as

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<sup>25</sup> Named for its chief sponsors, Republican Senator Barry M. Goldwater of Arizona and Democratic Representative Bill Nichols of Alabama, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense [DOD] Reorganization Act of 1986 resulted in the most significant reorganization of DOD since its creation in 1947. The Act included eight objectives: "reorganize DOD and strengthen civilian authority; improve military advice given to civilian decision-makers; place 'clear responsibility' on the CINCs [commanders in chief] for accomplishing the missions of the unified commands; ensure that the CINCs' authority over their forces is commensurate with their responsibilities as CINCs; increase attention to strategy and contingency planning; encourage the more efficient use of defense resources; improve joint officer management policies; and enhance the effectiveness of both military operations and DOD management." Operational authority was centralized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was designated the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense, as opposed to the Service chiefs. The act also established the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and streamlined the operational chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified commanders. Of additional interest to USTRANSCOM, Goldwater-Nichols also ordered the Secretary of Defense to consider creation of a unified transportation command and revoked the law preventing creation of such a command.

<sup>26</sup> A combatant commander commands one of the nine unified commands: US Central Command, US European Command, US Southern Command, US Pacific Command, US Special Operations Command, US Northern Command, US Joint Forces Command, US Strategic Command, and US Transportation Command. Combatant commanders were called CINCs until October 2002, when the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, directed that the title "Commander in Chief" would be used only to "connote or indicate" the President of the United States of America. Henceforth, the four-star leaders of the unified combatant commands would be known as "commanders"; for example, Commander, US Transportation Command.

<sup>27</sup> Navy Admiral Carlisle A. Trost, Chief of Naval Operations, July 1986 to June 1990.

good as Jack Griffith's credentials in the Air Force. Actually, in some cases, they were better. Here's a guy who had been to King's Point [US Merchant Marine Academy, King's Point, New York]. He had been a deck officer in the Merchant Marine. He had been an admiral for a long time. He was older than me and wiser. [Laughter] He had less hair, and it was all white. [Laughter] I met Al Herberger for the first time. When I said yes to Al Herberger being the deputy commander, it was the most brilliant day in my life, I want to tell you that.

So we put together a staff of people who then hired the initial staffs in TRANSCOM. That's what made TRANSCOM work. We achieved objectives because we put together the best junior staff I have ever seen, and it's because of these three people, with the help of Dave Hinton, going out and personally selecting and interviewing everybody we got on the staff. There was nobody on that staff that some two[-star] general/flag officer didn't know personally. Therefore, it gelled really quickly, so I can't say enough about that. Was that the question that you asked? [Laughter]

Dr. Smith: That was the question and an excellent answer.

Gen Cassidy: Let me make one other comment here on Dave Hinton's ability. We were really efficient in those days. Dave came to me with all sorts of questions I had no answers for. One was where are we going to be located? I said, "Well, beats the hell out of me, Dave, go find a place." So he went over to the Reserves on the other side of the field. The Reserves were working weekends. Dave said, "Well, those offices are empty on the weekdays," so that's where we started the command. We were hot-desking with the Reserves. Now that's efficiency. Dave and the crew set up their



First USTRANSCOM Staff Meeting, 17 April 1987

Left to Right: General Duane H. Cassidy, Colonel Walter O. McCants, Colonel George E. "Bucky" Poole, Colonel Donald Scooler, Colonel John C. Sowers, Lieutenant Colonel Kim A. Smallheer, Colonel Stark O. Sanders, Jr., Colonel Richard L. Fuller, Colonel James A. Corsi, Colonel Robert D. LaRue, and Colonel David S. Hinton

offices initially in the Reserve buildings across the way, which are gone now. I thought that was a brilliant idea. As a matter of fact, we even discussed Dave staying over there with the Reserves for the rest of his career. [Laughter] But we gave him a desk and an office in the headquarters.

Al, do you want to add anything to that? About Dave?

VADM Herberger: He was absolutely the best pick that you made.

Gen Cassidy: I didn't want to say that with you senior guys around. [Laughter]

Dr. Smith: I want to point out to the audience that Dave Hinton is sitting there in the second row.

VADM Herberger: Right there. Raise your hand.

[Applause for Dave Hinton]



Gen Cassidy: Jack Griffith is over here, too. So you're looking at the initial staff other than Jack Piatak, who had some family issues, or he would have been here as well. We really had a hell of a staff.

Dr. Smith: Sir, what were your objectives and priorities for getting TRANSCOM going?

Gen Cassidy: If any of you disagree, stand up and say so, which I don't have to tell them, they will anyhow. Our first priority after building the staff was to gain some credibility with our fellow combatant commanders; to go out and say, "What can we do for you?" To let them know that we weren't in a mode to go out and attempt to take over things. We were in the mode, as a command, to go out and show and prove ourselves. Admiral Herberger and the gang put together a team, and we traveled around the world. We spent a lot of time with the other combatant commanders establishing ourselves as a combatant command.



First Component Commanders Conference, 1988  
Front row, left to right: Army Major General John H. Stanford, Commanding General, Military Traffic Management Command; Vice Admiral Albert J. Herberger; General Duane H. Cassidy; Air Force Lieutenant General Anthony J. Burshnick, Vice Commander, Military Airlift Command, and Vice Admiral Paul D. Butcher, Commander, Military Sealift Command



There is, I think, a process you go through when you change jobs regarding how you act, how you behave. Are you going to behave like a combatant command and commander and staff? Or are you going to behave as if you were the old staff you used to be, just grown up a little bit? There's a huge difference between the two. If you act like a four-star, you'll be treated like a four-star. If you act like a big three-star who has four stars on, you'll be treated as a three-star. I use that only as an example.

Gen Honor: But Duane, you always acted as a four-star. [Laughter]

Gen Cassidy: Thank you. But our staffs had to act that way, too. We had to permeate through the staff that we weren't bigger than our britches; but, indeed, we were a combatant command that had responsibilities and could do things and make things happen. We put together our lead programs that would put us on the map, things we knew needed to be done. You could have asked Jack Griffith on any given day what needed to be done in the transportation system, and he would have had a book for you, and he probably had prioritized it in his head since he was a kid. Jack, if you don't know Jack well, has held every grade from enlisted buck private to two-stars, so he'd had a little experience by then, and we looked to these people to lead us in establishing our first priorities.

One of our big priorities was to be able to make all the [information] systems somehow talk to one another. We had to get information, and we had to assimilate into our staff the staff of the

JDA [Joint Deployment Agency],<sup>28</sup> which had already done some very good work in this area. The JDA really had done some good staff work, but they lacked the ability to get things done. They were a real pain in the neck most of the time to me as the commander of MAC. We wanted to establish ourselves not as a pain in the neck, but as an organization that had something going and something moving. One of the first things we did was sit down and say, “What are we going to do about information?” Out of that grew the Global Transportation Network. We worked out what it should look like in a very few days and set a guy by the name of Rick Poff [Air Force Colonel Richard G.] to work on it, and the rest is history. GTN, as I was briefed this morning, is still working today, still used, still the primary system. It was designed at a table in P-3<sup>29</sup> in a series of a few meetings twenty years ago. I think that says something for that system, although maybe you just haven’t been able to get a new system on line or something, I don’t know. [Laughter]

Dr. Smith: Thank you, General Cassidy. For those of you who might not recognize the acronym, JDA was the Joint Deployment Agency, and that organization was folded into TRANSCOM after TRANSCOM was created, and its responsibilities brought into the command.

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<sup>28</sup> In 1979, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formed the JDA at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, to be the single manager for deployment execution. Over the next eight years it significantly improved force projection capabilities, but it did not have authority to direct the transportation operating agencies of the Services or the unified and specified commanders in chief to take corrective actions, keep data bases current, or adhere to milestones. JDA’s mission and functions transferred to USTRANSCOM on 18 April 1987, when the agency became the command’s deployment directorate.

<sup>29</sup> Building P-3 on Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, which at that time housed USTRANSCOM offices.



*The men and women of the United States Transportation Command*

*request the pleasure of your company*

*at a ceremonial parade formally activating the*

*United States Transportation Command*

*on Thursday, the first of October*

*at eleven o'clock*

*Parade Field, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois*

*Reception immediately following outside*

*USTRANSCOM Headquarters (Bldg P-4)*

*R.s.v.p. by 11 Sep 1987  
(618) 256-2483  
AUTOVON: 576-2483*

*Military: Blue Ceremonial or  
Service Dress  
Civilian: Business Suit*

### Invitation to USTRANSCOM's Activation Ceremony



Building P-3 as the command's first home



Reviewing the Troops:  
 USTRANSCOM's Activation Ceremony,  
 1 October 1987, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois  
 Left to right: William H. Taft, IV, Deputy  
 Secretary of Defense; General Duane H.  
 Cassidy, Commander in Chief,  
 USTRANSCOM; and Admiral William J.  
 Crowe, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff



General Cassidy accepting the  
 USTRANSCOM flag,  
 USTRANSCOM Activation Ceremony



1st Cavalry Division, Horse Platoon, Fort Hood, Texas  
 USTRANSCOM Activation Ceremony



**Vice Admiral Albert J. Herberger**, US Navy (Retired), was one of only two sailors in the entire command when USTRANSCOM was activated in 1987. As the Deputy Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, from September 1987 to February 1990, he immediately and emphatically moved USTRANSCOM into the sealift business. Under his guidance, USTRANSCOM became the Department of Defense's advocate for revitalizing the US maritime industry to create a ready and

capable strategic sealift force for national defense. Admiral Herberger helped develop the command's first concept of operations, which included development of the Global Transportation Network; interceded with the Navy personnel system to eliminate the obstacles that were preventing USTRANSCOM from filling its Navy billets; worked with the National Defense Transportation Association to establish the Sealift Committee; and formalized USTRANSCOM's relationship with the Department of Transportation. Admiral Herberger retired from the Navy following his USTRANSCOM tour, but he continued to work closely with the command as Vice President, Maritime Affairs, International Planning and Analysis Center from 1990-1993, and Administrator, Maritime Administration, from 1993 to 1997. Among other things, Admiral Herberger revamped the Ready Reserve Force, partnered with USTRANSCOM to get passage of the Maritime Security Act, and brokered the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement.

## *Navy Vice Admiral Albert J. Herberger*

Dr. Smith: Admiral Herberger, we've already heard about the fact that the Navy opposed the creation of a fully unified transportation command with forces assigned. Knowing that, how did you approach your assignment as the Deputy Commander in Chief of TRANSCOM?

VADM Herberger: Okay. [Laughter] I went to see the CNO, Admiral Carlisle Trost, en route out here. I was fully aware of then Secretary of the Navy John Lehman's [John F., Jr., Secretary of the Navy, February 1981 to April 1987] almost single-handed opposition to the standing up of this command. Earlier in his tenure as Secretary of the Navy, he succeeded in stopping the merger of MSC and MTMC back in '82. He went to Senator Tower [John G., Republican-Texas, 1961 to 1985], who was chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and through a conversation, he killed that effort.<sup>30</sup> But many people didn't understand why he was so opposed. People said, "Well, the Navy wants to have singular control of the sealift, of the maritime sector. They don't want to share it with anyone else." They'd been at the Near Term Prepositioned Force efforts from the late 70s. They had the Marine Corps preposition

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<sup>30</sup> In December 1979, a House-Senate Conference Committee on the Fiscal Year 1980 DOD Appropriations Bill directed DOD to develop an implementation plan for the consolidation of Military Sealift Command and Military Traffic Management Command or create a new defense traffic management agency that would assume their traffic management responsibilities. After considerable study and planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously approved a merger plan in February 1982, but the Secretary of the Navy testified against the plan before the House Armed Services Committee and sent a memo to the Secretary of Defense urging the proposal be dropped. The Senate Armed Services Committee, chaired by Republican Senator John Tower of Texas, inserted into the Fiscal Year 1983 DOD Authorization Bill a general provision prohibiting the consolidation of any of the functions of the Service transportation commands, which was retained in the final bill, killing the merger.





Admiral Carlisle A. Trost  
Chief of Naval Operations

squadrons.<sup>31</sup> They had some experience here, and they truly didn't want to share it. At least that was the public perception. But I found out many years later in talking to John Lehman that the single issue that caused his opposition was over the defense business operations fund.<sup>32</sup> In those days, it was the Navy Defense Business Operations Fund. The proceeds from the surcharges charged for providing sealift went into this fund. The Navy got millions of dollars near the end of each fiscal year and was using it not for transportation, but for Naval Air Rework Facilities, NARFs.<sup>33</sup> They didn't in any way want to lose that money. I

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<sup>31</sup> In 1980, the US Navy established the first Near Term Prepositioned Force to hold a Marine Corps brigade's worth of equipment afloat in the Indian Ocean for troops to fall in on during a crisis or contingency operation. The Near Term Prepositioned Force was replaced in December 1985 by the Afloat Prepositioning Force, which today consists of 34 ships operating around the world in three categories: the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Marine Corps); Army Prepositioned Stocks-3, with equipment for Army units; and Navy, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency ships loaded primarily with fuel and ammunition.

<sup>32</sup> A defense business operations fund is a business area managed by a DOD component for providing goods and services to other DOD agencies on a reimbursable basis.

<sup>33</sup> Naval Air Rework Facilities provided depot-level maintenance for Navy aircraft.

guess they didn't have enough in the FYDP [future years defense program] in those budget years.<sup>34</sup> Honest, that came right from the man himself, John Lehman.

I went to the CNO, and I said, "I know the Navy's opposed to standing up this command." I'd worked for Admiral Trost as his aide one time, and I was his deputy down at CINCLANT [Commander in Chief Atlantic] Fleet. I said, "I'm going to go out and do the best I can." He said, "That's exactly what I want you to do." So I came out unencumbered, if you will. I'd known all about the opposition. I knew MSC, particularly, was a little uneasy about the whole thing. So my job was very simple: come out and make it work in whatever way we could. And that was the start of it.



John F. Lehman, Jr.  
Secretary of the Navy

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<sup>34</sup> The future years defense program is a five-or six-year spending program that is updated annually.



General Cassidy mentioned Dave Hinton. To me, Dave Hinton was absolutely indispensable as the chief of staff. We had about fifty people on day one in October '87, the original plank owners. Talk about a lean and mean staff. I tell this story because it proves the point. Every morning I'd meet with General Griffith, General Piatak, and Dave Hinton. We'd have a little meeting in my office. "What are we going to handle today?" On day five, I said to the two two-star generals, "How many people do you have working for you?" They both said, "Two." [Laughter] I said, "That's got to be some kind of a record in DOD, for two two-star generals to have only two people working for them." It gives you the idea of what it was like.

We took on a lot of issues. General Cassidy alluded to the fact that Jack Griffith led a team around the world to ask all of the commanders, the warfighting commanders, "What do you think TRANSCOM should do?" From those surveys that were taken and other information, we came up with our plan of operations. We started to talk about GTN. Another area that was vital--this is a good lesson learned, and it was General Cassidy's idea--we needed to know what our industry, the transportation industry, was all about. So we brought in the CEOs, the union leaders, one at a time. We sat them down in a conference room and said, "What can you do for this new command?" They were our forces in all reality. They were the forces that we were going to need if we ever had to go do a major deployment. So, from the beginning, we started a direct link, a direct dialogue with the senior officials, both on the industry side and the union side.



Vice Admiral Albert J. Herberger

The other thing we did was, we went back into Washington and visited every agency, every department that had transportation and/or deployment in their mission statement. I remember there were 32. There were 32 that had it in their mission statement, and a group of us went around to all those places to talk about it. Of the 32, there were probably a dozen that really worked at it. The others, it was in their original mission statement and remained. The best thing that came out of that, that I recall, was intelligence. We hooked up with DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]. We hooked up with the intelligence agencies because we needed, at that particular time, not the air-type intelligence, we needed maritime. We needed to know what was moving on the oceans of the world. Believe it or not, there were pockets of intelligence gathering buried in DIA and other places. I remember we went in to see the three-star DIA general and he said, “Maritime intelligence. I know we have a shop on that.” The long and short of it was, the guy who had been working at it for thirteen years later in the day thanked me, because he said that was the first time



Vice Admiral Paul D. Butcher

he'd ever been in the general's office. [Laughter] From that we were getting intelligence representation out here, and it was a start. It was exciting. We knew we were on the right path. There were a lot of the iron majors<sup>35</sup> out there who were never going to really try to work with us, and at times we had to get a little hard-nosed about it. The biggest stumbling block, right from the get-go, and it was the Navy, again, that did this: they took the peacetime mission out of our charter. Ironically, the Navy action officer who was responsible for that subsequently came out here to relieve me, [Vice] Admiral Paul [D.] Butcher [Deputy Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, February 1990 to March 1991]. He was the action officer charged with removing the peacetime role from TRANSCOM. I think it was about 1992 when they finally straightened that out and gave TRANSCOM its peacetime role.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> A term for a hard-nosed action officer. An "iron major" can be any rank and any Service.

<sup>36</sup> See Appendix 16.



*Cape Decision*  
A Ready Reserve Force Roll-On/Roll-Off Ship

The other area that I was asked to talk about is MARAD, Maritime Administration. I went to MARAD in 1993, and I was there until '97. During that time, we worked on the Maritime Security Program and VISA [Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement].<sup>37</sup> General Honor has talked about those two programs. We established a close working relationship with TRANSCOM. We would come out here quarterly and then semi-annually to brief the RRF [Ready Reserve Force].<sup>38</sup> We were really trying to put a big “R” in readiness in the RRF, and we ended up getting the support of successive USCINCTrans [Commanders in Chief, USTRANSCOM]. When it came to the Maritime Security

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<sup>37</sup> The Maritime Security Program (MSP) provides financial assistance to offset the increased costs associated with operating a US-flagged vessel. In return, participating carriers commit vessel capacity and their intermodal transportation resources for DOD use in the event of contingencies. MSP provides assured access to sealift/intermodal capacity and a readily available work force of merchant mariners. The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, developed through a partnership between DOD, the Department of Transportation, the Maritime Administration, and the US flag commercial sealift industry, establishes the order in which government-owned merchant ships and private sector maritime assets are called up in a war or national emergency.

<sup>38</sup> The Ready Reserve Force consists of militarily useful ships (the number fluctuates) owned and maintained by the Maritime Administration. These ships are kept at specified readiness levels and come under the operational control of Military Sealift Command when activated.

Program, USCINCTRANS, General Rutherford [Air Force General Robert L., USCINCTRANS, and Commander, AMC, October 1994 to July 1996] sat with me at a hearing in the Senate on sea power. It was the Maritime Administrator and General Rutherford from TRANSCOM both saying how important this program was going to be.

General Cassidy is famous over in Congress for his “if I were king for a day” speech<sup>39</sup> that he gave before one of the key Senate committees about support of the commercial merchant marine. Basically, so I don’t confuse you too much, his posture statement had been purged of anything meaningful the day before the hearing, so he had to come up with a gambit. Senator Breaux [Senator John B., Democrat-Louisiana, 1987 to 2005], the chairman at the time, told him, “I’m going to ask you to give your personal opinion.” General Cassidy, in his inimitable style, said, “If I were king for a day, this is what I would do,” and ticked off about six different items, all in support of the commercial merchant marine. That helped carry the day.

Fast forward to just a couple of years ago: General Handy’s [Air Force General John W., Commander, USTRANSCOM and AMC, November 2001 to September 2005] testimony time and again in support of the Maritime Security Program got it reauthorized. So there’s been a partnership between MARAD and TRANSCOM for many years, a vital partnership. It’s needed, because let’s face it, this country really doesn’t give a lot of support to maritime. The record’s replete with that. I’m talking about the commercial maritime industry. It’s always a hard sell. It’s always hard to get support. It’s vital that the Defense Department and the commercial side and the Maritime Administration stay in a warm, working

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<sup>39</sup> See Appendix 12.

partnership to fight off those evil people who are continually trying to weaken the position. [Laughter] Have I run out of time?

Dr. Smith: No sir.

VADM Herberger: Okay. [Laughter]

LTG Wykle: Better tell him yes; he'll talk all day. [Laughter]

VADM Herberger: I could. I could. I've been stuck with this subject for a long time. I love it. What I think we should do is start looking to the future. I made this comment at an earlier conference: things are changing big time, certainly in the transportation field. It looks like they're changing big time on the military side, and we need to work just like we did back when we started TRANSCOM twenty years ago, trying to project out to the future what we needed. We came up with the programs: Military Sealift Policy, increased readiness of the RRF, the LMSR [large medium speed roll-on/roll-off ship] program.<sup>40</sup> All of those things are what makes it possible to do what we've just done in the last few years. It took a number of years for those initiatives to come to fruition, but they are paying off now. We need to do the same thing for the future. We need to work together in a partnership, and I mean a true partnership. I'll shut down here momentarily.

Dr. Smith: Thank you, Admiral Herberger.

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<sup>40</sup> As a result of lessons learned from the first Gulf War, Congress appropriated \$6 billion to acquire twenty LMSRs, fifteen via new construction and five by conversion of existing hulls. Nine were assigned to Military Sealift Command's afloat prepositioning force and eleven to its sealift fleet. The LMSRs have an average cruising speed of 17 knots and 300,000 square-foot capacity.



**Lieutenant General Kenneth R. Wykle**, US Army (Retired), served as Deputy Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, from 30 August 1993 to 1 September 1995. An advocate of Total Quality Management, he brought to the command a customer focus and a leadership style based on empowering the work force and rewarding performance. He oversaw the first major reorganization of the command since its creation to realign staff functions in light of the publication in 1993 of a new

charter that made USTRANSCOM the Department of Defense's single manager for transportation. The new charter assigned the transportation component commands to USTRANSCOM in peace and war, gave USTRANSCOM combatant command of all DOD transportation assets that were not Service-unique, and placed the transportation accounts of the Defense Business Operations Fund under the control of the Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM. Among other changes, the reorganization created an independent Program Analysis and Financial Management Directorate and the Joint Secretariat. General Wykle also shepherded the Defense Transportation System 2010 strategic planning effort that used input from customers and suppliers to create a guide to future business processes. Following his retirement from the Army in 1995, General Wykle served as Federal Highway Administrator from 1997-2001, where he achieved passage of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century that increased federal aid for highways. In 2002, General Wykle succeeded Edward Honor as president of the National Defense Transportation Association.



## ***Army Lieutenant General Kenneth R. Wykle***

Dr. Smith:

General Wykle, you became the Deputy Commander in Chief of TRANSCOM shortly after the command received what is commonly referred to as its peacetime charter when, in February 1992, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney [Richard B. “Dick,” Secretary of Defense, March 1989 to January 1993] designated TRANSCOM the DOD single manager for transportation, assigned the transportation component commands to TRANSCOM in peace and war, gave TRANSCOM combatant command of all DOD transportation assets that were not Service-unique, and placed the transportation accounts of the Defense Business Operations Fund under the control of the TRANSCOM commander. In what ways did this change in mission impact the way the command was organized and operated during your time here?



Richard B. “Dick” Cheney  
Secretary of Defense

LTG Wykle: As you indicated, this occurred shortly after Desert Shield and Desert Storm.<sup>41</sup> The peacetime mission that AI mentioned had been taken out of TRANSCOM's charter earlier was put back in, so we were trying to get to that focus of being the single manager for transportation in both peace and war. We needed to have an area or focus, I'd guess you'd say, to rally around and drive the command in that direction, and Total Quality Management was the tool we used to do that. We were charged by the commander<sup>42</sup> to really focus on Total Quality Management to bring us together and cause us to look at staff functions and how we were doing business. So we did that. We set out as if to compete for the Baldrige Award,<sup>43</sup> knowing that we couldn't win it, but at least it would help us focus. As I recall, there were five primary areas for that competition. One of the most important was metrics. That really helped us start to try to measure what we were doing operationally and internally, and how quickly we could handle actions, complete actions, get material moved, and things like that. We developed rudimentary stoplight charts for the metrics. I know you've come a long way since that time. I've seen some of your sophisticated charts today. Continue to focus on metrics, because if you measure something, you know how well you're doing or not doing, and you can make adjustments from there.

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<sup>41</sup> Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm refer to the defense of Saudi Arabia and liberation of Kuwait from Iraq, respectively, the two phases of the first Gulf War, August 1990 to March 1991.

<sup>42</sup> Air Force General Ronald R. Fogleman, Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM and Commander, Air Mobility Command, 25 August 1992 to 18 October 1994.

<sup>43</sup> The Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award is the nation's highest Presidential honor for organizational performance excellence. Established by Congress in 1987 to increase the competitiveness of American businesses, the award is named for Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce from 1981 to 1987. Initially only manufacturers, service companies, and small businesses were allowed to compete for the award. The list was expanded in 1999 to include educational and health care institutions, and in 2007 to add nonprofits, including government organizations.



Frank P. Weber

Additionally, we took a look at the staff. We put an SES, Frank Weber,<sup>44</sup> many of you know him, in charge of a group, and they spent several months looking at the entire staff, every function the staff was responsible for, identifying those functions that should remain within TRANSCOM, those functions that maybe should be pushed down to the component commands, and those functions that perhaps were departmental type functions. From that we then restructured the staff, forming a Program Analysis and Financial Management Directorate, the [TC]J8, and the Joint Secretariat to help us on the paperwork side and the processing of documents and so forth. As was mentioned, we got the DBOF, the Defense Business Operations Fund, which is the TWCF [Transportation Working Capital Fund]<sup>45</sup> today, established in the command and capitalized with enough money to really get that revolving fund going.

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<sup>44</sup> Frank P. Weber, Deputy Director, Plans and Policy Directorate, USTRANSCOM, February 1992 to June 1997, and Deputy Director, Logistics and Business Operations, Operations and Logistics Directorate, USTRANSCOM, June 1997 to September 2002.

<sup>45</sup> TWCF is a revolving fund financial structure through which USTRANSCOM covers the cost of operations by billing customers for transportation based on pre-established rates.

Then we focused on reducing the number of information systems. We were transportation-oriented at that time, and we did an inventory of all the transportation management systems and came up with a number of about 127, 129, 130. It depended upon whether you counted some of them as two separate systems or as being rolled into one. Fred Lewis<sup>46</sup> developed a plan to migrate those down to about 29, and we set off on a course to do that. It's not unlike what you're doing with distribution portfolio management today as you look more broadly than just at the transportation systems.<sup>47</sup>



Fred P. Lewis

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<sup>46</sup> Colonel Fred P. Lewis, Chief, Weather Division, USTRANSCOM, August 1992 to February 1994; Director, Joint Transportation Corporate Information Management Center, USTRANSCOM, March 1994 to July 1996.

<sup>47</sup> On 28 July 2004, Bradley Berkson, Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, and Navy Vice Admiral Gordon S. Holder, Director for Logistics on the Joint Staff, jointly designated USTRANSCOM the portfolio manager for DOD logistics information technology systems related to distribution activities, specifically sustainment and force movement. This authority gave USTRANSCOM the lead for developing a management process on which to base decisions about the future of the more than 300 such information systems then in existence. Fred Lewis returned to USTRANSCOM from September 2005 to September 2007 as a Senior Executive Service civilian to direct this effort. See Appendix 18.

We put a lot of emphasis on TPFDDs [time-phased force and deployment data]<sup>48</sup> and the TPFDD review process; bringing representatives from the combatant commands in, spending three or four or five days here looking at the transportation feasibility analysis of those plans and whether or not they could be implemented. What type of capability would it take to do that? That, of course, drives materiel requirements.

We started emphasizing the responsiveness of the component commands to TRANSCOM, because they hadn't really been accustomed to that in the past. The air component wasn't too difficult because of the dual-hatted command arrangement for AMC and TRANSCOM. The TRANSCOM commander could be the AMC commander one day, and the next day he could walk over to TRANSCOM and disapprove something he had signed over on the AMC side. [Laughter] But getting MTMC and MSC in the routine of responding to TRANSCOM from an operational aspect was a little bit more of a challenge. I know that's changed today, and Rob Reilly [Navy Rear Admiral Robert D., Jr., Commander, MSC, March 2006 to the present] snaps to every time he receives something from TRANSCOM.

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<sup>48</sup> A TPFDD is the information residing in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System that constitutes the database portion of an operation plan. It includes information on the personnel and cargo of in-place units and units to be deployed, along with their priority, desired sequence, and routing; estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted simultaneously with the deployment of forces; and estimates of the transportation requirements.



A M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle from the 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia, backing up the ramp of a C-5B Galaxy, 5 October 1993. The aircraft transported the Army equipment to Mogadishu, Somalia, in support of Operation Restore Hope.

On the operational side, it was certainly a different environment than you have today, but there were a lot of little things going on around the world. Somalia was one.<sup>49</sup> After the Ranger operation in Mogadishu, there was a big rush to get tanks over there.<sup>50</sup> We sat around trying to figure out how to do that, and the decision was made: “We’ll fly some over on C-5s.” The readiness rates of the C-5s were so bad that every time one landed, it would break. So

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<sup>49</sup> Beginning in 1991, drought and civil war devastated Somalia, leading to United Nations (UN)-led peacekeeping and relief operations in which the United States was a major participant. When these efforts failed to resolve the crisis, President George H. W. Bush initiated Operation Restore Hope/Joint Task Force Somalia in which the United States assumed leadership of coalition forces under a UN mandate and deployed American forces to Somalia to provide security for humanitarian relief operations from December 1992 to April 1994.

<sup>50</sup> In a rapid display of global reach, Air Mobility Command airlift and tanker aircraft combined to move about 1,300 troops and their heavy equipment, including 18 M-1 tanks and 44 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, to Mogadishu in a nine-day period from 5-15 October 1993. The reinforcements were rushed to Somalia following a 15-hour pitched battle between US Army Rangers and other special forces personnel and forces loyal to Mohamed Farah Aideed. A total of 56 C-5 and C-141 missions operating primarily from Hunter Army Air Field, Georgia, and Griffiss Air Force Base, New York, airlifted the troops and approximately 3,000 tons of cargo. The airlifters flew nonstop to Mogadishu, refueling four times in flight before recovering at Cairo, Egypt. Tanker crews flew 169 refueling missions and offloaded 13.4 million pounds of fuel.

General Fogleman [Air Force General Ronald R., Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, and Commander, AMC, 25 August 1992 to 18 October 1994] made the decision that once we got them airborne, they weren't going to land until they got to Mogadishu. [Laughter] We put up tankers and did, I think, four inflight refuelings, to get them there. None of the C-5s broke in Mogadishu, for some reason. [Laughter] They all landed, offloaded their tanks, and got back. We activated an FSS [Fast Sealift Ship]<sup>51</sup> and got that on berth down in Savannah [Georgia] and loaded out tanks. It was in Mogadishu within, I think, 21 days total time, but we didn't have tugs to berth it. We needed three, and we only had two. We called up the captain of the ship and said, "Will you try it with two?" He thought about it a little bit and said yes, he'd do that, and we were successful in getting it berthed with two tugs. The tanks were offloaded, and we were appreciative of him doing that.<sup>52</sup>

Then, of course, along came the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda.<sup>53</sup> To reach that far with the airplanes, again, en route refueling was needed. Once the planes got on the ground, trying to communicate

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<sup>51</sup> Eight Fast Sealift Ships (FSSs) were added to the US Navy's inventory in the early 1980s as part of a major sealift enhancement program and assigned to Military Sealift Command. They were purchased from private industry as commercial container ships and modified to add roll-on/roll-off ramps, lift capability, and decks for helicopters and vehicles. Capable of speeds up to 30 knots per hour, the FSSs are the fastest cargo ships in the world. Seven ships made nine trips to deploy US forces for operations in Somalia, and six ships made ten trips during the redeployment.

<sup>52</sup> The Fast Sealift Ship *USNS Denebola* departed Savannah, Georgia, on 13 October 1993 with 128,000 square feet of cargo, including tanks. It arrived in the vicinity of Mogadishu, Somalia, on 27 October, in just fourteen days, but lack of the third tug and high seas prevented docking for two days.

<sup>53</sup> After President William J. Clinton directed "an immediate and massive increase" in US relief efforts to assist refugees fleeing ethnic conflict in Rwanda, Air Mobility Command (AMC) launched a large and complex humanitarian operation, Operation Support Hope (23 July to 30 September 1994), over vast distances. AMC aircraft first landed at Goma, Zaire, on 23 July and began operating into Entebbe, Uganda, eventual hub of the operation, on 24 July. Through 11 September, AMC flew 700 Operation Support Hope airlift missions, transporting over 11,000 passengers and 23,000 short tons of cargo. Nearly 400 KC-135 missions air refueled the C-5s and C-141s. KC-10s also flew several dozen missions to ferry fuel from Harare, Zimbabwe, to Entebbe where it was offloaded on the ground.



back to Scott was a challenge. General Handy was the J3 [Director of Operations and Logistics] at the time, and he came up with the idea of a forward comm[unications] set-up, which we pushed. I think some were procured to handle future situations so that airplanes would have on-ground communications when they were some distance away.



Aerial view of the Port of Mogadishu, Somalia, 1 December 1992

Haiti occurred shortly thereafter.<sup>54</sup> I think most of you may recall the planning to invade Haiti. We had about 75 C-130s on the ramp down at Pope Air Force Base/Fort Bragg [North Carolina] loading up the 82d [Airborne Division]. I think all but one made the take-off. They were flying toward Haiti, and General Powell<sup>55</sup> was down there negotiating very intently. There was a spy, so to speak,

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<sup>54</sup> Operation Uphold Democracy was a US-led, multinational military intervention authorized by the United Nations to restore the legitimate, democratically-elected government of Haiti to power following a coup. An invasion force consisting largely of 82d Airborne Division troops was airborne on 18 September 1994 when a delegation headed by former President Jimmy Carter convinced the Haitian strongmen to step aside, thus averting the attack.

<sup>55</sup> In 1994, Retired Army General Colin L. Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1989 to 1993), joined former President Jimmy Carter and Senator Sam Nunn (Dem-Georgia), Chairman, Committee on the Armed Services, on a last-minute peace-making expedition to Haiti, which resulted in the end of military rule and the peaceful return to power of the elected government of that country.

or at least a guy at Fort Bragg who called Haiti and said, “Hey, they’re on their way. They’re serious this time. They’re coming.” That helped General Powell in his negotiations. The aircraft were about at the half way point, and we were sitting over in the TACC [Tanker Airlift Control Center] operations center about midnight, trying to decide whether or not to continue with the mission or turn them around and bring them back. Once they got past a certain point, they had to land because of fuel. At just about that critical point, the decision was made that an agreement had been reached, so they turned around and came back and landed.



Members of the 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, shout in appreciation and enthusiasm after Vice President Al Gore thanked the troops for the outstanding support to their nation, 20 September 1994.



*USNS Benavidez*  
Military Sealift Command Bob Hope Class  
Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off Ship

We worked some things on the acquisition side. The C-17 program was just getting going at that time.<sup>56</sup> It was in trouble. I think five had been built, over budget and behind schedule. The program was limited at that time to a max of forty unless they could get the program squared away. General Rutherford got personally involved, and the program manager was changed. Other improvements were made, and the program got back on track. You know where we are today with that airplane, and how well it's performing. It was in big trouble about that time.

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<sup>56</sup> In 1981, McDonnell Douglas won the contract to produce the C-17 Globemaster III as the replacement for the aging C-141 Starlifter. A full-scale production contract was signed in 1985 for 210 aircraft, later reduced to 120 by Secretary of Defense Richard B. "Dick" Cheney. The C-17 made its first flight on 15 September 1991, a year behind schedule. In December 1993, mounting costs and performance problems led DOD to threaten to cancel the program at 40 aircraft unless contractor management and productivity greatly improved within two years. By the mid-1990s, most of the problems had been resolved. The first operational aircraft was delivered to Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina, on 14 June 1993, and the first squadron became operational there in January 1995. As of October 2007, 190 aircraft were contracted for delivery to the Air Force.

Desert Shield/Desert Storm proved the need for LMSRs.<sup>57</sup> We didn't have them, so we began a procurement program to get them. Again, the biggest challenge was getting funding, and, once we got the funding, keeping track of it, because the Navy wanted to pull it for other purposes. Just like Al was saying, any place they could get money, they wanted it for the combatant ships. It was a challenge to keep those funds available and get the number of ships that we finally achieved, nineteen or twenty.



During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, CRAF aircraft delivered 64 percent of the total passengers and 27 percent of the total cargo.

Then there were the commercial programs. The CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet] carriers were ready to pull out after Desert Shield/Desert Storm, which was the first time CRAF was activated, so we had to come up with some new ideas to

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<sup>57</sup> See footnote 39 on page 37.

incentivize the carriers to continue in the CRAF program.<sup>58</sup> That's an enduring problem that continues today. What are we doing in the Military Airlift Committee [of NDTA]? We're looking at incentives for CRAF, because the business models are changing, the airlines are going through bankruptcy, they've resized their fleets, they don't have as many wide-bodies, all of those things. Why should they participate in CRAF? So we're looking for incentives there.

The VISA program has already been mentioned. As the deputy, I got the task of what General Honor, the CEOs and General Rutherford agreed to that would solve the sealift issue. It was my job as the deputy to make that happen. We got a group together here. Twenty-five percent of my time the last year I was at TRANSCOM was spent on VISA. We met every week in a little conference room to hammer out the VISA framework. Some of those who came after me continued to get that fleshed out. We had the Sealift Readiness Program before, which enabled the US government to "commandeer" ships from the commercial companies. But we found out that wasn't enough. We needed more than the ships, we needed the capability. We needed the ports. We needed the terminals. We needed the cranes. We needed the MHE [materiel handling equipment]. VISA was designed to get capability, not just ships, but the capability of the ships and all that goes with that, the information management

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<sup>58</sup> CRAF is a partnership between the commercial airlines and DOD created to ensure that sufficient airlift is available for deployments in the event of contingencies or war. It came into existence through a series of presidential executive orders and memoranda of understanding, the first of which was signed 15 December 1951. Normally, CRAF commercial carriers voluntarily provide sufficient aircraft to move military passengers and cargo. The USTRANSCOM commander, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, can activate a portion of the fleet commensurate to the needs of the military. Activation can occur in the following three stages: Stage I for a regional crisis, Stage II for a major theater war, and Stage III for a multiple theater war or period of national mobilization. CRAF was activated for the first time on 17 August 1990 when Stage I was called up to support Operation Desert Storm. A portion of Stage I was also activated on 8 February 2003 for the deployment of forces in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US-led invasion of Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein from power, which began on 19 March 2003.

systems and everything. That proved very beneficial in terms of revitalizing the US Merchant Marine and giving them something they could hang their hat on.

I must say, that some of the folks I worked with were just tremendous. Some are sitting here today. On the Joint Staff, [Navy] Vice Admiral [Richard C.] Macke [Director, Joint Staff, December 1992 to July 1994] was the director of the Joint Staff; and then [Air Force Lieutenant General] Walt Kross [Director, Joint Staff, July 1994 to July 1996; later served as USCINCTrans and Commander, AMC, July 1996 to August 1998] came along. For my second year, Jack Sheehan [Marine Corps Lieutenant General John J., Director for Operations, the Joint Staff, May 1993 to October 1994] was the J3. I worked with Jack and Gary Mears [Air Force Lieutenant General Gary H., Director for Logistics, the Joint Staff, September 1991 to September 1993], who was for a short time the J4; and then Bat LaPlante [Navy Vice Admiral John B., Director for Logistics, March 1994 to March 1996] replaced him. In the component commands, Tony [Air Force Lieutenant General Charles T. "Tony" Robertson, Jr., Vice Commander, AMC, June 1995 to September 1996; later served as USCINCTrans and Commander, AMC, August 1998 to November 2001] was over at AMC as the Vice; before him, it was General Jackson [Air Force Lieutenant General John E., Vice Commander, AMC, August 1993 to August 1994], and Ed Tenoso [Air Force Lieutenant General Edwin E., Vice Commander, AMC, October 1994 to June 1995]. Dick Larson [Army Major General Richard G., Commanding General, MTMC, September 1991 to May 1994] was at MTMC at that time, and Kalleres [Navy Vice Admiral Michael P., Commander, MSC, June 1992 to September 1994] and Quast [Navy Vice Admiral Philip M., Commander, MSC, September 1994 to February 1997] were at

MSC. It was really a good group of people who enabled us to get a lot accomplished, and I'm very pleased to have had the opportunity to have done it. Thank you.

Dr. Smith: Thank you, General Wykle.



## *Concluding Remarks*

Dr. Smith: TRANSCOM has certainly come a long way in twenty years, and I'd like to ask each of you in turn to comment on what you think of the command today. Have we got it about right? And what do you think the future holds? I'll start with you, General Honor.

LTG Honor: It doesn't seem like it has been twenty years. I was only 34 when this thing started. [Laughter]

VADM Herberger: No, it doesn't seem like twenty years, does it?

LTG Honor: I think the best is yet to come. I think as the distribution process owner<sup>59</sup> mission evolves, and with the work that's being done with the Defense Logistics Agency today,<sup>60</sup> I think there are some cost avoidances of a magnitude that DOD has not even considered.

Dr. Smith: General Cassidy?

Gen Cassidy: Look at the number of people here at this headquarters, somewhere between 1,000 and 1,700 I think General Schwartz told me yesterday; we had 350.<sup>61</sup> You've taken on other missions, and I'm not complaining about the number of people here. I think what you've got to do is always stay vital. Don't get so big and cumbersome that the bureaucracy weighs you down. Go out to the other, older unified commands and see how hard it is just to get

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<sup>59</sup> In the biggest change to USTRANSCOM's mission since it received the peacetime charter in 1992, on 16 September 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld designated the USTRANSCOM commander the distribution process owner (DPO) for DOD. DPO responsibilities include improving the "overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution related activities – deployment, sustainment and redeployment support during peace and war," and serving as "the single entity to direct and supervise execution of the Strategic Distribution system." See Appendices 17, 19, and 21.

<sup>60</sup> The Defense Logistics Agency works closely with USTRANSCOM on distribution process owner matters.

<sup>61</sup> As of 1 October 2007, USTRANSCOM's authorized strength was 1,131 personnel (684 active duty military and 447 civilians) plus 412 contractors, making it the smallest combatant command by far.

someone to say hello to you. And always stay young. Twenty years is not very long--you're still a kid, you know. What good is a newborn baby? You're just barely out of teenagership here. You've got to always stay very supple and very quick and not get sedate out here in the cornfields. You probably would be better off being short of office space and having to use the Reserves' offices or something like. It'll make people work harder, because it's not comfortable. I think the command is amazing, it's just wonderful. I'd like to take full credit for it, but there are hundreds of people who have come after us who certainly did a lot more than we ever did and will do even more. So, have at it, you all.

Dr. Smith: Admiral Herberger.

VADM Herberger: I think for the twenty-year run the command is just doing an outstanding job. You hear nothing from the outside world but good things. Our challenge at the beginning was to work with the commercial industry. There are very few commands within DOD that have that as a challenge, so for most of us that had the military experience, that was a unique challenge. I urge you to continue to work together with your commercial industry partners, taking on the future, just like we had to when we started out twenty years ago. Skilled manpower is becoming critical across the board. The types of vessels, the types of aircraft, types of infrastructure, all these things are key issues today. We established, I think, genuine partnerships from the beginning, and I urge you to continue that effort.

Dr. Smith: Thank you, sir. General Wykle.

LTG Wykle: Personally, I'm very proud to have been a part of the command. I think you've just done great work. I'm really pleased that I could be a part of that. The role and the significance of the command in

the joint command structure have improved tremendously over the last twenty years, and you really are a true equal among the joint component commands, if you will. My compliments. I commend the past commanders of TRANSCOM and the past leadership of TRANSCOM for what they've been able to do, how much the command has grown, and the improvements that have been made over the twelve years that I've been gone. It's hard to believe that twelve years ago I left this place. There's been just great progress since that period of time. I commend all you and thank you for the opportunity.

Dr. Smith:

Thank you.

Ladies and gentlemen, this concludes our panel discussion. I'd like to thank our panelists for sharing their memories and their insights with us this morning. Please give them a warm round of applause.



20th Anniversary Photo, 21 September 2007  
Front row, left to right: Vice Admiral Ann E. Rondeau, Deputy Commander;  
General Norton A. Schwartz, Commander; and Major General William Johnson, Chief of Staff

## APPENDIX 1

### *Consolidation of Transportation in the Department of Defense*

**World War II:** Showed that transportation and other military functions were poorly organized, resulting in overlap and duplication in manpower and assets. Consequently, in 1944 Congress considered establishing a unified armed service. Testimony highlighted the benefits of centralizing military transportation resources and defense traffic management. Service opposition, however, killed the initiative.

**National Security Act of 1947:** Clarified Congress' intent not to merge the three Services into a single organization and directed the Secretary of Defense (James V. Forrestal, September 1947 to March 1949) to eliminate unnecessary duplication and overlapping in several fields, including transportation. That position led to interdependence of transportation functions and eventually to today's single manager concept.

**1949 Hoover Commission:** Was sharply critical of the lack of coordination in the government supply and transportation functions, and recommended that they be consolidated. It specifically recommended that military transportation be centralized under a National Military Establishment. The result was the creation of the General Services Administration on 1 July 1949 with power to establish policy and methods of procurement in the areas of transportation and traffic management. However, the Secretary of Defense (Charles E. Wilson, January 1953 to October 1957) could exempt the Department of Defense from General Services Administration authority in the interest of national security, and in 1954 he moved the Department out from under the Administration's control.

**1955 Hoover Commission:** Criticizing the general lack of modern traffic management in the federal government, the 1955 Hoover Commission recommended that the Secretary of Defense create a Director of Transportation under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics that would establish policy for traffic management. The Army agreed to centralization in principle but felt it should be the central traffic manager, while the Navy and Air Force favored retaining traffic management functions in the Services. In the end, the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to agree so they shelved the issue.

**1956-1970:** The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Army made several attempts to centralize traffic management but were thwarted by the Services' inability to agree: the Navy and the Air Force believed traffic management was integral to the logistics system and thus must remain the responsibility of the individual Services.

**1956:** The Secretary of Defense (Charles E. Wilson, January 1953 to October 1957) designated the Army as the single manager for continental United States military traffic and created the Military Traffic Management Agency.

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**1958:** The House Committee on Government Operations registered a scathing indictment of the Department of Defense policies for procuring civil airlift and suggested centralization of military traffic management.

**1961:** The Military Traffic Management Agency was placed under Defense Supply Agency and named Defense Traffic Management Service.

**1964:** The Defense Traffic Management Service returned to the Army with a new name, Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service, recognizing its increased responsibilities.

**1970: Blue Ribbon Defense Panel.** Recommended creation of a Logistics Command to take over the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service and Military Sealift Command traffic and terminal management functions. Military Airlift Command would be included in the new unified command.

**1971: Deputy Secretary of Defense Decision Memorandum.** Directed the merger of Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service and Military Sealift Command into a joint Department of Defense surface transportation command. The Department of Defense, however, failed to document any savings and assumed the Navy would not mind losing Military Sealift Command. Congress killed the plan.

**1977: Joint Chiefs of Staff Study.** Known as the Steadman Study, it examined several options for consolidating Department of Defense surface transportation but concluded no deficiencies existed and recommended the status quo--Military Airlift Command remained a specified command and Military Sealift Command and Army's transportation operating agency, renamed Military Traffic Management Command in 1974, stayed independent under their respective services. This study stands alone in not recommending consolidation.

**November 1978: Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Nifty Nugget.** Demonstrated inefficiencies of the existing traffic management structure. Fragmented responsibilities for surface movement created severe coordination problems that inhibited responsiveness.

**April 1979: Report on the Feasibility of Consolidating the Military Traffic Management Command and the Military Sealift Command.** The House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations staff recommended that a defense traffic management agency assume Military Traffic Management Command and Military Sealift Command traffic management responsibilities.

**May 1979:** The Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Joint Deployment Agency at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

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**December 1979:** The House/Senate Conference report on the Fiscal Year 1980 Defense Appropriations Bill directed the Department of Defense to develop an implementation plan for consolidation of Military Sealift Command and Military Traffic Management Command and/or the creation of a defense traffic management agency in Fiscal Year 1980. In testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, the Department of Defense advised that further analysis of alternatives was required before a decision could be made. It set up a steering committee and contracted with Harbridge House.

**September 1980: Harbridge House Study.** Recommended establishment of a defense traffic management agency or a unified traffic management command comprised of Military Traffic Management Command and Military Sealift Command as components. The Army would continue to operate ports and the Navy sealift.

**November 1980:** The Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise Proud Spirit reinforced the findings of Nifty Nugget and the Office of the Secretary of Defense and congressional studies: no single agency was able to view the total transportation system and ensure efficient employment of all modes.

**December 1980:** The House/Senate Conference Committee on the Fiscal Year 1981 Department of Defense Appropriations Act concluded that further study of this issue was not required and that the Department of Defense should submit a plan for a unified traffic management command or agency by 1 May 1981.

**January-April 1981:** The reaction of the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Harbridge House recommendation was that, with its component command structure, the unified traffic management command would increase layering and adequate weight was not given to wartime needs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to initiate their own review of the issue.

**30 June 1981:** After a review of the Service responses and in order to be responsive to congressional direction, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Frank C. Carlucci III, February 1981 to December 1982) approved a compromise proposal. He directed the transfer of sealift cargo and passenger booking and contract administration functions to Military Traffic Management Command by 1 October 1981, and asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a plan that would establish the organizational and procedural framework for performing joint wartime and contingency mobility planning and deployments, and peacetime and wartime traffic management.

**24 July 1981:** The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted concept and milestones for enhancement of deployment planning and execution. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed unanimously that the management of the surface movement system could best be accomplished by integration of the Military Traffic Management



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Command and Military Sealift Command into a single command reporting through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense.

**16 September 1981:** The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Frank C. Carlucci III, February 1981 to December 1982) approved the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept and associated milestones for implementation planning and established a senior-level steering group chaired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to oversee the work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Task Force. The Deputy Secretary set 1 October 1982 as the goal for completing the integration of Military Traffic Management Command and Military Sealift Command. The Chairmen of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees, as well as other interested members, were advised of the course of action.

**5 October 1981:** The Military Export Cargo Offering and Booking Offices were established worldwide under Military Traffic Management Command supervision.

**20 October 1981:** The Department of Defense announced the formation of the Military Export Cargo Offering and Booking Offices and approval of the concept for integration of Military Traffic Management Command and Military Sealift Command.

**16 November 1981:** The Report of the House Appropriations Committee on the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for 1982, heartily endorsed the Deputy Secretary's decision of 16 September 1981, to merge Military Traffic Management Command and Military Sealift Command.

**January 1982:** The Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Task Force completed the implementation plan for integration of Military Traffic Management Command and Military Sealift Command.

**3 February 1982:** The Joint Chiefs of Staff by unanimous vote recommended the integration of Military Sealift Command and Military Traffic Management Command into a unified military transportation command. They provided an implementation plan and Terms of Reference for the military transportation command which would result in establishment of the command by 1 October 1982.

**5 March 1982:** The Secretary of the Navy (John F. Lehman, Jr., February 1981 to April 1987) recommended that the Secretary of Defense (Caspar W. Weinberger, January 1981 to November 1987) drop consideration of the military transportation command because it would do more harm than good in regard to sealift management.

## APPENDIX 1

**10 March 1982:** At hearings before the House Armed Services Committee, the Secretary of the Navy (John F. Lehman, Jr., February 1981 to April 1987) testified against the military transportation command proposal.

**1 April 1982:** The Secretary of the Navy (John F. Lehman, Jr., February 1981 to April 1987) in a memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Frank W. Carlucci III, February 1981 to December 1982) elaborated on his opposition to the military transportation command and, again, suggested that he drop consideration of the proposal.

**13 April 1982:** The Senate Armed Services Committee reported the Department of Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 1983 with a general provision prohibiting the consolidation of any of the functions of the transportation commands.

**17 June 1982:** The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Frank W. Carlucci III, February 1981 to December 1982) testified in support of the military transportation command at hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee. His testimony was supported at these hearings by the Director of the Joint Staff (Air Force Lieutenant General James E. Dalton, July 1981 to June 1983) and Commanding General, Military Traffic Management Command (Army Major General John D. Bruen, June 1979 to July 1983). The Commander, Military Sealift Command (Navy Vice Admiral Kent J. Carroll, July 1981 to May 1983), while supporting integration, testified that he believed that the commander should always be a naval officer.

**3 August 1982:** The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Frank W. Carlucci III, February 1981 to December 1982) advised Senator John G. Tower (Republican-Texas) of the results of a review of deployment capabilities by the Defense Science Board. Their findings confirmed the need for management improvements in the transportation area.

**10 August 1982:** Just prior to consideration of the military transportation command issue by the House/Senate conferees on the Authorization Bill, the Secretary of Defense (Caspar W. Weinberger, January 1981 to November 1987) sent letters to both Senator John G. Tower (Republican-Texas) and Congressman Charles Melvin Price (Democrat-Illinois) asking for their support and indicating that the Secretary of the Navy (John F. Lehman, Jr., February 1981 to April 1987) was prepared to carry out those steps necessary to implement the merger.

**16 August 1982:** The Conference Report on the Department of Defense Authorization Bill was published. Its language prohibiting consolidation of the functions of the transportation commands was retained. Its language also suggested that the Department of Defense should seek legislation to enhance operations of the transportation commands.

## APPENDIX 1

**August 1983:** The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Frank W. Carlucci III, February 1981 to December 1982) approved a compromise plan for the military transportation command developed by the Army and Navy. This plan essentially would have converted Military Traffic Management Command into a unified military transportation command. Transportation contingency and execution planning would have been consolidated in the military transportation command. Military Sealift Command would have continued as a separate Navy command.

**September 1983:** The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Paul W. Thayer, January 1983 to January 1984) asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare an implementation plan in 60 days. Letters were sent to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees describing the compromise proposal for the military transportation command and requesting repeal of the prohibition against consolidating functions.

**November 1984:** The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Department of Defense proceed with a systems development approach to resolving surface transportation planning and execution problems and hold in abeyance organizational changes.

**January 1985:** The Deputy Secretary of Defense (William H. Taft, IV, February 1984 to April 1989) approved the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations to proceed with a systems development proposal. A joint flag/general officer steering group was established to oversee the effort and report on the progress. The Department of Defense proposals in the Fiscal Year 1984 and Fiscal Year 1985 authorization requests to repeal language prohibiting consolidation of transportation functions were rejected by Congress.

**28 February 1986:** President Reagan's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission) recommended, in its Interim Report, that Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger (January 1981 to November 1987) "establish a single unified command to integrate global air, land, and sea transportation."

**28 March 1986:** The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. (October 1985 to September 1989), formed a general/flag officer steering committee and a full-time working group to plan for the establishment of a unified transportation command.

**1 April 1986:** President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive No. 219 directing the Secretary of Defense (Caspar W. Weinberger, January 1981 to November 1987) to establish a unified transportation command.

**29 September 1986:** Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 ordered the Secretary of Defense to consider creation of a unified

## APPENDIX 1

transportation command with Military Airlift Command, Military Traffic Management Command, and Military Sealift Command and repealed the law prohibiting it.

**31 December 1986:** Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV (February 1984 to April 1989) approved the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation to unify Military Airlift Command, Military Traffic Management Command, and Military Sealift Command under a unified transportation command with headquarters at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. In addition, the Joint Deployment Agency, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, would be disestablished and absorbed by the new command. Furthermore, Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command, would also serve as the commander in chief of the unified transportation command. Finally, Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., October 1985 to September 1989) to write an Implementation Plan and to establish the unified transportation command in early 1987.

**10 April 1987:** The Secretary of Defense, (Caspar W. Weinberger, January 1981 to November 1987) approved the United States Transportation Command Implementation Plan.

**18 April 1987:** President Reagan directed Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger (January 1981 to November 1987) to establish the United States Transportation Command to provide global, air, land, and sea transportation to meet national security needs. The new command's mission was wartime oriented with few peacetime responsibilities other than deliberate planning and exercises.

**1 July 1987:** The Senate confirmed Air Force General Duane H. Cassidy, Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command (September 1985 to September 1989), as first Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command (April 1987 to September 1989), thus activating the command at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.

**1 October 1987:** The formal activation ceremony of the United States Transportation Command took place at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.

**14 February 1992:** Secretary of Defense Richard B. "Dick" Cheney (March 1989 to January 1993) signed a memorandum expanding the mission responsibilities of the United States Transportation Command. "The mission of the Commander in Chief of the United States Transportation Command shall be to provide air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense, both in time of peace and time of war."

**1 June 1992:** The Air Force inactivated the Military Airlift Command and constituted and activated the Air Mobility Command at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, in the largest reorganization of the Air Force since it was formed in 1947.

## APPENDIX 1

**8 January 1993:** Donald J. Atwood, Jr., Acting Secretary of Defense, signed Department of Defense Directive No. 5158.4 superseding Secretary of Defense Richard B. “Dick” Cheney’s (March 1989 to January 1993) memo of 14 February 1992. The new directive gave the Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command, combatant command of the transportation component commands in time of peace and time of war and made him the Department of Defense’s “single manager for transportation, other than service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets.”

SOURCE: Chronology (U), “Consolidation of Transportation in the Department of Defense,” by Dr. James K. Matthews and Ms. Cora J. Holt, 1994.

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## EXECUTIVE ORDER 12526

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### **President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management**

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and in order to establish, in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. I), a Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. *Establishment.* (a) There is established the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. The Commission shall be composed of no fewer than ten and no more than seventeen members appointed or designated by the President.

(b) The composition of the Commission shall include persons with extensive experience and national reputations in commerce and industry, as well as persons with broad experience in government and national defense.

(c) The President shall designate a Chairman from among the members of the Commission. The Chairman shall appoint a professional and administrative staff to support the Commission.

Section 2. *Functions.* (a) The Commission shall study the issues surrounding defense management and organization, and report its findings and recommendations to the President and simultaneously submit a copy of its report to the Secretary of Defense.

(b) The primary objective of the Commission shall be to study defense management policies and procedures, including the budget process, the procurement system, legislative oversight, and the organizational and operational arrangements, both formal and informal, among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Command system, the Military Departments, and the Congress. In particular, the Commission shall:

1. Review the adequacy of the defense acquisition process, including the adequacy of the defense industrial base, current law governing Federal and Department of Defense procurement activities, departmental directives and management procedures, and the execution of acquisition responsibilities within the Military Departments;
2. Review the adequacy of the current authority and control of the Secretary of Defense in the oversight of the Military Departments, and the efficiency of the decisionmaking apparatus of the Office of the Secretary of Defense;
3. Review the responsibilities of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in providing for joint military advice and force development within a resource-constrained environment;
4. Review the adequacy of the Unified and Specified Command system in providing for the effective planning for and use of military forces;
5. Consider the value and continued role of intervening layers of command on the direction and control of military forces in peace and in war;
6. Review the procedures for developing and fielding military systems incorporating new technologies in a timely fashion;
7. Study and make recommendations concerning congressional oversight and investigative procedures relating to the Department of Defense; and

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8. Recommend how to improve the effectiveness and stability of resources allocation for defense, including the legislative process.

(c) In formulating its recommendations to the President, the Commission shall consider the appropriate means for implementing its recommendations. The Commission shall first devote its attention to the procedures and activities of the Department of Defense associated with the procurement of military equipment and materiel. It shall report its conclusions and recommendations on the procurement section of this study by December 31, 1985. The final report, encompassing the balance of the issues reviewed by the Commission, shall be submitted not later than June 30, 1986, with an interim report to be submitted not later than March 31, 1986.

(d) The Commission shall be in place and operating as soon as possible. Shortly thereafter, the Commission shall brief the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Secretary of Defense on the Commission's plan of action.

(e) Where appropriate, implementation of the Commission's recommendations shall be considered in accordance with regular administrative procedures coordinated by the Office of Management and Budget, and involving the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, and other departments or agencies as required.

Section 3. *Administration.* (a) The heads of Executive agencies shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the Commission such information as it may require for purposes of carrying out its functions.

(b) Members of the Commission shall serve without additional compensation for their work on the Commission. However, members appointed from among private citizens may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in the government service (5 U.S.C. 5701-5707), to the extent funds are available.

(c) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Commission with such administrative services, facilities, staff, and other support services as may be necessary. Any expenses of the Commission shall be paid from such funds as may be available to the Secretary of Defense.

Section 4. *General.* (a) Notwithstanding any other Executive order, the functions of the President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, except that of reporting to the Congress, which are applicable to the Commission, shall be performed by the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with guidelines and procedures established by the Administrator of General Services.

(b) The Commission shall terminate 30 days after the submission of its final report.

Ronald Reagan

The White House,  
July 15, 1985.



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To accomplish meaningful, long-range defense planning, certain modifications are needed in our defense establishment.\*

The President and the Secretary of Defense require military advice that better integrates the individual views of the nation's combatant commanders and the Chiefs of the Services. Today, there is no one uniformed officer clearly responsible for providing such an integrated view, who can draw upon the best thinking of, and act as an effective spokesman for, our senior military leadership. The current authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is insufficient to enable him to perform effectively in this capacity. The Chairman's advisory relation to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman's mandate over the Joint Staff and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman's place in the channel of communications between the Secretary of Defense and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands (CINCs), all must be strengthened to this end.

So, too, must the views of the CINCs be more strongly and purposefully represented than they are at present within the councils of the Joint Chiefs and in weapons requirements decision-making. Because it is the responsibility of the Chairman to integrate the sometimes conflicting advice of the Service Chiefs and the CINCs into a national strategy, the necessity for impartiality and objectivity in doing so argues for another voice in the Joint Chiefs of Staff to represent the views of the CINCs. For these purposes, and to assist the Chairman in his existing and additional responsibilities, we conclude that the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be established.

There is an important need to provide for continuity of advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President in the absence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The current system, in which the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) rotate quarterly as Acting Chairman, has provided continuity better than earlier systems. It also has served to enhance a needed joint perspective among the Service Chiefs and increase their effectiveness in both their JCS and Service roles. The establishment of a Vice Chairman as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff having special responsibilities for representing the interests of the CINCs and reviewing weapons requirements would be an important innovation. While underscoring the importance of continuity, the

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\*With certain important additions, this Chapter represents relevant findings and recommendations presented earlier in our *Interim Report*.

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Commission believes the procedures under which an Acting Chairman is designated should remain flexible. Under the President's direction, the Secretary of Defense should be permitted to adopt those procedures which are best suited to the particular circumstances and to revise them in accordance with changing needs.

The Commission believes that the present authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to influence the quality of the personnel assigned by the Armed Services to the Joint Staff is adequate to assure proper support for him, and for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We note that the JCS corporately control all military personnel, and therefore are in the best position to provide the Chairman with the best possible staff. We do not believe that Congress can usefully legislate new rules for selecting and promoting Joint Staff officers.

We find that improvements also are needed in the several Unified (i.e., multi-Service) and Specified (i.e., single Service) Commands into which our combat forces are organized.

The measure of command now accorded the nation's combatant commanders is not always sufficient for our forces to perform with high confidence of success and coherence of effort. Unified Commanders require broader authority than "operational command," as now understood and practiced, in order to meet the heavy responsibilities that their missions place on them.

In our *Interim Report*, we expressed the conviction that, were combatant commanders authorized and directed to do so, they could reduce significantly the numbers of headquarters subordinate to them and their components, as well as the numbers of personnel assigned to staff duties in these headquarters. We remain convinced that increased authority for each CINC should enable him so to rationalize his command structure. We therefore urge that the Secretary of Defense elicit, through the JCS, specific recommendations to that end.

The Unified Command Plan divides responsibilities among combatant commanders too arbitrarily on the basis of geographical boundaries. Today, some threats overlap those boundaries and must be dealt with functionally.

Moreover, the current command structure reflects command arrangements that evolved during World War II to deal with high-intensity conflict across vast regions of the globe. However well the layers of the present command structure suit the contingency of general war, they are not always well-suited to the regional crises, tensions, and conflicts that are commonplace today.

Finally, loose coordination of strategic lift of military forces throughout the world now constrains military effectiveness. There are demonstrated managerial shortfalls in our ability to allocate available air, land, and sea transportation among many claimants.

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The specific changes recommended by the Commission are necessary to assure unified action by our Armed Forces. On April 24, 1986, in a Special Message to Congress (see Appendix D to this *Final Report*), the President endorsed our recommendations on military organization and command and requested early enactment of legislation required to implement them. As the culmination of a major legislative effort begun in the House of Representatives in 1982 and joined in the Senate by passage of the Barry Goldwater Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, we anticipate enactment of our basic recommendations by the end of 1986.

## Recommendations

**The Commission recommends the following reforms in federal law and DoD practices.**

**Current law should be changed to designate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as the principal uniformed military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, representing his own views as well as the corporate views of the JCS.**

**Current law should be changed to place the Joint Staff and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the exclusive direction of the Chairman, to perform such duties as he prescribes to support the JCS and to respond to the Secretary of Defense. The statutory limit on the number of officers on the Joint Staff should be removed to permit the Chairman a staff sufficient to discharge his responsibilities.**

**The Secretary of Defense should direct that the commands to and reports by the Commanders-in-Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands (CINCs) should be channeled through the Chairman so that the Chairman may better incorporate the views of senior combatant commanders in his advice to the Secretary.**

**The Service Chiefs should serve as members of the JCS. The position of a four-star Vice Chairman should be established by law as a sixth member of the JCS. The Vice Chairman should assist the Chairman by representing the interests of the CINCs, co-chairing the Joint Requirements and Management Board, and performing such other duties as the Chairman may prescribe.**

**The Secretary of Defense, subject to the direction of the President, should determine the procedures under which an Acting Chairman is designated to serve in the absence of the Chairman of the JCS. Such procedures**

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should remain flexible and responsive to changing circumstances.

Subject to the review and approval of the Secretary of Defense, Unified Commanders should be given broader authority to structure subordinate commands, joint task forces, and support activities in a way that best supports their missions and results in a significant reduction in the size and numbers of military headquarters.

The Unified Command Plan should be revised to assure increased flexibility to deal with situations that overlap the geographic boundaries of the current combatant commands and with changing world conditions.

For contingencies short of general war, the Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the Chairman and the JCS, should have the flexibility to establish the shortest possible chains of command for each force deployed, consistent with proper supervision and support. This would help the CINCs and the JCS perform better in situations ranging from peace to crisis to general war.

The Secretary of Defense should establish a single unified command to integrate global air, land, and sea transportation, and should have flexibility to structure this organization as he sees fit. Legislation prohibiting such a command should be repealed.

APPENDIX 4

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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
April 1, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT  
AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND  
TECHNOLOGY POLICY  
THE ADMINISTRATOR, GENERAL SERVICES  
ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Implementation of the Recommendations of the Blue  
Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (U)

The President has approved the attached Directive implementing  
those recommendations of the Commission on Defense Management  
that can be carried out through Executive action.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



John M. Poindexter

Attachment  
NSDD-219

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## APPENDIX 4

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON  
April 1, 1986

National Security Decision  
Directive Number 219

### IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT (U)

This directive outlines the steps I have approved for the implementation of the initial recommendations of the Commission on Defense Management. I expect the Commission to make additional recommendations which I will evaluate in due course and to elaborate on those it has already made, as required. We must, however, be especially mindful of the need to move quickly and decisively to implement those changes that the Secretary of Defense and I have approved to date. (U)

#### I. National Security Planning and Budgeting (U)

The current Department of Defense planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) is a sophisticated and effective process for the allocation of defense resources. Effective planning is a key element of PPBS. In striving to achieve the objectives of our five-year defense program within a constrained resource environment, the requirement for stable and effective planning is becoming even more important. The planning process requires that we consider the entire scope of national policies and priorities. (U)

In this regard, I have determined that defense planning should convey the initial guidance from senior civilian and military officials to those required to implement such guidance by:

1) the NSC reviewing our national security strategy to determine if changes are required; 2) strengthening the process through which I provide policy and fiscal guidance to the Department of Defense; and 3) enhancing the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the resource allocation process. (U)

NSDD-32 and supporting documents will be reviewed by the National Security Council to assess the need for any appropriate and necessary modifications. This review will begin as soon as possible and extend no more than 60 days beyond the date of this directive. The NSC will then report to me on the need for any adjustments to current national security strategy. (U)

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8/12/92  
under provisions  
of E.O. 12356  
by S. Tiley, National  
Security Council

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The NSC, with the advice and assistance of the Office of Management and Budget, will develop revised schedules and procedures to improve the integration of national security strategy with fiscal guidance provided to the Department of Defense. Toward this end, within 90 days of the date of this directive, the Secretary of Defense shall recommend to the NSC and OMB procedures for: (U)

A) the issuance of provisional five-year budget levels to the Department of Defense. Those budget levels would reflect competing demands on the federal budget and gross national product, and revenue projections; (U)

B) a military strategy to support national objectives within the provisional five-year budget levels. Such strategy would include broad military options developed by the Chairman with the advice of members of the JCS and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands; (U)

C) a net assessment of U.S. and Allied Forces as compared with those of possible adversaries. This net assessment will be used to evaluate the risks associated with various strategic options. Such net assessment will be prepared by the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the JCS (with the assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff); (U) and

D) selection by the President of a military program and the associated budget level. (U)

The NSC and OMB will ensure that such procedures are fully in place prior to the beginning of the budget cycle for Fiscal Year 1989. In the meantime, the Secretary of Defense will ensure that improvements to the planning process, which result from the guidance above, are integrated with the preparation of the Fiscal Year 1988 defense budget to the greatest possible extent. In addition, OMB and DOD will undertake the appropriate steps necessary to produce a two-year defense budget for Fiscal Years 1988-89. (U)

My objective is to improve and stabilize strategic planning at the highest level, so that public and congressional debate can be elevated and brought to bear on these larger questions of defense policy. (U)

### II. Military Organization and Command (U)

I fully endorse the recommendations of the Commission concerning military organization and command. To continue to

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## APPENDIX 4

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strengthen command, control, and military advice, the following measures will be undertaken:

A. Within 90 days of this directive, the Secretary of Defense will report to me concerning changes to appropriate DOD Directives undertaken to increase the effectiveness of communications between the Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commanders. Such changes shall include improved procedures for the Chairman of the JCS to: (U)

(1) channel the reports of the Combatant Commanders to the Secretary of Defense, subject to the direction of the Secretary, so that the Chairman may better incorporate the views of the Combatant Commanders in his advice to the President and the Secretary; and (U)

(2) channel to the Combatant Commanders the orders of the President and the Secretary of Defense. (U)

B. Within 180 days of the date of this directive, the Secretary of Defense will report to me on revisions made to Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication #2 (Unified Action Armed Forces), the Unified Command Plan, and any other such publications and directives as may be necessary to accomplish the following: (U)

(1) to provide broader authority to the Combatant Commanders to structure subordinate commands, joint task forces and support activities, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense; (U)

(2) to provide options in the organizational structure of Combatant Commands to accommodate the shortest possible chains of command consistent with proper supervision and support, which the Secretary of Defense may implement during contingencies short of general war; (U)

(3) to provide increased flexibility to deal with situations that overlap the current geographical boundaries of the Combatant Commands; and (U)

(4) to ensure the continuing responsiveness of the Combatant Commands to current and projected national security requirements. (U)

I also support the recommendation of the Commission that the current statutory prohibition on the establishment of a single Unified Command for transportation be repealed. Assuming this provision of law will be repealed, the Secretary of Defense will take those steps necessary to establish a single Unified Command to provide global air, land, and sea transportation. (U)

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### III. Acquisition Organization and Procedures (U)

To continue to improve acquisition management, the following measures will be undertaken:

A. Within 60 days of the date of this directive, in anticipation of the enactment of legislation establishing a level II position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, the Secretary of Defense will issue a DOD Directive outlining the roles, functions, and responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, who should have a solid industrial background, will serve as the Defense Acquisition Executive. The existing Defense Acquisition Executive will immediately begin implementation of these actions pending the passage of a bill authorizing appointment of a new USD(A) as contemplated by the Packard Commission. The Directive will encompass the following:

- (1) definition of the scope of the "acquisition" function; (U)
- (2) responsibility for setting policy for procurement and research and development; (U)
- (3) supervision of the performance of the entire department acquisition system; and (U)
- (4) policy for administrative oversight of defense contractors. (U)
- (5) develop appropriate guidance concerning auditing of defense contractors. (U)

B. Within 60 days of the date of this directive, in anticipation of enactment of legislation to establish the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, the Secretary of Defense will direct the Secretaries of the Military Departments to prepare Military Department Directives establishing Service Acquisition Executives. The Service Acquisition Executives, acting for the Service Secretaries, will appoint Program Executive Officers (PEO) who will be responsible for a reasonable and defined number of acquisition programs. Program managers for these programs would be responsible directly to their respective PEO and report only to him on program matters. Thus, no program manager would have more than one level of supervision between himself and his Service Acquisition Executive, and no more than two levels between himself and the Department of Defense Acquisition Executive. Each Service should retain flexibility to shorten

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## APPENDIX 4

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this reporting chain even further, as it sees fit. By this means, DOD should substantially reduce the number of acquisition personnel. (U)

C. The Administration should work with the Congress to recodify all federal statutes governing procurement into a single government-wide procurement statute. This recodification should aim not only at consolidation, but more importantly at simplification and consistency. Within 120 days of this directive, the Director of OMB should submit a legislative initiative to me that accomplishes the needed consolidation, simplification and consistency. In preparing this initiative, OMB should work with the DOD and all other appropriate Federal Agencies. (U)

D. Within 60 days the Secretary of Defense shall report to me on measures to strengthen personnel management policies for civilian managers and employees having contracting, procurement or other acquisition responsibilities. (U)

E. Within 45 days of this directive the Secretary of Defense shall establish procedures which call for the Joint Requirements Management Board (JRMB) to be co-chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) and the Vice Chairman of the JCS. These procedures should call for the JRMB to play an active and important role in all joint programs and in appropriate Service programs by defining weapons requirements, selecting programs for development, and providing thereby an early trade-off between cost and performance. The JRMB will conduct its activities under the general supervision of the Secretary of Defense and in coordination with the Defense Resources Board. (U)

F. Within 90 days after the appointment of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, the Secretary of Defense shall report to me on measures, already taken or to be taken, to enhance the cost-efficiency, quality, and timeliness of procurements. (U)

#### IV. Government, Industry, Accountability (U)

Within 90 days of the date of this directive, the Secretary of Defense shall begin implementation and report to me on the implementation of the recommendations of the President's Commission on Defense Management relating to Government/Industry accountability. Steps taken in this regard should not, however, reduce the Department's ability to monitor and audit contractor performance and procedures. (U)

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### V. Reporting and Coordination (U) UNCLASSIFIED

This NSDD contains numerous actions, plans, and implementation procedures. In order to keep me fully informed on the progress of these events, the Secretary of Defense will advise me regularly on implementation progress. (U)

*Ronald Reagan*

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## **APPENDIX 4**

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APPENDIX 5

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

4 April 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL  
INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Implementation of the Recommendations of the President's  
Commission on Defense Management

On April 1, 1986, the President signed a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) to implement most of the recommendations presented to him in the interim report on the President's Commission on Defense Management. The NSDD, and the memoranda issued by Secretary Weinberger to me, as the Defense Acquisition Executive, and to the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation on April 1, 1986, addressed certain of the Commission's recommendations that can be implemented by executive action.

The President has stressed that "the Commission recommendations should provide the basis for structural reform which would permit the Department of Defense to build upon and go beyond what has already been accomplished." The Secretary and I are committed to this objective and we need your cooperation to insure that it is carried out. In doing so, it is important that we move ahead quickly. In this regard, I have carefully examined the Commission's Report, the NSDD, and the Secretary's memorandum to me and determined that the task can best be accomplished by assigning lead DoD officials. I recognize that each implementation action may involve several organizations within the Department. Therefore, each lead official should coordinate closely with other cognizant DoD officials during the implementation process.

Lead responsibility for implementation of the NSDD is assigned as follows:

I. National Security Planning and Budgeting

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)  
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation

## II. Military Organization and Command

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

## III. Acquisition Organization and Procedures

### A. Establishment of Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition)

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)

### B. Establishment of Service Acquisition Executives and Appointment of Program Executive Officers

Secretaries of the Military Departments with the Secretary of the Army taking the coordination lead.

### C. Development of a Single Government-wide Procurement Statute

DoD General Counsel will serve as DoD focal point with the Office of Management and Budget.

### D. Personnel Management Policies

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel)

### E. Joint Requirements Management Board

Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering)

### F. Cost-Efficiency, Quality, and Timeliness of Procurement

Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) (90 days after appointment)

## IV. Government/Industry Accountability

DoD General Counsel

Lead responsibility for implementation of the Secretary's April 1 memorandum is assigned as follows:

### A. Cost-Efficiency, Quality, and Timeliness of Procurement

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Logistics)

### B. Personnel Management Policies

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel)



C. Expand Role of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency  
Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering)

D. Government/Industry Accountability

DoD General Counsel

We all recognize the importance of this effort. It is absolutely essential that we keep on schedule to implement the decisions made by the President and Secretary of Defense. The DASD(Administration) will establish a control mechanism to track assigned responsibilities, progress, and deadlines. He will keep me informed and develop any reports which may be required for the President, the Secretary, or me. Please provide to him the name of an individual who will serve as your representative on these matters.



William H. Taft, IV

## **APPENDIX 5**

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## APPENDIX 6



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-457-86  
1 December 1986

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Recommendations for a Unified Transportation Command

1. These recommendations for the establishment of a Unified Transportation Command (UTC) are in response to Deputy Secretary of Defense instructions of 4 April 1986 on the implementation of National Security Decision Directive 219. They are the result of an extensive examination over the past 7 months of transportation and deployment issues and deficiencies.

2. As a result of this examination, I recommend the establishment of a UTC with headquarters at Scott AFB, Illinois. The UTC will be a unified command organized on functional lines as opposed to the geographic area responsibilities of most other unified commands. Its mission will be to provide global air, sea, and land transportation to meet national security taskings and it will have three component commands to accomplish this tasking: Military Airlift Command (MAC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). As a component of the new unified command, MAC would lose its specified command status once forces of all three components are assigned. The Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) would be disestablished and its functions and responsibilities would be integrated into the UTC.


3. The Commander, MAC, would be dual hatted and serve as Commander in Chief of the UTC reporting directly to you. Although a totally separate command might have been a preferred alternative, resource implications, available general officer/flag billets, and timing showed clear advantages to exploiting further the existing capabilities of Military Airlift Command by integrating selected elements of the UTC command structure, C3S, and other facilities. The dual hatting of the Commander, MAC, and the Commander in Chief of the UTC could always be revisited, later, after the turbulence associated with the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (Defense Reorganization Act) and related issues subsides.

## APPENDIX 6

4. The enclosed concept for the UTC describes the organizational and functional relationships of the new command and is consistent with the requirements of the Defense Reorganization Act. Upon your approval of these recommendations, a command nucleus task force will draft a detailed implementation plan. The UTC will phase-in over a 12-month period. The implementation plan will be provided to you early next year for your approval and forwarding to the White House for Presidential approval and notification of Congress.

5. These recommendations are supported by the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force, but not the Chief of Naval Operations nor the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In their divergent views (enclosed), the Navy favors the establishment of an autonomous command, but on an "evolutionary" basis, using Joint Deployment Agency resources to improve strategic mobility planning and integrate the deployment-related ADP systems of all Services. The Marine Corps' divergent view supports forming an autonomous command, but also recommends commissioning an independent management consultant to conduct a comprehensive analysis before any changes are implemented. Neither the Navy nor the Marine Corps divergent view assigns forces to the UTC in peacetime, leaving questions as to compliance with Section 162 of the Defense Reorganization Act and complicating the transition of the UTC to effectively deploy forces during crises. Also, neither the Navy nor the Marine Corps favors dual hatting CINCMAC or locating the UTC at Scott AFB.

6. My recommendation is that the establishment of the UTC as described in paragraphs 2 through 4 above and in the enclosed concept be approved. It is a positive and responsive move which meets the sense of Congress (Defense Reorganization Act) and the direction of the White House (NSDD-219). Finally, my recommendation provides a structure with the strong potential to rectify once and for all the chronic problems with our wartime deployment system. To the extent possible the concerns of the Navy and Marine Corps will be carefully addressed as command phase-in occurs.



WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosures

a/s

APPENDIX 7



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA


31 December 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Recommendations for a Unified Transportation Command

Your recommended approach for establishing the Unified Transportation Command (UTC), contained in your memorandum of December 1, 1986, subject as above, is approved. I look forward to receiving your detailed implementation plan and to moving ahead with the establishment of the UTC in early 1987.

In addition, within two years of the assignment of forces to the UTC, the Secretary of Defense should be provided with a report evaluating the effectiveness of the command and providing such recommendations for improvement as considered appropriate by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. This review should include an analysis of the dual-hat command arrangement as it relates to the ability of the UTC to satisfy mission-essential requirements of the major transportation users.

  
William H. Taft, IV  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

46461

## **APPENDIX 7**

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OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CM-529-87  
14 January 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, US Army  
Chief of Naval Operations  
Chief of Staff, US Air Force  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command  
Commander in Chief, US Readiness Command

Subject: Unified Transportation Command Implementation Plan  
Development

1. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has approved the establishment of a Unified Transportation Command (UTC) based on the approach forwarded to him on 1 December 1986 (Enclosure A). Below are guidelines for developing the implementation plan which will result in command establishment.
2. The Director for Logistics (J-4) will head a Joint Task Force, which will consist of full-time representatives of the OJCS, the Services, the Transportation Operating Agencies, the Joint Deployment Agency, and the command designate. Their task will be to develop the detailed implementation plan, using the approved concept (Enclosure B). The task force will also draft the necessary changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP).
3. To meet the early 1987 target for establishment of the UTC, (Enclosure C) the Task Force's efforts will require expedited attention. Therefore, the implementation plan will be processed in the same manner as the basic concept for the UTC--directly between the Service Operations Deputies and the Director for Logistics.
4. Enclosed is a listing of manpower requirements for participation in the Joint Task Force (Enclosure D). I would appreciate your providing to J-4 the names of your representatives to that group by 16 January 1987.

WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosures  
a/s



## APPENDIX 8

### GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR THE UNIFIED TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

#### 1. PURPOSE:

To identify the composition, scope, organizational relationships, guidelines, and tasks for the Joint Task Force to establish a Unified Transportation Command (UTC). The primary responsibility of the task force will be the development of a detailed implementation plan for command establishment, based on the concept approved by the Secretary of Defense on 31 December 1986. The Joint Task Force will also prepare the proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP).

#### 2. COMPOSITION:

The Joint Task Force will be under the direction of the Director for Logistics, OJCS, and will consist of representatives from the Joint Staff, the Services, the Transportation Operating Agencies (TOAs), the Joint Deployment Agency, and the command designate of the UTC (see Enclosure A). These representatives will be committed full-time to the working group and will require expedited access to varied staff agencies in their respective Service/command (e.g., personnel, transportation, comptroller, ADP, etc.). The secretary of the task force working group will be an O-6 assigned to OJCS/J-4.

#### 3. SCOPE:

The task force will adhere strictly to the principles in the approved concept in developing the implementation plan. The plan will specifically address:

- a. UTC mission and authority in peace and war.
- b. UTC organization, responsibilities, detailed functional descriptions, and assignment of forces.
- c. Relationship of the UTC with OSD, unified/specified commands, JCS, Services, components and other elements of the joint deployment community.
- d. Programming milestones for: the initial establishment of the command; the transfer of functions and manpower; deactivation of the Joint Deployment Agency; attainment of fully operational status.
- e. Funding for the command headquarters and mission requirements.
- f. Proposed changes to the UCP.

Enclosure B

## APPENDIX 8

g. Chronic deployment system deficiencies (e.g. strategic mobility planning and ADP integration).

### 4. ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS:

The Joint Task Force will be the focal point for the implementation plan until its approval by the President. This will facilitate approval of the implementation plan throughout the joint staffing process. The UTC command designate will identify a command nucleus to participate with the task force, provide recommendations on the implementation plan, and harmonize the UTC's internal programming plans and documents with the JCS implementation plan. The plan will be coordinated directly between the Service Operations Deputies and the Director, J-4.

### 5. ADDITIONAL GUIDELINES:

a. Service-unique transportation missions, functions, and responsibilities specifically delineated in the approved concept remain under Service purview.

b. The manpower available for the UTC headquarters will not exceed the limit currently authorized to JDA; offered by the Services/TOA to execute the functions stated in the concept; realigned by joint manpower surveys; essential to full command establishment (e.g., personnel, administration, special staff, and command section).

c. Military and civilian personnel policies will be designed to minimize disruptions while moving as rapidly as possible to full operational capability.

d. The task force will follow the organizational principles and the definitions in JCS publications.

e. The implementation plan will ensure the continuity of JDA and TOA wartime/contingency/exercise operations throughout the transition to the UTC.

f. The principal OJCS interface point for the UTC after its establishment will be OJCS J-4. (OJCS-J-3, J-7, and C3S will maintain liaison for plans, operations, JOPES development, and communication matters).

g. The plan will make provisions for the Commander-in-Chief Unified Transportation Command to request adjustments to resource requirements (manpower and funding) prior to full-up operations.

Enclosure B

## **APPENDIX 8**

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APPENDIX 9

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

2825

April 18, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER  
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Establishment of the Unified Transportation  
Command

In accordance with the plans outlined in NSDD-219, your recommendation to me of April 10, 1987, and with the advice of the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you are hereby directed to effect the following changes in the structure of combatant commands:

- 1) Establishment of a unified U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).
- 2) Deactivation of the Military Airlift Command as a specified combatant command, to be accomplished as soon as CINCTrans certifies to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that TRANSCOM is fully operational.

Conforming changes to the Unified Command Plan are approved, as proposed.

*Ronald Reagan*

## **APPENDIX 9**

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# UNCLASSIFIED

DJCS INFORMATION  
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FM JCS WASHINGTON DC//VCJCS//  
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INFO CSA WASHINGTON DC  
CMC WASHINGTON DC  
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL  
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM  
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL

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CINCMAC SCOTT AFB IL  
CNO WASHINGTON DC  
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
USCINCRD MACDILL AFB FL  
USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO  
CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NE

UNCLAS

SUBJ: ESTABLISHMENT OF US TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

1. ON 18 APRIL 1987 THE PRESIDENT APPROVED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE US TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (USTRANSCOM) AT SCOTT AFB, IL.
2. UNTIL THE SENATE CONFIRMS THE PRESIDENT'S NOMINATION FOR USCINTRANS, CINCMAC WILL ACT AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE NEW COMMAND. IN THIS CAPACITY, HE WILL EXECUTE THOSE PLANNING, MANAGEMENT, AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS DUTIES ESSENTIAL TO THE FORMAL ESTABLISHMENT OF USTRANSCOM AS STATED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. MAC WILL RETAIN SPECIFIED COMMAND STATUS UNTIL USTRANSCOM BECOMES FULLY OPERATIONAL.
3. SUBSEQUENT TO CONFIRMATION, USCINTRANS WILL ARRANGE APPROPRIATE CEREMONIES TO ESTABLISH FORMALLY THE NEW COMMAND. BT

TMSVC ZDF REQUIRED

ACTION CJCS (5)  
INFO DJS: (1) DJS (1) SJCS (1) NIDS (1) DOCDIV (1) J4 (9)  
QUAL CONTROL (1)

(M)

MCN=87117/04334

TDR=87117/1738Z

TAD=87117/1752Z

CDSN=MAJ466

PAGE 1 OF 1  
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# UNCLASSIFIED

## **APPENDIX 10**

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# APPENDIX 11

MSG CAG153

PRIORITY

DATE: 222  
TIME: 1619

J3  
CNO SEC  
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ZNR UUUUU  
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TO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC  
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RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC  
RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA  
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL  
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
RHCGSRA/CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA  
RHCUAAA/USCINCTrans SCOTT AFB IL  
RHCUAAA/CINCMAC SCOTT AFB IL  
RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
-RUCJAAA/USCINCRD MACDILL AFB FL  
RUEOEHA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM  
RUWRNLB/CINCNORAD PETERSON AFB CO  
RUWTNOA/USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO  
RUCUAAA/CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NE  
-RUCJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL

PAGE 02 RUEKJCS3192 UNCLAS

BT

UNCLAS

SUBJECT: ACTIVATION OF FORSCOM AND USTRANSCOM

1. ON 1 JULY 1987, THE PRESIDENT'S NOMINATION OF GENERAL JOSEPH T. PALASTRA AS THE FIRST COMMANDER IN CHIEF, FORCES COMMAND (CINCFOR) WAS APPROVED BY THE SENATE.
2. ACCORDINGLY, EFFECTIVE 1 JULY 1987, FORCES COMMAND WAS ACTIVATED AS A SPECIFIED COMMAND. THE MISSION OF FORSCOM IS: PROVIDE A GENERAL RESERVE OF COMBAT-READY GROUND FORCES TO REINFORCE OTHER UNIFIED OR SPECIFIED COMMANDS AS DIRECTED; PROVIDE FOR READINESS AND RELATED DEPLOYMENT PLANNING FOR ASSIGNED OR PROGRAMMED FORCES TO REINFORCE THE OTHER UNIFIED OR SPECIFIED COMMANDS; CONDUCT JOINT TRAINING, INCLUDING JOINT TRAINING EXERCISES, OF ASSIGNED FORCES; PLAN FOR, AND EXECUTE IF REQUIRED, LAND DEFENSE OF THE CONTINENTAL

PRIORITY

PAGE 1

MLN 2292



## APPENDIX 11

PRIORITY

PAGE 2

MLN 2292

UNITED STATES. FORSCOM WILL ACHIEVE FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY BY 30 SEPTEMBER 1987.

3. ON 1 JULY 1987, THE US SENATE ALSO CONFIRMED THE PRESIDENT'S NOMINATION OF GENERAL DUANE H. CASSIDY AS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, US TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (USCINCTRANS), A UNIFIED COMMAND. GENERAL CASSIDY RETAINS HIS CURRENT GRADE AND CONTINUES IN HIS POSITION AS

PAGE 03 RUEKJCS3192 UNCLAS

CINCMAC. USTRANSCOM WAS ACTIVATED WITH THE CONFIRMATION OF GENERAL CASSIDY. THE MISSION OF USTRANSCOM IS: PROVIDE GLOBAL AIR, LAND AND SEA TRANSPORTATION.

4. IN ADDITION TO BEING THE AIR COMPONENT OF USTRANSCOM, MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND WILL REMAIN A SPECIFIED COMMAND UNTIL USCINCTRANS HAS CERTIFIED THAT USTRANSCOM IS FULLY OPERATIONAL. FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY IS TO BE ATTAINED BY 1 OCT 88. UNTIL FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY IS ACHIEVED, USTRANSCOM WILL TAKE ACTION FOR PLANNING, WHILE INDIVIDUAL AIRLIFT REQUESTS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO MAC.

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## APPENDIX 12

Excerpt, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, 101st Congress, First Session, July 13, 1989, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1989.

Senator Breaux: Gentlemen, thank you for all your testimony, your presence at the hearing and for your continued interest and work in this very important area.

General Cassidy, you are a person I have a great deal of respect for. You admit that you come into this as a newcomer. And I think that is probably very good. We need some new ideas and new thoughts and new focus on this problem. We have been fooling around with it for far longer than I have been in Congress, which is 17 years. And we still are giving the same type of opening statements that we gave 17 years ago about the trend and the downturn in the U.S. ability to have a strong sealift policy.

We hear that today we are getting out of the Secretary of Transportation a sealift policy that eventually is going to be presented. It makes you wonder why we have not had that for the last 25 years, which apparently we have not.

I notice that your statement--I think it has been sanitized fairly well--has got a lot of platitudes in it. I mean, you say things like, "We have to have an ability to compete for cargo; throwing money at the problem is not the answer; we need to change the way we do things; the old policies need to be changed to fit these times; we have to cut the shackles; we should not do things that do not work; we should consider alternatives." That all sounds great, but it does not tell me what I need to do.

And I guess what I am looking for is some specific recommendations from a person who is in charge of our military transportation. If you had the pencil and could write something for me, what would you say all this tells me I ought to be doing? I mean, does it tell me I ought to be developing a ODS [Operating Differential Subsidy program]-type of program? Does it tell me I ought to be doing a construction differential-type of program for shipyards? Does it tell me I should be reserving more cargo for American ships? Does it tell me I should be putting more money in the Ready Reserve Fleet, or taking some money from the Ready Reserve Fleet and using it for one of these other types of programs?

What does it tell me specifically, other than some nice things that sound very good, that I should be doing, and indeed this Congress should be doing?

## APPENDIX 12

General Cassidy: Sir, if I were king for the day, as you have given me the opportunity, I would start out with five areas. All of them are controversial, all of them will not even have the concurrence of the people that are testifying here today, but this is what I would start out with, and I would do it as quickly as I could. Because every day we lose, we lose time.

First, I would decouple the U.S.-flagged carrier industry and the shipbuilding industry. There is no other industry in this country that I know of where we keep two dissimilar cultures tied together. And it is a disservice to both of the cultures. That is, the shipbuilders and the ship operators. The yoking of these two industries together, in my mind, does nothing but stifle competition, rather than build competition.

Senator Breaux: How do we tie them together? And what do you mean by decoupling? What would we have to do to decouple?

General Cassidy: Decouple the shipbuilding and shipoperating segments and allow the U.S. operators to buy ships where ships are the best for them to buy; the best being the kind they need, that serve their purpose, the most economical for their purpose, the most efficient for their purpose. Do not say you can only buy ships in certain shipyards.

Senator Breaux: In other words, build foreign?

General Cassidy: Buy anywhere you can get them, yes, sir. I think that will do two things. First of all, that will drive the costs down of the ship operators and it will make them competitive. And it will make, once again, the shipyards of this country competitive, because they will have to be competitive.

When you guarantee them the business of the United States, there is no need to become competitive. That is not capitalism as I see it.

Senator Breaux: How would you answer the argument by shipbuilders who point out that, even with the assistance and this coupling arrangement, they are still going down the tube, and we do not have the base that is needed?

General Cassidy: The reason they are going down the tubes is they are not competitive. They have not modernized the shipyards, and if they would use yankee ingenuity and technology, which are the long suit this country has, they will become competitive.

As a matter of fact, the yard workers' salaries--the labor costs are competitive. Our labor costs in this country are less than the costs in Europe and Japan right now. So there is no reason we cannot become competitive on the market. We should not saddle our shipbuilders only to U.S. markets. They should be out selling ships to everyone else. And they can do that if we let them.

## APPENDIX 12

- Senator Breaux: I do not want to get off what you are getting ready to tell me, but on that point, Mr. Creelman, I see in your testimony you speak to the fact that the most productive foreign yards are building major commercial ships using less than 20 man-hours per ton of steel erected, while the best U.S. yards presently require more than twice as many man-hours. That is what you are talking about?
- General Cassidy: That is exactly what I am talking about, sir. We need to modernize that industry. It has languished. It is stuck in time. It was stuck in time, 20 years ago.
- Senator Breaux: I know that Mr. Stocker is going to want to address that when he has his chance. And we are certainly going to give him that chance.
- Okay, that is number one; what is number two?
- General Cassidy: As I said, these will all be controversial, sir. Of course, there would not be any solutions if they were not.
- Senator Breaux: And this is very true.
- General Cassidy: It is time for statesmanship.
- The second issue is I would eliminate regulations that increase the cost of U.S.-flagged ships to operate. There are regulations that are simply inconsistent. Those are our own governmental regulations. Things that talk about basic structure. The ad valorem tax placed upon our ship operators to have repairs done overseas, which they just simply pay no attention to any more, because it is still cheaper to do it overseas. We need to look at all these restrictions and throw the ones out that are not working.
- And I, quite frankly, would throw them all out.
- We need to look at the tax base; another very controversial issue, particularly since we have just gone through a wrenching tax reform in this country. Nonetheless, I submit to you that if our ship operators are being taxed in their operations, and the people they are competing with are not being taxed, and that is occurring, then we are going to lose.
- So we cannot ignore that situation as we prepare to establish a tax base for this industry. And there are lots of things that can be done in the tax arena. I am certainly not an economist, but I know that the tax reform has hurt this industry when it was already hurting.
- ODS reform, you mentioned that--
- Senator Breaux: When you speak of the tax base--let me interrupt you just for a second--are you talking about the operators or the builders or both?
- General Cassidy: I am specifically talking about the operators in this case, but I would review it for both segments of the industry. The operators

## APPENDIX 12

because, once again, I am trying to level out the playing field they are on so they can compete. I am not trying to give them an advantage over other U.S. industries. I am trying to recognize the market that they are in, and they are getting beat in that marketplace, and I want to do something about that.

The same thing for the ODS issue. This industry needs some sort of differential subsidy. Now this is not pure subsidy as the American public thinks of subsidy. This is really an investment in the people in this industry.

As a matter of fact, you could call it buying a reserve of some sort. Nonetheless, it is a differential subsidy. It does not fully subsidize the industry, it just provides for a subsidy to bring the differential up--bring the playing field up level so our guys can get in there and compete. I am not looking for handouts. I am just saying that we are committed to some differential subsidy in this industry now, we have been since the existence of the industry. We cannot take that away. And I believe that the very meager amount of subsidy that now exists can be better used if we have some reform.

And that reform would simply be to take all the restrictions away. Wipe the slate clean. Recognize the differential subsidy for what it is, about 85 percent of the \$230-some-million that we use in subsidy goes directly to the seamen. And that is exactly what we want to do. And we want to do that without gumming it up with all sorts of restrictions and regulations.

Senator BreauX: Let me ask you, on that point, about the need for an operating differential subsidy. How is that consistent with your first point that you made with regard to shipyards, where you are saying that they just have to compete? But, I take it, when you are talking about operators of ships, that they need subsidy because of the tough situation in the world market?

General Cassidy: There is no construction differential subsidy now, as you know. And I think we must look at that, and also make that playing field level if need be. I do not know that situation exists now. I do not know that subsidy would be necessary if we permit, if we encourage, if we incentivize the shipyard industry to modernize, to use technology.

And as I said, right now, our labor costs in our yards are lower than the yards in Europe and Japan. So I do not know that that differential subsidy is needed.

Remember, I believe a subsidy is only needed to level the playing field; it should not be used as a handout or to keep somebody at the public trough. It needs to be there to provide--

## APPENDIX 12

Senator Breaux: Well, hopefully, the filing of the complaint, section 301 of the Trade Act, by shipbuilders against other countries who seem to be, at least in my opinion, in violation of provisions of our Trade Act, would be a remedy.

General Cassidy: I think that would. It would certainly be enlightening for all of us. And it would certainly get some of the issues on the table that would make the issue you brought up clearer.

The other issue, though, in ODS, is very clear. It is very apparent. And we have a very good example in the two largest liner companies, one subsidized, one not subsidized. And their profit and loss statements will show very quickly the effect of subsidy versus non-subsidy.

The last thing I would do, sir, is just go out there and get market share. And I do not have a good panacea for this. As a matter of fact, all of the suggestions I have heard have some baggage with them. But I know this for a fact, that we have lost market share every year. I have looked at the charts, and in the 1950s, we had 50 percent of the world market share. The market has grown exponentially, and we, at the same time, have lost market share.

The answer then, the solution, the financial solution to this problem is not to throw money at it or appropriate money out of the Congress, but is indeed to provide a field in which we can capture market share. And I would set ourselves some goals for that. It is 4 percent now overall--it is 14 or 15 percent of the liner industry now, and I would say we should increase that by X number of percentage a year until we get up to the point where, from my point of view, we have sufficient shipping for national defense.

I certainly would not want to stop at that, as a citizen's point of view, but my major concern at this moment is that of national security.

Senator Breaux: When you talk about going after market share, obviously, the question arises: How do we do that? And I have two questions. The first one is really, would you be advocating a reservation of cargo--a cargo preference-type of program to arrive at that market share level that you think is appropriate and necessary?

General Cassidy: I do not think there is any one solution. I think some of that would be appropriate, particularly with some countries. With other countries it would be inappropriate; as a matter of fact, self-defeating.

So I think, for instance, that bilateral agreements with some of the Third World and developing nations are quite appropriate and

## APPENDIX 12

quite proper and would work. And we have some of those now. We have a good example of that; with Brazil, for instance.

I think on the other hand, that sort of solution with some of our larger trading partners, like Japan and Germany and England, might be counterproductive. And therefore we must resort back to the free trade theory and notion that we have lived by for so long and which has made us the largest trading nation.

So I think it has to be looked at individually, and I think the answer to that is yes, some of that: yes, some cargo preference; yes, some bilateral agreements, where they apply and will work. And we have certainly the right minds in this country to decide where that would work. And I think we should explore all of those arenas.

But I think we should have as the goal, capturing market share and look at market share where it exists. The market in Japan is different from the market in Brazil. The market in Brazil is different from the market in South Africa. And I think we must look at each individually and explicitly.

Senator Breaux: The second point on that market share question is upcoming GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] talks that are going to be ongoing. There is a great deal of concern by many of us in the Congress who are concerned, particularly about the condition of the U.S. Merchant Marine, about whether that question of negotiating with the Merchant Marine interests should be part of a trade negotiation. I feel very strongly that is part of our national security and national defense; it is not something that you negotiate with during economic trade negotiations.

Do you have any thoughts on that?

General Cassidy: Well, I am not an authority on GATT, but I have certainly heard enough noise on GATT, from people that I respect greatly, to share some of your concerns. So my concern, if I may do that, sir, is that anything that would affect or further accelerate the decline of the Merchant Marine, I am against. And therefore, by the judgments of you and some of the labor leaders and others, of this country, if you believe it would negatively affect the Merchant Marine, I am with you, I am against it.

Senator Breaux: Well, we certainly got away from the platitudes quickly.

I really thank you for your suggestions. I know that it is not without a great deal of thought. You are in charge of transportation for the military. I mean, that is talking about air transportation, ground transportation, and water transportation.

General Cassidy: Yes, sir.

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Senator Breaux: How would you compare the condition of the three, vis-à-vis the national security/military interests--the status of our ground transportation and our air transportation capabilities versus the water-borne transportation?

General Cassidy: Well, first of all, the industry--and I must talk about industry here, although certainly I will include that organic capability which resides in the military today. Nonetheless, 85 percent of the capacity I would use in wartime, 85 percent will come from the private sector.

Senator Breaux: Is this overall?

General Cassidy: Overall; 50 percent of airlift, over 90 percent of sealift, close to 90 percent of ground transportation, all added up to be about 85 percent.

And as a matter of fact, an awful lot of even the organic capability I have resides in reserve. For instance, in airlift, which is what I need first is the quickest, and the most reactive and flexible, 85 percent of my airlift capacity resides in the reserve forces today, and that is in the civil reserve air fleet as well.

So let me characterize that whole industry. First of all, the transportation industry of the world is booming. It is absolutely booming. It is a high-tech industry. It is an exciting industry. And moving boxes around is exciting because of what we are doing today in all segments of the industry.

The airline/aircraft industry contributes more to the balance of payments of this country than any single industry in the country. We must keep that going. It is healthy, it is supportive. And what we are doing in that industry is good, and what we are doing in the military is good. We are building the C-17. It is a large program with great support in the Congress and from the Department of Defense, and it is moving through very well, and the development program is good.

So the air industry is solid, growing and booming.

With regards to the ports of our nation, our ports have never been in better shape. The ports are very modern. They are very large in capacity. They can handle throughput better than they have ever been able to handle it. The shocking thing is you can go into a port in our country and see no U.S. flag there. That is the problem in the port. It is not the port capacity.

The railroads have never been stronger. There is less track than there was before. There are fewer locomotives than there were before, but that which is there is more productive than it has ever been before. And that industry has turned around enormously. It, too, is an exciting industry.



## APPENDIX 12

The last then, of course, is the trucking and bus industry. And they, too, are very strong, very well supported. And the highways, although we have some bridge problems in the country, we know what the bridge problems are, where they are, and we can manage around that for defense.

So all sectors of the industry are good. All sectors in the industry are growing and booming. And all sectors of the industry, within the military, are well-supported and growing as well, except for sealift. And the sealift issue is the one single thing that we have neglected. And when I say "we," all of us. I mean the Department of Defense, the government, the industry itself--it has been divisive and self-destructive. And we have got to put all that behind us, not look for the witches, and get on with it. We need some leadership, sir.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

February 14, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT  
OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Strengthening Department of Defense Transportation Functions

In light of changes in the world situation and reduced resources devoted to the national defense, the Department of Defense is moving to a smaller, but highly trained, well-equipped and mobile military force. The national security strategy depends heavily upon our ability to transport personnel and materiel. To strengthen the Department's ability to carry out its transportation missions effectively and efficiently, this is to direct as follows:

1. Mission. The mission of the Commander in Chief of the United States Transportation Command (CINCTRANS) shall be to provide air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense, both in time of peace and time of war.
2. Forces and Authority. The Secretaries of the Military Departments, after coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall (a) assign the Military Traffic Management Command of the Department of the Army, the Military Sealift Command of the Department of the Navy, and the Air Mobility Command (or the Military Airlift Command until the Air Mobility Command is established) of the Department of the Air Force, in time of peace and time of war, to CINCTRANS under CINCTRANS combatant command, and (b) shall assign all transportation assets of their Departments to CINCTRANS under CINCTRANS combatant command, except that they may withhold assignment of service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets. [The authority and duty to organize, train, and equip forces for assignment to CINCTRANS, and the associated programming and budgeting functions, shall remain with the Secretaries of the Military Departments.] CINCTRANS shall be the DOD single manager for transportation, other than service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets. CINCTRANS may provide management support for service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the commanders of unified or specified commands. CINCTRANS is hereby delegated authority to (a) procure commercial transportation services (including lease of transportation assets) in accordance with applicable law as necessary to carry out the mission of CINCTRANS and (b) to activate, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, the Ready Reserve Force, and the Sealift Readiness Program. CINCTRANS shall, subject to such instructions as the Comptroller of the Department of Defense may issue after coordination with appropriate departmental officials (including instructions relating to funding of operations of service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets), control the transportation accounts of the Defense Business Operations Fund.

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
3. Transportation Requirements. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics, the Commander in Chief of the Transportation Command, and such other departmental officials as may be appropriate, shall submit to me for approval procedures for the submission of transportation movement requirements to CINCTRANS.
4. Movement Priorities. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics, CINCTRANS, and such other department officials as may be appropriate, shall submit to me for approval any changes to the transportation movement priority system necessary to ensure its responsiveness to the commanders of the unified and specified commands and other DOD components requiring transportation services.
5. Administrative Adjustments. CINCTRANS shall submit to me, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics, and other departmental officials as appropriate, for approval any changes to transportation, fiscal, procurement or other DOD policies that may be appropriate to implement this memorandum.
6. Service-Unique or Theater-Assigned Transportation Assets. For purposes of this memorandum, the term "service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets" means transportation assets that are:
  - (a) assigned to a Military Department for functions of the Secretaries of the Military Departments set forth in Sections 3013(b), 5013(b), and 8013(b) of Title 10 of the United States Code, including administrative functions (such as motor pools), intelligence functions, training functions, and maintenance functions;
  - (b) assigned to the Department of the Army for the execution of the missions of the Army Corps of Engineers;
  - (c) assigned to the Department of the Navy as the special mission support force of missile range instrumentation ships, ocean survey ships, cable ships, oceanographic research ships, acoustic research ships, and naval test support ships; the naval fleet auxiliary force of fleet ammunition ships, submarine surveillance ships, fleet stores ships, fleet ocean tugs, submarine ballistic missile support ships, and fleet oilers; hospital ships; Marine Corps intermediate maintenance activity ships; Marine Corps helicopter support to senior Federal officials; and, prior to initial discharge of cargo, maritime prepositioning ships;
  - (d) assigned to the Department of the Air Force for search and rescue, weather reconnaissance, audiovisual services, and aeromedical evacuation functions, and transportation of senior Federal officials; or
  - (e) assigned for combatant command to a commander of a unified or specified command (including the Special Operations Command) other than CINCTRANS.

This memorandum supersedes existing DOD Directives (including Directive 4500.9) and guidance to the extent of any inconsistency. Department of Defense Directives

5160.2, 5160.10, and 5160.53 (relating to single manager assignments) are rescinded. Nothing in this memorandum shall affect the authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs with respect to Congressional travel support. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after coordination with other departmental officials as appropriate, shall prepare changes to the Unified Command Plan that are consistent with this memorandum.

The Director of Administration and Management, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics, and other departmental officials as appropriate, shall ensure the preparation for approval of directives and revisions to directives to incorporate the substance of this memorandum in the DOD Directives System.

Paragraphs 1 through 6 of this memorandum shall take effect upon approval by the President of the next revision of the Unified Command Plan. The Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and CINCTrans shall accomplish the tasks assigned to them by paragraphs 1 through 6 within 90 days of the President's approval of the Unified Command Plan. Planning to implement paragraphs 1 through 6 shall proceed immediately.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Dick Cheney". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style. The first name "Dick" is written with a large, sweeping 'D' that extends upwards and to the left. The last name "Cheney" is written in a more compact, cursive script. The signature is positioned in the lower half of the page, centered horizontally.

## **APPENDIX 13**

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## Department of Defense DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5158.4

January 8, 1993

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USD(A)

SUBJECT: United States Transportation Command

- References:
- (a) Title 10 of the United States Code
  - (b) Unified Command Plan
  - (c) DoD Directive 4500.9, "Transportation and Traffic Management," January 26, 1989
  - (d) DoD Directive 4515.12, "Department of Defense Support for Travel of Members and Employees of the Congress, December 12, 1964
  - (e) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Strengthening Department of Defense Transportation Functions," February 14, 1992 (hereby superseded)

### 1. PURPOSE

This Directive implements Sections 113 and chapter 6 of reference (a) with respect to Department of Defense transportation.

### 2. APPLICABILITY

This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities (hereafter referred to collectively as "DoD Components").

### 3. DEFINITIONS

As used in this Directive, the following terms have the meanings set forth:

3.1. "Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets" means transportation assets that are:

3.1.1. Assigned to a Military Department for functions of the Secretaries of the Military Departments set forth in Sections 3013(b), Section 5013(b), and 8013(b) of reference (a), including administrative functions (such as motor pools), intelligence functions, training functions, and maintenance functions;

3.1.2. Assigned to the Department of the Army for the execution of the missions of the Army Corps of Engineers or, prior to the initial discharge of cargo, Army afloat propositioned ships;

3.1.3. Assigned to the Department of the Navy as:

3.1.3.1. The special mission support force of missile range instrumentation ships, ocean survey ships, cable ships, oceanographic research ships, acoustic research ships, and naval test support ships;

3.1.3.2. The naval fleet auxiliary force of fleet ammunition ships, submarine surveillance ships, fleet stores ships, fleet ocean tugs, submarine ballistic missile support ships, and fleet oilers;

3.1.3.3. Hospital ships;

3.1.3.4. Marine Corps intermediate maintenance activity ships;

3.1.3.5. Marine Corps helicopter support to senior Federal officials; or

3.1.3.6. Prior to initial discharge of cargo, maritime prepositioning ships.

3.1.4. Assigned to the Department of the Air Force for search and rescue, weather reconnaissance, audiovisual services, and aeromedical evacuation functions, and transportation of senior Federal officials, or, prior to the initial discharge of cargo, Air Force afloat prepositioned ships; or

3.1.5. Assigned for Combatant Command to a commander of a Unified or Specified Command (including the Special Operations Command) other than the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Transportation Command.

3.2. "CINCTRANS" means the Commander in Chief of the United States

Transportation Command.

#### 4. MISSION

The mission of the Commander in Chief of the United States Transportation Command shall be to provide air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense, both in time of peace and time of war.

#### 5. POLICY

It is the policy of the Department of Defense that:

5.1. CINTRANS shall have Combatant Command of the Military Traffic Management Command of the Department of the Army, the Military Sealift Command of the Department of the Navy, and the Air Mobility Command of the Department of the Air Force, in time of peace and time of war.

5.2. CINTRANS shall have Combatant Command of all transportation assets of the Military Departments, except for Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets.

5.3. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall have the authority and duty to organize, train, and equip forces for assignment to CINTRANS.

5.4. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall have the authority and duty to program and budget for the organizing, training, and equipping of forces for assignment to CINTRANS.

5.5. CINTRANS shall be the Department of Defense single manager for transportation, other than Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets.

5.6. CINTRANS shall provide management support for Service-unique or theater assigned transportation assets to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands when:

5.6.1. the Secretary of Defense so directs; or

5.6.2. CINTRANS and the Secretary concerned or the commander concerned so agree.



5.7. CINCTrans shall make recommendations, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition on the capability, capacity, characteristics, design and other requirements for mobility assets needed to execute the mission of CINCTrans.

5.8. CINCTrans shall establish and maintain relationships between the Department of Defense and the commercial transportation industry to develop concepts, requirements, and procedures for the Contingency Response Program, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, and the Sealift Readiness program. Any procedures so developed shall take effect upon their approval by the Secretary of Defense.

## 6. DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY

6.1. In addition to the authority of CINCTrans under chapter 6 of reference (a) and authority provided by direction from the President or the Secretary of Defense, CINCTrans is delegated authority to:

6.1.1. Procure commercial transportation services (including lease of transportation assets) in accordance with applicable law as necessary to carry out the mission of CINCTrans; and

6.1.2. With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, to activate and command assets of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, the Ready Reserve Force, and the Sealift Readiness Program, consistent with applicable law.

6.2. CINCTrans is delegated control of the transportation accounts of the Defense Business Operations Fund, subject to such instructions as the Comptroller of the Department of Defense may issue after coordination with the appropriate Departmental officials (including instructions relating to funding of operations of Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets).

6.3. The authority and duties of the Secretary of Defense under Section 2218 of reference (a) are delegated and assigned to the Comptroller of the Department of Defense. In the exercise of this authority, the Comptroller of the Department of Defense shall make available the funds of the National Defense Sealift Fund in accordance with applicable law to:

6.3.1. CINCTrans, with respect to funds in the National Defense Sealift

Fund for operations, maintenance, and lease or charter of national defense Sealift vessels (other than such vessels that are Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets); and

6.3.2. The Secretary of the Navy, with respect to other funds in the National Defense Sealift Fund.

## 7. RESPONSIBILITIES

7.1. The CINCTRANS shall execute the mission set forth in Section 4. and to that end shall:

7.1.1. Exercise Combatant Command of the Military Traffic Management Command of the Department of the Army, the Military Sealift Command of the Department of the Navy, and the Air Mobility Command of the Department of the Air Force, in time of peace and time of war;

7.1.2. Exercise Combatant Command of all transportation assets of the Military Departments, except for Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets;

7.1.3. Be the Department of Defense single manager for transportation, other than Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets;

7.1.4. Have the authority to provide management support for Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands; and

7.1.5. Submit as necessary from time to time to the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and such other Department officials as may be appropriate, for approval any changes to transportation, fiscal, procurement or other Department of Defense policies that may be appropriate to implement this Directive.

7.2. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

7.2.1. After coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assign the Military Traffic Management Command of the Department of the Army, the Military Sealift Command of the Department of the Navy, and the Air Mobility Command of the Department of the Air Force, in time of peace and time of war, to

CINCTRANS under CINCTRANS Combatant Command;

7.2.2. After coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assign all transportation assets of the Military Departments to CINCTRANS under CINCTRANS Combatant Command, except that they may withhold assignment of Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets;

7.2.3. Organize, train, and equip forces for assignment to CINCTRANS; and

7.2.4. Program and budget for the organizing, training, and equipping of forces for assignment to CINCTRANS.

7.3. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

7.3.1. Submit as necessary from time to time to the Secretary of Defense, after coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, CINCTRANS, and such other Departmental officials as may be appropriate, for approval:

7.3.1.1. Any needed changes to procedures for submission of transportation movement requirements to CINCTRANS; and

7.3.1.2. Any changes to the transportation movement priority system necessary to ensure its responsiveness to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands and other Department of Defense Components requiring transportation services.

7.3.2. After appropriate coordination, recommend to the Secretary of Defense for approval forces for assignment in accordance with Section 162 of reference (a) to CINCTRANS.

7.4. The Comptroller of the Department of Defense shall:

7.4.1. Issue, after coordination with appropriate Departmental officials, such Instructions as may be necessary relating to the use of funds in transportation accounts of the Defense Business Operations Fund consistent with Section 6.2. above; and


7.4.2. Administer and manage the National Defense Sealift Fund consistent with Section 6.3. above.

8. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

8.1. This Directive is effective immediately.

8.2. In the event of any conflict between this Directive and DoD Directive 4500.9 (reference (c)), this Directive governs. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition shall carry out the responsibilities assigned by Section 4.1. of DoD Directive 4500.9.

8.3. Nothing in this Directive affects the authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs under DoD Directive 4515.12 (reference (d)).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald J. Atwood". The signature is stylized with a large initial "D" and a long horizontal stroke.

Donald J. Atwood  
Acting Secretary of Defense

## **APPENDIX 14**

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## APPENDIX 15

### *List of Plank Owners* *“First 50” Assignments*

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>DAS*</u>	<u>Badge No.</u>
Gen	Air Force	Cassidy, Duane H.	870703	1
Col	Air Force	Hinton, David S.	870217	2
MSgt	Air Force	Magee, William J.	870219	3
A1C	Air Force	Waddle, Thomas J.	870223	4
COL	Army	Lotz, Reinhard M.	870301	5
Col	Air Force	LaRue, Robert D.	870301	6
Lt Col	Air Force	Eason, Robert A., Jr.	870309	7
GS-12	Air Force	Ohlemeier, Rex P.	87-330	8
GS-7	Air Force	Jones, Patricia A.	870330	9
GM-14	Air Force	Matthews, James K.	87-412	10
Col	Air Force	Floyd, Bobby O.	870427	11
MSgt	Air Force	Vernon, Donald A.	870501	12
Col	Air Force	Baker, Roy T.	870501	13
Maj	Air Force	Spence, William T.	870511	14
GS-12	Air Force	Davis, Terry L.	870524	15
GS-6	Air Force	Wilhelm, Ruth M.	870608	16
SSG	Army	Oliver, Bobby E.	870620	17
Lt Col	Air Force	Culley, Larry L.	870630	18
Lt Col	Air Force	Pelak, Andrew J.	870702	19
GS-6	Air Force	Meyer, Sondra S.	870705	20
GS-6	Air Force	Jones, Melinda R.	870705	21
Maj	Air Force	Wigginton, John L.	870706	22
SSgt	Air Force	Fitts, Dixie L.	870706	23
MSgt	Air Force	Moore, Gregory A.	870706	24
Lt Col	Air Force	Hawley, Jon A.	870708	25
CMSgt	Air Force	Jenkins, Robert J.	870715	26
CMSgt	Air Force	Burns, Richard P.	870717	27
Lt Col	Air Force	Lee, James R.	870718	28
GS-6	Air Force	Bien, JoLynn J.	870720	29
SP4	Army	Tuff, Abigail R.	870720	30
SFC	Army	Peters, Mark G.	870724	31
Lt Col	Air Force	Gibson, Gary P.	870730	32
Maj	Air Force	Schaefer, C. Parks	870730	33
GS-9	Air Force	Manning, Jackie H.	870803	34
GS-6	Air Force	Amend, Dorothy	870803	35
Sgt	Air Force	Regan, Mary K.	870804	36
LTC	Army	Miles, Robert A.	870814	37
Maj	Air Force	Mills, Willard N.	870814	38
LCDR	Navy	Porter, Jo Ann	870814	39
GS-11	Air Force	Kister, Mary E.	870817	40
SFC	Army	Acosta, Manuel E.	870817	41
GS-5	Air Force	Hunter, Patti	870817	42
CMSgt	Air Force	Whitaker, George T.	870822	43
Lt Col	Air Force	Bordenave, Robert J.	870826	44
BG	Army	Piatak, John R.	870828	45
Lt Col	Air Force	Behm, Paul C.	870831	46
LTC	Army	Evarts, Robert S.	870831	47
Col	Air Force	Craveiro, Richard C.	870904	48
Maj Gen	Air Force	Griffith, John E.	870916	49
RADM	Navy	Herberger, Albert J.	870928	50

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## APPENDIX 16

### Memo For Record: Issue of the Wartime Charter

USTRANSCOM's implementation plan, developed by the Joint Staff, allowed the Services to retain their single-manager charters for their respective transportation modes--air, land, and sea--and limited the command's authorities primarily to wartime. As a result, during peacetime, USTRANSCOM's component commands continued to operate day-to-day much as they had in the past. They controlled their defense business operations funds and maintained responsibility for Service-unique missions, Service-oriented procurement and maintenance scheduling, and Department of Defense charters during peacetime single-manager transportation operations. They also continued to have operational control of forces. USTRANSCOM's peacetime role was limited to planning and exercise participation.

In late 1989, Vice Admiral Albert J. Herberger and Colonel David S. Hinton asked Dr. James K. Matthews, the Command Historian, to research why the command's implementation plan limited USTRANSCOM's mission to wartime. He discovered that drafts of the plan did not contain the word "wartime." Digging deeper, he called retired Army Colonel George F. "Buckey" Pool, who was the Joint Deployment Agency representative on the Unified Transportation Command working group, and asked him when the word "wartime" first appeared, and who put it there. The answer: the change had been made at the "midnight hour," during the final coordination at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level, and the "culprit" had been a "rear admiral on the Chief of Naval Operations' staff named Butcher."

Vice Admiral Paul D. Butcher, who succeeded Admiral Herberger as Deputy Commander in Chief of USTRANSCOM, appreciated the irony in this anecdote. Following the Gulf War, he told Dr. Matthews that his number one priority at USTRANSCOM, as ordered by USTRANSCOM's second commander in chief, General H. T. Johnson, was to work with the Services, Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense to remove the word "wartime" from the command's charter. He also stated that, as the Military Sealift Command commander before coming to USTRANSCOM, he had already "begun to see the light," but it was his Gulf War experiences, especially seeing the pain defense transportation customers endured during the transition from peace to war in August 1990, that made him a proselytizer for a USTRANSCOM peacetime and wartime, single-manager charter.

Asked if he regretted having added the wartime restriction to the original document, Admiral Butcher replied that, at the time, he believed he was acting in the best interests of the Navy, as laid out for him by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy. He added that, with hindsight, it was "one of the dumbest things" he had ever done. Admiral Butcher came to believe that it was in the nation's best interest for USTRANSCOM and its component commands to operate in peacetime as they would during war.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Secretary of Defense, Richard B. "Dick" Cheney, gave USTRANSCOM a new charter. Nicknamed the "Valentine's Day Memo" from its 14 February 1992 date, and later codified in a Department of Defense directive, it stated that the command's mission was to "to provide air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense, both in time of peace and time of war."

(Source: See footnote on p. 4, James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, *So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm*, Scott AFB IL: United States Transportation Command, 1996.



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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

September 16, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS)  
COMMANDER, US TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

SUBJECT: Actions To Improve Logistics And Global Supply Chain Management

Recently completed studies and analyses indicate significant logistics and global supply chain management improvement will be achieved if action is taken in departmental organizations, plans, policies, programs, processes and systems. Accordingly, the following actions are directed.

The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) is designated as the Defense Logistics Executive (DLE) in addition to his other duties.

a. The DLE shall have authority to make changes necessary to integrate the global supply chain.

b. The DLE shall be advised by a Defense Logistics Board (DLB) in a manner analogous to the advice provided the Defense Acquisition Executive by the Defense Acquisition Board.

c. In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DLE shall prepare any directives, instructions, decision memos and suggest legislative changes.

d. Effective immediately, USD (AT&L) shall serve as Chair of the Joint Logistics Board pending its reorganization to meet the goals and objectives of the DLE.


The Commander, US Transportation Command is designated as the Distribution Process Owner (DPO).

a. The DPO shall improve the overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution related activities - deployment, sustainment and redeployment support during peace and war.

b. The DPO is to serve as the single entity to direct and supervise execution of the Strategic Distribution system. The DPO shall receive oversight from the DLE via the DLB. However, this will not change Commander, US Transportation Command's current reporting chain or direct access to me.

## APPENDIX 17

Further, the DPO is directed to develop a draft DoD Distribution process directive defining DPO authority, accountability, resources, and responsibility to improve distribution and submit this to me within 30 days from the date of this memorandum. Unified Command Plan change recommendations, if any, will be prepared by the CJCS.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "D. H. [unclear]", is written above the distribution list.

cc:

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Military Departments  
Combatant Commanders  
Defense Logistics Agency

## APPENDIX 18



ACQUISITION,  
TECHNOLOGY  
AND LOGISTICS

### OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

JUL 28 2004

#### MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

SUBJECT: Management of the Distribution Systems Portfolio: Sustainment and Force  
Movement

The Department has made improved and timely information technology (IT) investment policies one of its enablers for change. By eliminating outdated business practices and fulfilling our net-centric goals, we will ensure that we have the appropriate IT capabilities available to perform our mission and to conduct effective information operations. A key management method used to drive transformation and to constrain IT investments is Portfolio Management (PfM). It is, therefore, the Department's policy to manage information technology investments through portfolio management. These portfolios will allow DoD to make decisions on whether to develop, modify, or terminate IT systems based on architectures, risk tolerance levels, potential returns, outcome goals, and performance.

In today's battlespace, the historic distinctions between distribution and force movement have faded. Under Title 10, the Joint Staff is responsible for preparing joint logistic and mobility plans and for assigning logistics and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces, and the J4 is designated as the Domain Owner for one of the numerous War Fighting Domains, Focused Logistics. The Business Mission Area of the Department is divided into six Business Domains, with Logistics as one of these Domains. DUSD(L&MR) is designated as the Domain Owner for Logistics, with distribution as a major component of the Logistics Domain. The Domain owner(s) are responsible for leading business transformation, developing the overarching architecture, and guiding execution activities. The Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense possess a common, overlapping and intersecting area of interest in Distribution.

The intersection of distribution in support of sustainment with distribution in support of force movement is apparent in the responsibilities of the Distribution Process Owner (DPO). The Commander, US Transportation Command is designated as the Distribution Process Owner and identified as the responsible authority to improve the overall effectiveness and interoperability of distribution related activities – force movement, sustainment and retrograde of forces during peace and war. Relevant and related definitions of distribution in policy and doctrine are detailed in the attached exhibit.

We need to intensify our efforts to effectively develop, integrate and implement logistics architecture, which will better guide IT investments in distribution, for both sustainment and force movements. Effective this date, DUSD(L&MR) and JSJ4 jointly designate the DPO as the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) and Portfolio Manager for that subset of logistics systems providing key capabilities in support of distribution (sustainment and force movement) related activities. The management of this sub-portfolio process will be led by the


## APPENDIX 18

DPO, co-chaired by Joint Staff J4, with oversight and support provided by DUSD(L&MR). As the Domain Owner for logistics business systems, DUSD(L&MR) will remain accountable for ensuring effective integration of the logistics portfolio across the breadth of the supply chain including the Distribution area of interest.


By August 31, 2004, in consultation with the Joint Deployment Process Owner, DUSD(L&MR), and Joint Staff J4, the DPO is directed to develop a draft sub-portfolio management process for distribution and force movement systems to include resource requirements, goals and objectives, responsibilities and identify systems of primary concern for inclusion in the sub-portfolio. By end of 2004, the DPO will identify potential returns, outcome goals, and draft performance requirements for the sub-portfolio. By end of 2005, the DPO will develop a change management plan and IT transition plan.

In addition, the DPO will identify systems of interest outside of the Distribution and force movement sub-Portfolio, those systems with important interoperability and data requirements for sustainment and force movement sub-portfolio but outside of the scope of distribution as defined in DoD publications. The DPO will also develop appropriate processes and procedures for liaison and coordination with systems of interest owners to influence synchronization of portfolio of systems across the Department.

The DPO, in executing portfolio management responsibility for distribution (sustainment and force movement), will, from time to time, interact directly with DoD Components. The DPO will also, in order to execute the portfolio management activities described above, serve as the integrating office for Distribution Architecture subset of the Logistics Architecture (BEA-LOG), under the oversight of DUSD(L&MR). Both JSJ4 and DUSD(L&MR) delegate all necessary authority to the DPO to require timely submissions of reasonable and necessary information in support of the distribution sub-portfolio activities as the Distribution OPR.



Gordon S. Holder  
Vice Admiral, US Navy  
Director for Logistics, J-4, The Joint Staff



Bradley Berkson  
Acting Deputy Under Secretary of  
Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness)

Attachment:

As stated

cc:

Secretaries, Military Departments  
Commander, US Northern Command  
Commander, US Joint Forces Command  
Commander, US Central Command  
Commander, US European Command  
Commander, US Special Operations Command  
Commander, US Pacific Command  
Commander, US Southern Command  
Commander, US Strategic Command  
Director, Defense Logistics Agency

## APPENDIX 18

Exhibit: Relevant definitions & designations for distribution, deployment, movement.

- The Supply Chain Management Regulation, 4140.1-R, defines Distribution for the Department. "The DoD Components shall operate an integrated, synchronized, end-to-end distribution system to meet customer requirements for information and materiel. That system shall be comprised of requisitioning channels, distribution depots, and other storage locations, transportation channels, tracking systems, and other activities involved with the delivery, sale, or disposal of materiel." Inherent in this definition are retrograde, return of materiel, and redeployment.
- Joint Publication 1-02 offers the following definition: "Distribution System: That complex of facilities, installations, methods, and procedures designed to receive, store, maintain, distribute, and control the flow of materiel between the point of receipt into the military system and to the point of issue to using activities and units."
- Joint Publication 1-02, the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines deployment, as it relates to distribution, to be, "The relocation of forces and materiel to desired operational areas. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas."
- Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines movement terms: "movement requirement: a stated movement mode and time-phased need for the transport of units, personnel, and/or materiel from a specified origin to a specified destination; Movement Control: the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo over lines of communications."
- Joint Publication 4-09, Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution joins the threads of distribution and deployment together, declaring that "... distribution encompasses the collective activities of the Services, defense agencies, and the commercial sector, guided by policy, doctrine, and modern logistic art and science to mobilize, deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy the national resources required to execute the National Military Strategy (NMS)."
- Joint Publication 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System, designates, "... the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness) to establish policies and provide guidance to DOD components concerning the efficient and effective use of the DTS. The Secretary of Defense has designated the Commander, USTRANSCOM as DOD single manager for transportation (other than for Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets) during times of peace and war.
- Joint Publication 4-01 states, "As the focal point for transportation for the Department of Defense, the Commander, USTRANSCOM exercises responsibility for global air, land, and sea transportation planning (deliberate and crisis action).

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DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

MAY - 8 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE LOGISTIC AGENCY

Subject: Redesignation of Commander, United States Transportation Command as the  
Distribution Process Owner (DPO)

Since the Secretary of Defense initial designation of Commander, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) as DPO by memorandum dated September 16, 2003, Subject: Actions to Improve Logistics and Global Supply Chain Management (hereby cancelled), USTRANSCOM and its partners have made significant progress transforming distribution related processes.

To strengthen that teamwork and to increase the momentum of change, this memorandum formally restates the designation of Commander, USTRANSCOM as the Department's DPO with the following defined mission areas:

- (1) Overseeing the overall effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment of DoD-wide distribution activities, including force projection, sustainment, and redeployment/ retrograde operations.
- (2) Establishing the concepts and operational frameworks relating to the planning and execution of DoD transportation operations.

As before, the DPO shall receive oversight from the Defense Logistics Executive. This will not change the direct reporting relationship of the Commander, USTRANSCOM, as a combatant commander, to the Secretary or his direct access to the Secretary.

Commander, USTRANSCOM is directed to develop a draft DoD Distribution Process Instruction, defining authority, accountability, resources, and responsibility for process management and submit this to the Defense Logistics Executive as soon as possible for his approval.

cc:  
Service Chiefs



OSD 07254-06



5/9/2006 9:03:55 AM



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# Department of Defense DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5158.04

July 27, 2007

USD(AT&L)

SUBJECT: United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)

- References:
- (a) DoD Directive 5158.4, "United States Transportation Command," January 8, 1993 (hereby canceled)
  - (b) Sections 113, 162, 163, 164, 2218, 3013(b), 5013(b), 8013(b), and 9514 of title 10, United States Code
  - (c) Unified Command Plan, current edition<sup>1</sup>
  - (d) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Redesignation of Commander, United States Transportation Command as the Distribution Process Owner (DPO)," May 8, 2006 (hereby canceled)
  - (e) through (s), see Enclosure 1

## 1. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE

This Directive:

- 1.1. Reissues Reference (a) to update responsibilities, functions, relationships, and authorities of the USTRANSCOM.
- 1.2. Implements Section 113 of Reference (b) with respect to DoD transportation.
- 1.3. Designates the Commander, USTRANSCOM (CDRUSTRANSCOM), as the DoD single manager for transportation, other than Service-unique or theater-assigned assets.
- 1.4. Designates the CDRUSTRANSCOM as the Mobility Joint Force Provider in accordance with Reference (c).
- 1.5. Designates CDRUSTRANSCOM as the DoD Distribution Process Owner (DPO) in compliance with References (c) and (d), and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness (DUSD(L&MR)) and Director for Logistics Joint Memorandum, "Management of the Distribution Systems Portfolio: Sustainment and Force Movement," (Reference (e)). References (d) and (e) have been incorporated into this issuance and are hereby cancelled.

<sup>1</sup> Request this reference by sending an email to [atl.lmr@osd.mil](mailto:atl.lmr@osd.mil)

*DoDD 5158.04, July 27, 2007*

1.6. Designates the CDRUSTRANSCOM as the DoD Distribution Portfolio Management (DPfM) Manager for Sustainment and Force Movement.

1.7. Designates CDRUSTRANSCOM as the single manager for Patient Movement, providing global patient movement in coordination with the Geographic Combatant Commanders, through the Defense Transportation System, in accordance with Reference (c).

## 2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

2.1. This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components"). The term "Military Services," as used herein, refers to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.

2.2. In the event of any conflict between this Directive and DoD Directive 4500.9E (Reference (f)), this Directive governs. Such instances shall be identified to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) for appropriate action, as required.

## 3. DEFINITIONS

Terms used in the Directive are defined in Enclosure 2.

## 4. RESPONSIBILITIES

4.1. The USD(AT&L), as the Defense Logistics Executive (DLE), as delegated in DoD Directive 5134.01 (Reference (g)), shall:

4.1.1. Oversee the implementation of distribution process changes to ensure they comply with the Strategic Planning Guidance (Reference (h)).

4.1.2. Publish DoD issuances for distribution process improvements, as needed, in compliance with Reference (g).

4.2. The Director, Defense Logistics Agency, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), through the (DUSD(L&MR)) and in accordance with DoD Directive 5105.22 (Reference (i)), shall:

4.2.1. Collaborate with the CDRUSTRANSCOM in support of distribution process improvement efforts.

*DoDD 5158.04, July 27, 2007*

4.2.2. Collaborate with the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise Community of Interest (JDDE COI) to:

4.2.2.1. Identify distribution-related process improvements, including changes to doctrine, procedures, policy, and systems.

4.2.2.2. Implement DoD approved distribution-related process improvements.

4.3. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, DoD, (USD(C)/CFO) shall:

4.3.1. Issue necessary guidance relating to the use of funds in the Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF).

4.3.2. Exercise the authority and duties of the Secretary of Defense over the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) pursuant to section 2218 of Reference (b). Make the NDSF funds available to the Secretary of the Navy, with direction contained in the annual operating budget. The Secretary of the Navy will provide reimbursable funding authority to either the CDRUSTRANSCOM or the Maritime Administration for the operations, maintenance, and lease or charter of national defense sealift vessels (other than such vessels that are Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets) from the portion of the NDSF intended for such purposes.

4.4. The Heads of DoD Components shall:

4.4.1. Organize, train, and equip forces assigned to the CDRUSTRANSCOM.

4.4.2. Program and budget for the organizing, training, and equipping of forces assigned to the CDRUSTRANSCOM.

4.4.3. Collaborate with the CDRUSTRANSCOM and JDDE COI to:

4.4.3.1. Identify distribution-related process improvements, including changes to doctrine, procedures, policy, and systems.

4.4.3.2. Implement DoD approved distribution-related process improvements.

4.5. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

4.5.1. Recommend forces for assignment to USTRANSCOM to the Secretary of Defense in accordance with sections 162 and 163(b)(2)(c) of Reference (b).

4.5.2. Assess whether distribution policies and processes are consistent with joint mobility plans and the National Military Strategy, in accordance with the Joint Staff J-4 mission (Reference (j)).

## APPENDIX 20

*DoDD 5158.04, July 27, 2007*

4.5.3. Receive USTRANSCOM's sourcing recommendations for mobility forces and after appropriate coordination, recommend to the Secretary of Defense for approval of forces for assignment in accordance with section 163 of Reference (b).

4.5.4. After coordination with the USD(AT&L), the CDRUSTRANSCOM, and other appropriate departmental officials, submit as necessary to the Secretary of Defense for approval:

4.5.4.1. Any needed changes to procedures for submission of transportation movement requirements to the CDRUSTRANSCOM.

4.5.4.2. Any changes to the transportation movement priority system necessary to ensure its responsiveness to the Commanders of the Combatant Commands and other DoD Components requiring transportation services.

4.6. The CDRUSTRANSCOM shall:

4.6.1. Command assigned forces in accordance with References (b) and (c), and DoD Directive 5100.1 (Reference (k)) and Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Forces For Unified Commands," (Reference (l)).

4.6.2. Have Combatant Command of the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command of the Department of the Army, the Military Sealift Command of the Department of the Navy, and the Air Mobility Command of the Department of the Air Force, in peace and war (Reference (l)).

4.6.3. Have Combatant Command of all assigned transportation assets of the Military Departments, except for Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets, unless otherwise directed by Reference (l).

4.6.4. Provide effective and efficient air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense, in times of peace and war.

4.6.5. Develop and maintain relationships between the Department of Defense and the commercial transportation industry to develop concepts, requirements, and procedures to implement airlift readiness programs, such as the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF); for sealift readiness programs, such as the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), Voluntary Tanker Agreement, and the Sealift Readiness Program; for surface transportation readiness programs; and for distribution readiness programs.

4.6.6. With Secretary of Defense approval, activate assets of the CRAF, VISA, Sealift Readiness Program(s), the Ready Reserve Force and other assets of the National Defense Reserve Fleet consistent with applicable law and existing delegated authority. Employ such assets.

## APPENDIX 20

*DoDD 5158.04, July 27, 2007*

4.6.7. Provide management support for Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands when either:

4.6.7.1. The Secretary of Defense so directs, or

4.6.7.2. The CDRUSTRANSCOM and the Secretary of the Military Department concerned or the Commander of the Combatant Command concerned so agree.

4.6.8. Make recommendations, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and USD(AT&L) on the capability, capacity, characteristics, design, and other requirements for mobility assets needed to execute the CDRUSTRANSCOM mission.

4.6.9. Serve as the DoD single manager for transportation other than Service-unique or theater-assigned assets.

4.6.9.1. Provide common-user and commercial air, land, and sea transportation, terminal management, and aerial refueling to support the global deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of U.S. forces pursuant to Reference (c).

4.6.9.2. Procure commercial transportation services (including lease of transportation assets) in accordance with applicable law as necessary to carry out the CDRUSTRANSCOM mission.

4.6.9.3. Request, on behalf of the Department of Defense, that the Department of Transportation provide government insurance or reinsurance for commercial transportation providers and supporting contractors up to the maximum extent authorized by applicable law. CDRUSTRANSCOM shall also be responsible for assisting the USD(C)/CFO to fulfill Department responsibilities in accordance with section 44305 of title 49, United States Code (Reference (m)), and section 9514 of Reference (b).

4.6.9.4. Provide common-user and commercial air, land, and sea transportation metrics to the DoD Components and Combatant Commanders.

4.6.10. Acquire supplies, equipment, items, and services necessary to accomplish the other missions of CDRUSTRANSCOM, including acquisition and management of Acquisition Category II and III programs related to distribution processes and information systems not otherwise provided or assigned under Reference (b) to other elements or organizations. Authority to manage acquisition programs at a greater level of investment (ACAT I and ACAT IAM) will be granted upon the USD(AT&L)'s determination that the necessary organizational, oversight and policy constructs are in place to support ACAT I and ACAT IAM programs.

4.6.11. Control the TWCF, subject to instructions issued by the USD(C)/CFO.

4.6.12. Serve as the DoD single manager for Operational Support Airlift assets, exercising scheduling authority and control of all passenger-carrying administrative aircraft unless specifically assigned to a theater Combatant Command by the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with DoD Directive 4500.43 (Reference (n)).

4.6.13. Serve as the Mobility Joint Force Provider and in this capacity:

4.6.13.1. Identify and recommend, in coordination with the Military Departments and other Combatant Commanders, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, global joint mobility sourcing solutions from all mobility forces and capabilities in accordance with Reference (c).

4.6.13.2. Supervise implementation of sourcing decisions in accordance with Reference (c).

4.6.13.3. Monitor readiness of global mobility capabilities and maintain readiness of strategic mobility capabilities in accordance with the Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept – Initial Capabilities Document (Reference (o)).

4.6.14. Serve as the DoD single manager for patient movement, providing global patient movement in coordination with the Geographic Combatant Commanders in accordance with Reference (c), DoD Directive 6000.12, and DoD Instruction 6000.11 (References (p) and (q)).

4.6.15. Serve as the DoD DPO pursuant to Reference (c), and in this capacity oversee the overall effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment of DoD-wide distribution activities, including force projection, sustainment, and redeployment/retrograde operations.

4.6.16. Serve as the DPfM Manager to include managing the information technology of the distribution portfolio in collaboration with the JDDE COI, and in accordance with DoD Directive 8320.2 (Reference (r)).

4.6.17. Submit for approval and implementation in the appropriate DoD issuances, as necessary, to the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, any recommended changes to transportation, fiscal, procurement, or other DoD policies that may be appropriate to implement this Directive.

*DoDD 5158.04, July 27, 2007*

5. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective immediately.



Gordon England

Enclosures -2

- E1. References, continued
- E2. Definitions



*DoDD 5158.04, July 27, 2007*

E1. ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES, continued

- (e) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness and Director for Logistics Joint Memorandum, "Management of the Distribution Systems Portfolio: Sustainment and Force Movement," July 28, 2004 (hereby canceled)
- (f) DoD Directive 4500.9E, "Transportation and Traffic Management," February 12, 2005
- (g) DoD Directive 5134.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L))," December 9, 2005
- (h) Strategic Planning Guidance<sup>2</sup>
- (i) DoD Directive 5105.22, "Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)," May 17, 2006
- (j) Joint Staff Manual 5100.01B, "Organizations and Functions of the Joint Staff," June 20, 2001
- (k) DoD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components," August 1, 2002
- (l) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Forces For Unified Commands," current edition<sup>3</sup>
- (m) Section 44305 of title 49, United States Code
- (n) DoD Directive 4500.43, "Operational Support Airlift (OSA)," October 28, 1996
- (o) Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept - Initial Capabilities Document, August 17, 2006<sup>4</sup>
- (p) DoD Directive 6000.12, "Health Services Operations and Readiness," April 29, 1996
- (q) DoD Instruction 6000.11, "Patient Movement," September 9, 1998
- (r) DoD Directive 8320.2, "Data Sharing in a Net-Centric Department of Defense," December 2, 2004
- (s) Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept Version 1.0, February 7, 2006<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Request this reference by sending an email to [atl.lmr@osd.mil](mailto:atl.lmr@osd.mil)

<sup>3</sup> Request this reference by sending an email to [atl.lmr@osd.mil](mailto:atl.lmr@osd.mil)

<sup>4</sup> Request this reference by sending an email to [atl.lmr@osd.mil](mailto:atl.lmr@osd.mil)

<sup>5</sup> Request this reference by sending an email to [atl.lmr@osd.mil](mailto:atl.lmr@osd.mil)

ENCLOSURE 1

*DoDD 5158.04, July 27, 2007*

E2. ENCLOSURE 2

DEFINITIONS

E2.1. Defense Logistics Executive (DLE). The DLE has overall responsibility for improving and maintaining the Defense Logistics and Global Supply Chain Management System. The DLE has authority to make changes necessary to integrate the global supply chain. The DLE shall be advised by a Defense Logistics Board in a manner analogous to the advice provided the Defense Acquisition Executive by the Defense Acquisition Board. In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DLE shall prepare any DoD Issuances or decision memorandums and suggest legislative changes.

E2.2. Distribution Process. The networks, relationships, and procedures used by the Department of Defense to control the flow and distribution of military forces and materiel between the point of receipt into the military system and the point of issue to using activities and units.

E2.3. Global Mobility Capability. Transportation assets, lines of communication, organizations, air, water, and land terminals, and other infrastructure required for movement of U.S. forces and their supplies at the strategic, operational, and tactical level.

E2.4. Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise Community of Interest (JDDE COI). The collaborative network of JDDE partner organizations sharing common distribution-related goals, interests, missions, and business processes which comprise end-to-end distribution in support of Combatant Commanders and/or Joint Force Commanders. See Appendix F of Reference (s) for JDDE composition, relationships, and control.

E2.5. Mobility Forces. Forces composed of ground, sea, or air military units or civilian or dedicated commercial capabilities; organized, trained, and equipped for common-user transportation and distribution operations to include command, control, movement management, materials handling, and terminal operations. Mobility forces are assigned to Combatant Commanders in accordance with References (c) and (l).

E2.6. Process Owner. The head of a DoD Component assigned a responsibility by the Secretary of Defense when process improvement involves more than one Military Service or DoD Component. The process owner has the responsibility for sustaining and improving processes, creating new processes where appropriate, and being accountable for their outcomes. Process owners advocate improvements for and across all DoD Components for effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment relevant to a particular process.

E2.7. Service-unique or theater-assigned transportation assets. Transportation assets that are assigned to:

E2.7.1. A Military Department for functions of the Secretaries of the Military Departments set forth in sections 3013(b), 5013(b), and 8013(b) of Reference (b), including administrative functions (such as motor pools), intelligence functions, training functions, and maintenance functions.

ENCLOSURE 2

## APPENDIX 20

*DoDD 5158.04, July 27, 2007*

E2.7.2. The Department of the Army for the execution of the missions of the Army Corps of Engineers or, prior to the initial discharge of cargo, Army afloat pre-positioned ships.

E2.7.3. The Department of the Navy as:

E2.7.3.1. The special mission support force of missile range instrumentation ships, ocean survey ships, cable ships, oceanographic research ships, acoustic research ships, and naval test support ships.

E2.7.3.2. The naval fleet auxiliary force of fleet ammunition ships, submarine surveillance ships, fleet stores ships, fleet ocean tugs, submarine ballistic missile support ships, and fleet oilers.

E2.7.3.3. Hospital ships.

E2.7.3.4. Marine Corps intermediate maintenance activity ships.

E2.7.3.5. Marine Corps helicopter support to senior Federal officials.

E2.7.3.6. Maritime pre-positioning ships prior to initial discharge of cargo.

E2.7.4. The Department of the Air Force for search and rescue, weather reconnaissance, or, prior to the initial discharge of cargo, Air Force afloat pre-positioned ships; or

E2.7.5. Assigned in Reference (l) to a Commander of a Combatant Command (including the Special Operations Command) other than the CDRUSTRANSCOM.

ENCLOSURE 2



# Department of Defense INSTRUCTION

NUMBER 5158.06

July 30, 2007

USD(AT&amp;L)

SUBJECT: Distribution Process Owner (DPO)

- References:
- (a) Unified Command Plan (UCP), current edition<sup>1</sup>
  - (b) DoD Directive 5158.04, "United States Transportation Command," July 27, 2007
  - (c) Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept – Initial Capabilities Document, August 17, 2006<sup>2</sup>
  - (d) Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept, Version 1.0, February 7, 2006<sup>3</sup>
  - (e) through (n), see Enclosure 1

## 1. PURPOSE

This Instruction:

1.1. Implements policy for overseeing, coordinating, and synchronizing the DoD-wide distribution processes, including force projection, sustainment, and redeployment/retrograde operations, in accordance with the responsibilities and authorities stated in References (a) through (c).

1.2. Specifies the functional responsibilities of the DPO, and outlines the interface with the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE). Pursuant to Reference (a), the Commander, United States Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM), is assigned the responsibility to serve as the DPO for the Department of Defense.

## 2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

2.1. This Instruction applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense

<sup>1</sup> Request this reference by sending an email to [atl.lmr@osd.mil](mailto:atl.lmr@osd.mil)

<sup>2</sup> Request this reference by sending an email to [atl.lmr@osd.mil](mailto:atl.lmr@osd.mil)

<sup>3</sup> Request this reference by sending an email to [atl.lmr@osd.mil](mailto:atl.lmr@osd.mil)

Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components"). The term "Military Services," as used herein, refers to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.

2.2. In the event of any conflict between this Instruction and existing DoD distribution-related issuances, other than DoD Directives, this Instruction governs. Such instances shall be identified to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) for appropriate action, as required.

### 3. DEFINITIONS

3.1. End-to-End. The boundaries of the JDDE applicable to force deployment and movement of materiel to support the operational requirements of a Combatant Commander and/or Joint Force Commander. Force deployment boundaries originate at unit origin or home station and terminate when units are located at their Combatant Commander and/or Joint Force Commander designated point of need. Inclusive are intra-continental, inter-theater, intra-theater movement, and reception/assembly activities, as required. Materiel movement commences at the source of supply and terminates with commodity receipt by the consuming unit, in accordance with the Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint Integrating Concept, Version 1 (Reference (d)).

3.2. Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE). The complex of equipment, procedures, doctrine, leaders, technical connectivity, information, shared knowledge, organizations, facilities, training, and materiel necessary to conduct joint distribution operations in accordance with Reference (d).

3.3. JDDE Community of Interest (COI). The collaborative network of JDDE partner organizations, to include DoD Components, sharing common distribution-related goals, interests, missions, and business processes, which comprise end-to-end distribution, in support of Combatant Commanders and/or Joint Force Commanders, pursuant to Reference (c).

3.4. Process Owner. The Head of a DoD Component assigned a responsibility by the Secretary of Defense when process improvement involves more than one DoD Component. The process owner has the responsibility for coordinating, sustaining, and improving processes; coordinating the creation of new processes, where appropriate; and being accountable for their outcomes. Process owners advocate improvements for and across all DoD Components for effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment relevant to a particular process.

### 4. POLICY

4.1. It is DoD policy to achieve effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment of DoD-wide distribution activities, including force projection, sustainment, and redeployment/retrograde operations.

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4.2. When distribution process improvements involve more than one Military Department or other DoD Component, the Secretary of Defense may designate a DPO with responsibility for coordinating, sustaining, and improving processes, coordinating the creation of new distribution processes, where appropriate, and being accountable for distribution process outcomes. The CDRUSTRANSCOM, designated as the DPO, advocates improvements for and across all DoD Components for effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment that are relevant to a particular distribution process pursuant to Reference (b) and DoD Directive 4500.9E (Reference (e)).

## 5. RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1. The USD(AT&L) is the principal assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters relating to logistics, including, as the Defense Logistics Executive (DLE), the Defense Logistics and Global Supply Chain Management System, and shall oversee the implementation of distribution process changes and publish DoD issuances for distribution process improvements. The DPO collaborates with the JDDE COI to reach agreements on distribution process matters under this Instruction. In the event the DPO is unable to obtain complete agreement of the JDDE COI on a distribution process issue, the issue must be presented to the DLE for resolution.

5.2. The Director, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), shall:

5.2.1. Support JDDE integration and capabilities development through active participation in the JDDE COI in accordance with Reference (c).

5.2.2. Identify distribution-related process improvements, including changes to doctrine, procedures, policy, and systems and provide them to DPO for consideration and action.

5.2.3. Provide materiel management expertise and guidance when identifying, evaluating, and prioritizing potential improvements to joint deployment and distribution processes.

5.2.4. Provide the DPO recommendations that will improve the ability of the DoD distribution system to deliver sustainment to customers in accordance with Reference (c).

5.2.5. Provide joint materiel management process training and doctrine assistance in accordance with Reference (c).

5.2.6. Direct the Defense Logistics Management Standards Office, as the designated DoD Executive Agent, in accordance with DoD Directive 8190.1 (Reference (f)), for exercising configuration control over Defense Logistics Management Standards, to closely coordinate with CDRUSTRANSCOM to ensure smooth and seamless supply chain operations at interfaces between their respective areas of responsibility.

5.3. The Heads of DoD Components shall:

5.3.1. Support JDDE integration and capabilities development through active participation in the JDDE COI in accordance with Reference (c).

5.3.2. Propose and prioritize changes to global distribution processes and forward them to the DPO for consideration and action in agreement with Reference (c).

5.3.3. Implement Secretary of Defense, DLE and DPO-approved changes to distribution processes and develop supporting processes for these changes.

5.3.4. Assist and coordinate with the DPO on distribution process concept development, process improvements, technological innovation, systems integration, assessments, and testing in accordance with Reference (c).

5.3.5. Provide recommendations to the DPO that will improve the ability of the DoD distribution system to deliver sustainment to customers in accordance with Reference (c).

5.3.6. Conduct and provide the results of evaluations of distribution process and systems effectiveness during exercises, experiments, and operations, and provide recommendations for retention, modification, or retirement of systems that interface with distribution systems to the DPO and JDDE COI in accordance with Reference (c).

5.3.7. Identify and advocate force projection, sustainment, and redeployment/retrograde operations process improvement changes to the DPO and the JDDE COI and any other appropriate DoD governance body.

5.3.8. Identify technology improvements supporting force projection, sustainment, and redeployment/retrograde process requirements through the JDDE COI and the appropriate DoD governance bodies.

5.3.9. Coordinate and implement approved distribution process changes and develop supporting processes for those changes in accordance with Reference (c).

5.4. The CDRUSTRANSCOM, as the DPO, shall:

5.4.1. Oversee the overall effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment of DoD-wide distribution activities, including force projection, sustainment, and redeployment/retrograde operations consistent with References (b) and (e).

5.4.2. Establish the concepts and operational frameworks relating to the planning and execution of DoD transportation operations consistent with Reference (b).

5.4.3. Develop and implement distribution process improvements that enhance the Defense Logistics and Global Supply Chain Management System in accordance with Reference (a).

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5.4.4. Establish, monitor, and improve distribution relationships with the Combatant Commands, the Joint Task Force Commanders, the DLA, General Services Administration, and the Military Services to ensure integration of distribution improvement efforts and performance standards in accordance with Reference (b). Establish a JDDE COI to develop, review, coordinate, and implement JDDE capabilities, including data visibility requirements in accordance with Reference (c), to:

5.4.4.1. Identify and coordinate joint distribution processes, materiel management, and force movement improvement efforts and initiatives to ensure efforts are integrated and complementary.

5.4.4.2. Assist with process improvement studies, analyses, recommendations, and implementation relevant to distribution.

5.4.4.3. Assist with developing distribution training and doctrine, as necessary.

5.4.4.4. In coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM), as the Joint Deployment Process Owner (JDPO), provide regular updates to the Joint Planning and Execution Community on the status of joint deployment and distribution process improvement initiatives to synchronize efforts of the community in accordance with DoD Directive 5158.5 (Reference (g)).

5.4.5. Serve as the DoD single coordination and synchronization element on behalf of and in coordination with the JDDE COI, in accordance with Reference (c), to:

5.4.5.1. Employ necessary knowledge management/decision support tools to enable JDDE COI information sharing and staffing in accordance with Reference (c).

5.4.5.2. Develop, coordinate, review, and take maintenance actions necessary to integrate the JDDE, including making policy recommendations to OSD, with respect to Directives, Instructions, and Decision Memorandums, and issue other distribution-related guidance in accordance with Reference (c).

5.4.5.3. Establish processes to plan, allocate, route, schedule, and validate Joint Force Commander deployment and distribution priorities, track movements, adjudicate constraints, and redirect forces and supplies to coordinate and synchronize joint distribution activities to meet Joint Force Commanders' needs in accordance with Reference (c).

5.4.5.4. Develop recommended DoD distribution technology investment priorities in accordance with Reference (c).

5.4.5.5. Define and document JDDE processes and business rules for joint distribution operations, to include operational, institutional, and financial processes, in accordance with Reference (c).



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5.4.5.6. Integrate JDDE processes by proposing recommendations for DoD policy, Directives, Instructions, and Decision Memorandums in accordance with Reference (c).

5.4.5.7. Establish and implement JDDE performance standards and metrics to monitor and improve the JDDE performance in accordance with Reference (c).

5.4.5.8. Serve as the lead functional proponent for Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) and related Automatic Identification Technology (AIT) implementation in the DoD supply chain, developing a centralized approach for the use of asset visibility technologies, to include satellite tracking and synchronization of DoD-wide implementations, in conjunction with the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration, and proposing changes to supply chain policies, to make use of AIT in accordance with the USD(AT&L) Memorandum (Reference (h)).

5.4.5.9. Define JDDE capability needs across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum and implement approved and funded DOTMLPF solutions required to meet JDDE capability needs (investment plans, infrastructure requirements, etc.) in accordance with Reference (c).

5.4.5.10. Advocate for the JDDE in all phases of the DoD planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process to ensure the JDDE attains the best mix of capabilities in accordance with Reference (c).

5.4.5.11. Enhance the DoD global distribution system (Reference (a)) by engaging in innovative and transformational distribution-related research, including force projection, sustainment, and redeployment/retrograde related research, consistent with DoD Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) principles, policies, and funding, to include:

5.4.5.11.1. Establishing and prioritizing distribution-related RDT&E investments in collaboration with the JDDE COI.

5.4.5.11.2. Conducting technology demonstrations that promote joint interoperable processes within the JDDE COI, leveraging joint experimentation capabilities, as appropriate.

5.4.5.12. Develop, coordinate, review, and recommend a common scalable, theater-level joint deployment and distribution control capability to ensure full integration with joint distribution operations in accordance with Reference (c).

5.4.5.13. Develop, coordinate, and review objectives and mission templates for joint distribution exercises, as depicted in updated doctrine, and nominate them for entry into the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Training and Exercise Program in accordance with Reference (c).

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5.4.5.14. Identify and advocate, on behalf of the JDDE COI, recommendations for the incorporation of joint distribution operations into the joint professional military education curricula in accordance with Reference (c).

5.4.5.15. Identify and advocate, on behalf of the JDDE COI, joint billet requirements for distribution operations in accordance with (Reference (c)) and DoD Directive 1300.19, DoD Instruction 1430.10, and DoD Instruction 1430.12 (References (i) through (k)).

5.4.5.16. Recommend new or appropriate updates to existing Joint Publications.

5.4.5.17. Advocate Component Command and JDDE COI distribution-related acquisitions in order to ensure unity of effort, system interoperability, and uninterrupted visibility, and to implement distribution process improvements more rapidly.

5.4.6. Publish an annual update on the "State of the JDDE" as part of the annual USTRANSCOM report in accordance with Reference (c).

5.4.7. Serve as the DoD Distribution Portfolio Management (DPfM) Manager for that subset of logistics systems providing key capabilities in support of distribution-related (sustainment and force movement) activities in accordance with Reference (b), to include:

5.4.7.1. Improving the overall effectiveness, efficiency, and interoperability of capabilities and systems in the distribution portfolio in accordance with Reference (b).

5.4.7.2. Developing a sub-portfolio management process for distribution and force movement systems to include resource requirements, goals, objectives, and responsibilities, and identifying systems of primary concern for inclusion in the sub-portfolio in accordance with Reference (b).

5.4.7.3. Developing a change management plan and Information Technology (IT) transition plan in accordance with Reference (b).

5.4.7.4. Identifying and recommending improvements to systems with important interoperability and data requirements for the sustainment and the force movement portfolio, but outside the scope of distribution as defined in DoD publications, in accordance with Reference (b).

5.4.7.5. Developing appropriate processes and procedures for liaison and coordination with systems owners to influence synchronization of portfolio systems across the DoD in accordance with Reference (b).

5.4.7.6. Ensuring that distribution and distribution-related IT systems are aligned and integrated with DoD Enterprise Architecture and DoD priorities in accordance with Reference (b).

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5.4.7.7. Establishing and managing deployment and distribution-related data management processes, a data strategy, data capture requirements, and data use standards, ensuring access to deployment, distribution and sustainment data, and developing a dynamic data capability, in accordance with Reference (c).

5.4.7.8. Establishing deployment and distribution-related IT standards, data standards (including those in support of asset and in-transit visibility), shipping standards, enterprise performance standards, and metrics, in accordance with Reference (c).

5.4.7.9. Incorporating RFID and related AIT into DoD's Joint Deployment and Distribution Architecture (JDDA) and overseeing data quality and performance using the portfolio management methodology under Defense Business Systems Management Committee oversight in accordance with Reference (h).

5.4.7.10. Conducting, coordinating, and/or participating in appropriate analyses and providing recommendations for retention, modification, or retirement of distribution systems currently supporting the joint deployment and redeployment process in accordance with Reference (g).

5.4.7.11. Collecting and coordinating appropriate processes, systems, and technical information needed to build and maintain the integrated JDDA for the Department of Defense. The DPO is also responsible for managing the JDDA in collaboration with the JDDE COI and will ensure that the JDDA complies with the DoD Business Enterprise Architecture (Reference (g)).

5.4.7.12. Responsibility for configuration control over the subset of DLMS related to distribution procedures, data, transaction formats, and business rules.

5.4.8. Serve as the DoD single manager for patient movement, providing global patient movement in coordination with the Geographic Combatant Commanders in accordance with Reference (a), DoD Directive 6000.12, and DoD Instruction 6000.11 (References (l) and (m), respectively).

5.4.8.1. Providing DoD global patient movement, in coordination with geographic combatant commands, through the Defense Transportation System in accordance with Reference (a).

5.4.8.2. Overseeing patient movement between geographic combatant commands, with the approval of the Combatant Commander of the destination theater, or within the continental United States during contingency operations in accordance with References (l) and (m).

5.4.8.3. Providing standardized patient movement procedures and information support systems and maintaining the Global Patient Movement Requirements Center in accordance with References (l) and (m).

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5.4.9. Coordinate the return of human remains, in accordance with Military Services' requirements and protocol.

5.5. The CDRUSJFCOM, as the JDPO, in accordance with Reference (g), shall:

5.5.1. Support JDDE integration and capabilities development through active participation in the JDDE COI in accordance with Reference (c).

5.5.2. Conduct activities to develop, coordinate, review, and maintain deployment capabilities that are integrated with overall JDDE capabilities in accordance with Reference (c).

5.5.3. Coordinate and review doctrine for joint distribution operations in accordance with Reference (c).

5.5.4. Coordinate and review JDDE operations training programs in accordance with Reference (c).

5.5.5. Coordinate and identify distribution-related deployment/redeployment process improvements, including changes to doctrine, procedures, policy, and systems, and provide them to the DPO for consideration and action.

5.5.6. Provide force deployment/redeployment expertise and guidance when identifying, evaluating, and prioritizing potential improvements to joint deployment and distribution processes.

5.5.7. Develop joint deployment/redeployment process training and doctrine in accordance with Reference (k).

## 6. PROCEDURES

The DoD JDDE COI will approach management, execution, and improvement of distribution-related processes collaboratively.

### 6.1. DPO Governance Structure

6.1.1. The DPO shall coordinate and collaborate with the JDDE COI to establish a structure of governance bodies that meet regularly to develop, analyze, coordinate, and prioritize distribution-related and force projection, sustainment, and redeployment/retrograde operations improvement recommendations and business processes and rules for JDDE operations, including operational, institutional, and financial processes in accordance with Reference (c).

6.1.2. The DPO governance structure shall incorporate hierarchical working groups and general/flag officer review forums to vet distribution process improvement ideas, identify distribution capability gaps, prioritize JDDE capability and RDT&E investments, and coordinate the implementation of distribution process improvement initiatives. The governance structure

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may charter teams to conduct Capabilities-Based Assessments in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E (Reference (n)), referred to as Capabilities-Based Assessment Teams, or CBATs, with specific objectives to conduct research and analyses, and to make recommendations on distribution process improvements.

6.1.3. Membership in the various bodies of the DPO governance structure will include appropriate representation from the JDDE COI to include: the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Services, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, the CDRUSJFCOM as the JDPO, the USTRANSCOM and its Component Commands (Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, Military Sealift Command, and Air Mobility Command), and the DLA, in accordance with Reference (c).

6.1.4. The CDRUSTRANSCOM, as the DPO, shall team with the JDDE COI to lead and facilitate CBATs that recommend improvements to distribution processes for the warfighter. CBATs will perform detailed operational, technical, and financial analyses of distribution processes and IT focus areas that will be prioritized by the JDDE COI. The CBATs will compile their analytical results into Business Case Analyses, which are then presented to the DPO and DoD governance forums for consideration (e.g., the OSD Investment Review Board).

6.2. Partnerships and Relationships. The CDRUSTRANSCOM shall establish partnerships within the JDDE COI to develop global distribution solutions for the warfighter. The DPO governance structure will consolidate warfighters' distribution requirements and coordinate long range planning with the JDDE COI to achieve unity of effort and faster improvements within the distribution segment of the DoD global supply chain. The CDRUSTRANSCOM shall also co-chair with the JDPO a semi-annual Joint Deployment and Distribution Conference to update the Joint Planning and Execution Community in accordance with Reference (g).

### 6.3. Distribution Process Analysis

6.3.1. The CDRUSTRANSCOM shall establish and maintain the Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center (JDPAC) as an in-house resource, to provide analysis and engineering support to improve the JDDE COI's ability to move and sustain the Joint Force.

6.3.2. The CDRUSTRANSCOM shall operate the JDPAC in direct support of his responsibilities as the DPO to synchronize the collective capabilities of the JDDE COI.

6.4. Distribution Financial Management. The DPO will obtain funding, in coordination with the JDDE COI, to pursue collaborative research and development projects having joint distribution improvement potential.

6.5. RDT&E. RDT&E activities, as coordinated with the JDDE COI, shall support the following objectives:

6.5.1. Transform global deployment and distribution-related capabilities.

6.5.2. Explore opportunities for, and promote the development and transition of, joint interoperable distribution-related technology solutions.

6.5.3. Leverage the DPO governance structure to exchange information regarding JDDE COI RDT&E projects in order to avoid unnecessary duplication, reduce costs, and ensure a transition strategy for proven technologies.

6.5.4. Maintain a continuity of effort directed toward transformational solutions for validated distribution capability gaps.

6.5.5. Achieve timely improvements in distribution-related systems and processes by incorporating relevant advances in technology.

6.6. DPfM

6.6.1. The DPfM Manager shall use DPO governance structures (and business-mission-area or warfighter-mission-area governance structures, as applicable), to pursue distribution process improvements through a transparent, repeatable process that facilitates making capabilities-based decisions on whether to develop, modify, or merge distribution or distribution-related IT systems.

6.6.2. The DPfM Manager shall conduct periodic execution reviews of programs that support distribution (sustainment and force movement) related activities, focusing on cost, performance, and schedule to monitor execution of transition plans.

6.6.3. The DPfM Manager shall monitor and advise with respect to the deliverables, budget, and schedule of programs that support distribution, while Program Executive Officers and Program Managers shall retain the proper execution responsibilities within established chains of commands.


6.6.4. The DPO is responsible for the Joint Distribution Architecture. The JDPO is responsible for the Joint Deployment Enterprise Architecture. Other members of the JDDE COI are responsible for their respective distribution architectures. Collectively, both by merger and by alignment, the resulting architecture is the JDDA. The JDDA provides the operational, systems, and technical foundation for DPfM. The JDDA optimizes processes by eliminating gaps, seams, and redundancies based on risk tolerance levels, potential returns, outcome goals, and performance for the warfighter.

## APPENDIX 21

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### 7. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Instruction is effective immediately.



*for* Kenneth J. Krieg  
Under Secretary of Defense  
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

Enclosures – 1

E1. References, continued

## APPENDIX 21

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### E1. ENCLOSURE 1

#### REFERENCES, continued

- (e) DoD Directive 4500.9E, "Transportation and Traffic Management," current edition
- (f) DoD Directive 8190.1, "DoD Logistics Use of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) Standards," May 5, 2000
- (g) DoD Directive 5158.5, "Joint Deployment Process Owner," November 12, 2001
- (h) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Memorandum, "Lead Proponent for RFID and AIT," September 26, 2006<sup>4</sup>
- (i) DoD Directive 1300.19, "DoD Joint Officer Management Program," September 9, 1997
- (j) DoD Instruction 1430.10, "Civilian Career Program Publications," June 22, 1981
- (k) DoD Instruction 1430.12, "Logistics Civilian Career Management Program," September 14, 1982
- (l) DoD Directive 6000.12, "Health Services Operations and Readiness," April 29, 1996
- (m) DoD Instruction 6000.11, "Patient Movement," September 9, 1998
- (n) CJCSI 3170.01E, "Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System," May 11, 2005

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<sup>4</sup> Request this reference by sending an email to [atl.lmr@osd.mil](mailto:atl.lmr@osd.mil)

ENCLOSURE 1



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## *Glossary*

AFB	Air Force Base
AMC	Air Mobility Command
CEO	chief executive officer
CINC	commander in chief
CINCLANT	Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COO	chief operating officer
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
DBOF	defense business operations fund
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOT	Department of Transportation
DPO	distribution process owner
FedEx	Federal Express
FSS	Fast Sealift Ship
FYDP	future years defense program
GTN	Global Transportation Network
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDA	Joint Deployment Agency
JS-J3	Director for Operations, the Joint Staff
JS-J4	Director for Logistics, the Joint Staff
LMSR	large medium speed roll-on/roll-off ship
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MARAD	Maritime Administration
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
MHE	materiel handling equipment
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSP	Maritime Security Program
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
NARF	Naval Air Rework Facility
NDTA	National Defense Transportation Association
RRF	Ready Reserve Force
SDDC	Surface Deployment and Distribution Command

TACC	Tanker Airlift Control Center
TCJ8	Program Analysis and Financial Management Directorate, USTRANSCOM
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TWCF	Transportation Working Capital Fund
UN	United Nations
UPS	United Parcel Service
USCINCTRANS	Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
UTC	unified transportation command
VISA	Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement

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